The literature and the NES data suggest that there has been a net gain in the public's ability to think about politics abstractly, and in terms of liberal and conservative ideologies. This gain has occurred despite the fact that other measures of political sophistication, such as knowledge of political facts, appear to have remained static, or to have declined slightly. The immediate reason for the increase in ideological awareness appears to be that more people have recognized the heuristic value of ideology as a criteria for their political decision making. More people now rely on ideology to obviate the search for additional political facts. Thus, the gains that have been made along one dimension of political sophistication have tended to come at the expense of the other two. Yet, because the ideological dimension is the most abstract of the three main dimensions of political sophistication, any improvement along this dimension must register as an improvement in the public's ability to think about politics abstractly, or in more "sophisticated" terms. As such, the increase in the number of ideological identifiers that has occurred over the last 40 years is the most important indicator that a change has occurred in the public's level of political sophistication.

Both the empirical data and the literature on political sophistication support the conclusion that, when compared with their Western European counterparts, most Americans continue to rank low in their level of political sophistication. Yet, over the last 40 years, the nature of their unsophistication  has clearly changed in ways that lead one to be more optimistic about their ability to attain higher levels of political sophistication. There is evidence in the literature and the data that over the last 40 years, more Americans rely on ideology as a criterion of political choice, and a decreasing number rely on such criteria such as party label or candidate likeability.

The Changing Ideological Distribution
The NES data surveyed in this study suggest that the core conclusions about the distribution of ideological thinking of mass publics are in need of important qualification. They specifically suggest that the nature of the public's ideological distribution has changed fundamentally over the last 40 years. The use of liberal or conservative heuristics to structure political thought is most characteristic of those at an intermediate level of political sophistication, among both elites and mass publics. By contrast, weakness of these heuristics and the prevalence of nonattitudes are more characteristic of mass publics. The capacity for synthesis, and the ability to reconcile conflicting liberal and conservative ideas to form a synthetic belief system, is more characteristic of a subset of highly knowledgeable elites. Understood in these terms, the distribution of polar ideological beliefs is curvilinear. Knowledge and use of these heuristics is largely absent at the lowest levels of political sophistication (mass publics), becomes more evident at an intermediate level of political sophistication (some elites and a very few party activists), and is again less evident at the highest levels of political sophistication (mainly elites, but increasingly some mass publics). Studies by Herzon(1980 ), Stimson(1975) Tetlock(1986 ) and others, support these conclusions.

Herzon's concept of multidimensionality and Tetlock's concept of integrative complexity parallel the concept of ideological synthesis, which is central to the 5s model.  Studies dealing with these concepts support the conclusion that a politically significant subset of elites are already able to think in integratively complex and multidimensional terms which subsume the polar ideologies of liberalism and conservatism. The key dynamics which appear to play the greatest role in elite's adoption of a synthetic mode of political conceptualization, as an alternative to the polar modes, include a number of well known psychological mechanisms, most of which are related to the cognitive dissonance literature. The prospects for the expansion of this class of "synthesists" is the basis for one of the most important implications of this study. Specifically, that a politically significant segment of the public has the capacity to reach the highest stage of political sophistication, or stage 5 of the 5s model.

In terms of the 5s model, the public's increased reliance on ideology as a heuristic, and the fact that more people are able to place themselves along the ideological continuum with some degree of accuracy, represents a significant improvement in the public's political sophistication. The public's level of political sophistication has registered a gain despite the fact that no corresponding improvements have occurred along the other two principal dimensions of political sophistication. Even a rudimentary grasp of what ideological labels stand for represents a distinct advantage. It has the effect of  reducing the "opportunity cost" of political information. The public's ability to employ ideology as a heuristic, although crude and inaccurate, increases its ability to efficiently deal with political information in a complex information environment. As the informational environment has grown more complex, a larger proportion of the population has resorted to the use of ideology as a heuristic. In terms of the 5s model, this change represents an increase in political sophistication. It specifically represents a movement from stage 2 of the 5s model to stage 3, among the less educated. This is the group which is most likely to be influenced by mass media. Among the more highly educated, there has been an increase in the numbers of people who are able to frame issues and interests in terms of abstract concepts associated with liberal and conservative ideologies. In terms of the 5s model, this represents a movement from stage 3 to stage 4. Hence, over the last 40 years there has been forward movement in political sophistication, as measured along the ideological dimension, at both mass and elite levels, even as there has been little discernible movement either forward or backward on the other two major dimensions of political sophistication.

One of the main indicators that the public's ability to employ ideology as a heuristic has increased over the last 40 years is the increase in the number of people who identify themselves as either liberals or conservatives. These "ideological identifiers" are able to make generally accurate use of ideological labels. At the lowest levels of conceptualization, people merely use ideological labels without a deeper understanding of the principles which these labels represent. But even this represents an advance in the public's political sophistication. The use of  ideological labels as a heuristic serves to move people from a blind commitment to parties and candidates to a category of decision making which is based on more abstract considerations. The ability to employ ideology as a heuristic involves the ability to apply certain generalizations in the absence of having more specific information. As such, ideology obviates the need for more extensive concrete information. Because most people rely on ideology as a heuristic, it is often used inaccurately in specific cases. Yet, ideology remains a generally accurate means by which people can determine where their interests lie in a broader political context. Even employing the term loosely and inaccurately, as most people do, ideology is a vehicle which can help to move people in the direction of greater sophistication.

The literature on political sophistication and the NES data suggest the major causes for this shift from less abstract to more abstract criteria have to do with media influences, and rising levels of education. Media influences stand out as the main contributor to increased awareness of ideological labels among the less educated. Hence, the conclusion remains intact that the public has become more politically sophisticated, even as its knowledge of political facts has not changed. In terms of its ideological distribution, the American electorate is beginning to more closely resemble the electorate of certain Western European countries, most notably, the Netherlands.

One would naturally expect the increase of ideological identifiers to result in a public which is increasingly divided along ideological lines, or increasingly polarized. That such polarization has occurred is evidenced by a Republican party which has become more homogeneously conservative and by a Democratic party which has become more homogeneously liberal over the last 40 years. While some may read this increasing level of polarization as a distinctively negative development, in terms of the 5s model, the public's increasing polarization along ideological lines represents a clear sign of progress. Specifically, increasing ideological polarization of the electorate is an indication of the fact that more people have progressed from stage 2 to stage 3, and from 3 to stage 4 of the 5s model. Simultaneously, and mainly as a consequence of the effects of higher education, the potential for elites to occupy the highest level of political sophistication (stage 5) will also have increased, simply by virtue of an increase in the numbers who occupy stages 4.

Thus, different forces are more responsible for changes in levels of political sophistication among mass publics and elites. On the other major dimensions of political sophistication, such as knowledge of political facts, and knowledge of issues, the "sophistication gap" between elites and mass publics appears to have grown larger, even as the gap in their ideological awareness has apparently narrowed over the last 40 years. Despite signs that ideological awareness is more widespread among both elites and mass publics than 40 years ago, it is likely that attaining the highest level of political sophistication will continue to prove an elusive goal for both groups, over the near term. Reaching the final stage of political sophistication involves the ability to synthesize all points along the ideological continuum so that the individual holds perfectly consistent, complementary, and mutually reinforcing views which span the ideological spectrum from left to right. In terms of mental processes at work, reaching ideological synthesis requires that the individual subjectively experience and resolve many of  the major ideological conflicts which occur at the mass level. Thus, the mental processes which lead to synthesis at the individual level are a microcosm of what is now happening at the mass level.

Increases in political sophistication have manifested themselves differently at the mass and elite levels. At the elite level, the public has become more sophisticated by virtue of being more ideologically and issue aware (Eldersveld and Walton, 2000). Also, more are employed in politically impinged professions (Luskin, 1987). Education, media, and public sector employment emerge as the three main categories of variables which appear to have been most responsible for increasing levels of ideological identification at the elite level. In the degree that public sector employment conduces to rationality of thought, it would seem to have significant potential as a force for synthesis. Thus, employment in the public sector and the educational requirements which are typically required for such employment may constitute a powerful force for the emergence of synthesists. To some extent, even a particular class of academics (Mannheim, 1936), may prove to be the vanguard of rational-synthesists who are largely able to transcend polar ideological thinking.  Correspondingly, a select group of academics and high GS grade public employees can expected to be among the first groups to reach stage 5 of the of the 5s model.

The phenomenon of ideological polarization of the parties offers additional inferential support for the hypothesis that the political sophistication of the American electorate has increased along the key dimension of ideology. Polarization of the parties can also be interpreted as a consequence of the fact that, in the current political environment, people who have more well developed political views tend to organize their views along either either liberal or conservative lines. Whereas, moderates tend to have less well developed political ideas. People who have more extreme attitudes also tend to have a greater motivation to participate in politics. Naturally, people with such motivations tend to be come concentrated in the party which most closely reflects their their more extreme views.

Prior to the emergence of synthesis as a significant political alternative, liberalism and conservatism are the only major conceptual frameworks available for people to organize their political thoughts to form coherent ideologies. The fact that these ideologies are suboptimal means of determining the public interest is not a consideration for most people. Most people approach these ideologies from the standpoint that what is best for them personally is also best for society as a whole. Hence, the tendency for society to become bifurcated along lines of liberal and conservative ideologies. The process of forming an ideological identity based mainly upon considerations of self interest doesn't mean that people don't have a concern for the general welfare. Rather, their judgment about the general welfare tends to be distorted by their considerations of self interest. Consequently, people will tend to resort to suboptimal ideologies (like liberalism and conservatism) which seem more likely to serve their interests over the short term, even though such ideologies tend to impose long term consequences on society which will eventually come back to impose costs on them personally.

People rationalize their choice of ideologies by professing to believe that what is best for them personally over the short term is also best for the nation over the longer term. But, over the longer term, increasing ideological polarization ultimately increases the prospects of synthesis. For presumably, as a direct result of passing through the polarization stages (stages 3 and 4) of the 5s model, more people will begin to realize that the comprehensive truth about society tends to be random, incoherent, and does not neatly conform to the black and white view of the world depicted by either liberalism or conservatism. That is, the truth about human society does not consistently favor either liberals or conservatives. The truth about human society is more likely to fall at different places along the ideological spectrum on different issues.

A further set of conclusions can be drawn from the literature. First, at the elite level, higher levels of education have contributed to the public's ability to understand ideology. Mainly by virtue of their educational experiences, more people are now able to correctly provide specific issue content or correctly match the correct ideological tag to particular issues than was the case 40 years ago. For instance, more people now know that environmental protection is more closely associated with being "liberal" and that being in favor of nuclear power is more closely associated with being  pro business, and hence, conservative. The main problem that the public faces in reaching higher stages of political sophistication lies in its ability to form deeper synthetic convictions, or those which dictate a breach of ideological boundaries. As an example of a "synthetic dyad" one might be in favor of nuclear energy because nuclear energy is cleaner than burning fossil fuels for power generation; or one might be in favor of certain social welfare measures as a deterrent to crime, and so forth. In other words, because the public has come to rely on ideological labels to define its own political interests, it will be inhibited in some degree from reaching synthesis.  Achieving such synthesis requires crossing ideological boundaries freely. For instance, the public will be initially inhibited from holding a policy associated with the left which has a logical complement on the political right and vice versa. The ability to perform ideological synthesis represents the remaining great leap forward in political consciousness which the American people have yet to take, and which even the majority of political elites have been reluctant to take for the obvious reason that their strongest supporters continue to have strong ideological loyalties.

Despite the fact that political elites are able to make the conceptual leap which synthesis requires, most are inhibited by considerations of political self interest. In the current polarized political environment, it is often difficult for politicians to find out how defending policy initiatives grounded in ideological synthesis can serve their interests. Thus, ideological synthesis is likely to remain a step which both elites and mass publics will prove reluctant to take, not because they are incapable of performing synthesis conceptually, but because of a key moral failure which most individuals experience when they are forced to choose between a strategy designed to maximize their own self interest over the short term, versus a strategy which results in a more distant and uncertain payoff for the general interest over the longer term.

Propositions from the Literature and the Data
A number of propositions logically follow from the literature and the data.
1)Over the last 30 years, more Americans have come to rely on ideology as a heuristic device.
2)Ideology allows people to make highly abbreviated judgments about which policies and political actors are most likely to serve their own interests.
3)A growing proportion of Americans have come to define their interests in terms of ideology.
4)As a result of more people defining their interests in ideological terms, Americans have become more ideologically polarized.
5)The increased reliance on ideology as a criterion of political choice has come at the expense of more concrete criteria, such as party label.
6)A combination of factors have contributed to the increasing proportion of ideological identifiers. These factors include higher education, public sector employment, and media influences.
7)Depending primarily on their level of education, people will be differentially impacted by mass media influences.
8)Those who hold ideological identifications which are primarily the result of media influences will tend to occupy one stage of political sophistication (stage 3 of the 5s model).
9)Those who hold ideological identifications which are primarily the result of educational influences will tend to occupy another stage of political sophistication (stage 4 of the 5s model).

In terms of the 5s model, a number of conclusions can be deduced from the propositions above. Specifically, from propositions 7, 8, and 9, movement from stage 2 to stage 3 of the 5s model can be deduced for individuals with little or no college education. For those with college education, movement from stage 3 to stage 4 can be deduced. College education has been shown to influence ideological identifications in ways that that mass media have not. The resulting political attitudes tend to be more stable and are more cognitively based than those which result more from mass media influences. The college educated exhibit a greater understanding of the actual concepts which liberal and conservative labels represent. By contrast, those who arrive at their ideological identifications as a result of mass media influences have less understanding of the abstract principles which these labels represent. Nonetheless, mass media do typically provide individuals with enough information to determine which ideological label is most closely associated with which party, and which party is most likely to further their interests, particularly their economic interests.

A number of additional propositions and conclusions can be postulated at this point. Belief systems among mass publics remain superficial. But, there are more superficial elements which comprise the political beliefs of mass publics because there are more environmental stimuli at work on their development. There is more information flowing through media channels (albeit low quality information) which can be reasonably expected to influence the public's level of political sophistication. In the normal course of their political experience, most people are not able to make the more complex connections which a high degree of "ideological sophistication" requires. More well thought out and well organized belief systems, or those which are organized along lines of liberal or conservative principles, (or some other set of organizing principles) are still more characteristic of elites. But, in the case of the growing number of single issue activists especially, there is a tendency to grasp an intuitive, practical understanding of ideology.  Most issue group activists form their views as a result of some preexisting sentiment or global affect which occurs in the absence of extensive knowledge about an issue. For instance, early in their careers, environmental activists learn that they should be generally friendly to a variety of causes on the political left, most conspicuously, the anti-nuclear movement. Without ever investigating the issue carefully, these activists accept the argument that nuclear power is bad for the environment. In effect, they come to hold "de facto" belief systems which qualify as ideologies simply by virtue of having a  an opinion across many different issues which happens to coincide with the underlying normative ethos of liberalism or conservatism. The belief systems of these activists do not rest firmly on factual knowledge gained from intensive study of the issues. Rather, their belief systems rest on popular perceptions which are filtered through the media. Media influences are commonly the main operating mechanism which lead to the formation of ideologies among the new wave of ideological identifiers.

Admittedly, at this stage, most of the new wave which claim to be either liberals or conservatives are merely employing ideological labels as a heuristic, and have little knowledge or appreciation of ideology at the level of abstract principles. But, it is important to note that largely with the help of media influences, vastly more people are able to locate their interests in proximity to one or the other ideology. This is all that most people need to use ideological labels as a heuristic means of defining their interests. The use of ideological labels as a heuristic marks a great improvement over using candidate likeability or party label as criteria for political choice. In short, it marks a more "sophisticated" means of defining social, economic, and political interests. It remains to be seen if and when the American people can rise to the conceptual and moral challenges which ideological synthesis requires. Ultimately, the future of  our democracy may depend on the American public's ability to reach the pinnacle of political sophistication. Considering the host of challenges which our nation is going to face in the coming century, institutional and legislative gridlock of a polarized political system dominated by liberal Democrats and conservative Republicans is not a particularly encouraging option.

Political Implications of the Changing Ideological Distribution
There are sufficient reasons in the literature for believing that the aggregations of voters who make their political decisions primarily by reference to ideological considerations will continue to gain strength and will eventually eclipse those who rely on such criteria as party label or candidate likeability as the primary determinants of their political choices. As a consequence, the size and strength of the poles can be expected to grow in relation to, and at the expense of, the ideological center. Under circumstances of intensified polarization, the fulcrum of power will tend to shift away from the center and towards the pole which is most powerful at a particular point in time. As the relative strength of the center shifts to one of the poles, election outcomes become more critically dependent on maintaining a state of equilibrium between the poles. The great significance of increasingly strong ideological poles lies in their potential to create states of disequilibrium which can determine election outcomes. But, to the extent that the left and the right are roughly in balance with one another, it could make for a period of very high political stability.

The more evenly divided the ideological middle is, the more leverage is given to the poles. As long as the aggregations on right and left remain roughly equal in strength, and as long as the center remains evenly divided on candidates, issues, and ideology, election outcomes will tend to be close. But, if one of the poles temporarily falls out of favor, due to transient economic or geopolitical events, in view of the more inert middle, it will tend to confer a decisive advantage to the other pole. This instability of the center, in combination with the polarized ends potentially translates into increasing volatility of political markets. Hence, the operation of "polar dynamics" also points to the possibility of a period of high temporal instability in the American electorate.

As for the place which moderates occupy in the ideological distribution, in terms of their levels of political sophistication, moderates likely fall into two groups. First, moderates include those who don't know enough about politics to hold strong ideological views. This is the group which tends to skew survey results to suggest that moderates are overall, less knowledgeable about politics than their polar counterparts. Alternatively, moderates include people whose political knowledge has reached the level at which it begins to undermine the legitimacy of the polar ideologies. Once people reach this point, their knowledge enables them to see flaws in the polar ideologies. This is also the point at which individuals begin to adopt a more eclectic outlook which tends to be a precursor of  synthesis.

For some people, ideological moderation results from experiencing serious doubts about their previously held polar ideological beliefs. Among this group, the very integrative complexity of their views tends to exert a moderating and synthesizing influence. Alternatively, some people can go directly from moderation (or ambivalence) to synthesis without ever having been deeply committed to one of the polar ideologies. Hence, there are good reasons for assigning both synthesists and moderates to the middle of the normal distribution model. Synthesists hold a wider variety of liberal and conservative views across many issues. Ideologically, these views tend to balance each other, or to cancel each other out so that one's ideologically identity becomes all but indiscernible vis a vis liberalism or conservatism. This is true despite the fact that the synthesist's views on any particular issue may be decidedly to the right or to the left of the ideological spectrum.

Implications of the Changing Ideological Distribution for Election Strategies
The changes that have been taking place in the ideological distribution of the electorate, such as ideological polarization, have important implications for the strategies which the major parties use to maximize their electoral support. Traditionally, the group of voters near the center of the ideological spectrum has been the most important factor determining the strategies which the major parties adopt to maximize their electoral support. The size of this "centrist" aggregation has meant that the major parties competed with one another mainly by jockeying for position around the ideological center (Downs, 1957). According to Downs, given a situation in which the majority of voters aggregate near the ideological center, or given a normal distribution of voters, the parties will compete with each other to occupy the ideological middle. Correspondingly, the parties try to develop an ideological program which is centrist. Publicly at least, the major parties must appear to support issue positions that are designed to appeal to the most numerous group of voters who occupy the ideological center. Down's model presumes a public which not only holds fairly well developed political opinions, but also one whose political opinions places it near the ideological center. But, as a general rule, in the current political environment, the more well developed a person's political beliefs, the more that person tends to identify with one of the ideological poles. Correspondingly, the more sophisticated ideologues will tend to hold views which are consistent within the narrow framework of the ideological principles they use to organize their political views.

Unlike Downs' contention that people have policy preferences which cause them to aggregate towards the center of the ideological spectrum, it seems more likely that the majority of voters continue to have only weakly defined policy preferences and political attitudes. As a result, a large percentage of voters continue to rely on heuristics such as party label and candidate likeability to make their political choices. But, over the last 40 years, the proportion of voters who do rely on such criteria as candidate likeability and party label to make to make their political choices has clearly experienced a sharp decline. Still, this group remains large enough to exert a powerful influence on electoral strategies of the major parties, though it may be experiencing a pivotal shift

The dominance of the ideologically ambivalent and uncommitted center has been the most important factor determining the strategies that the parties adopt to maximize electoral support. As long as the center remained the most prominent feature of the ideological distribution, the primary strategy of the major parties was likely to remain focussed on the need to secure as many votes from the ideological center as possible. For this is the strategy most likely to retain moderate votes within the party and the strategy which is most likely to encourage the defection of moderates from the opposing party. But, when faced with a situation in which the distribution of voters is multimodal, or one in which there are strategically important and growing concentrations of potential voters at the poles of the ideological spectrum, both the Republican and Democratic parties have increasing incentives to supplement their catch-all strategy (which must still remain the most publicly visible strategy) with a strategy which is mainly designed to appeal to the group of voters which aggregate near the ideological pole with which the party is most closely identified. In the case of Democrats, this secondary strategy will be mainly directed at interest groups on the ideological left. In the case of Republicans, this means pursuing an equally polarizing strategy designed to gain support from interest groups on the ideological right.

At the same time that the two parties pursue these less visible strategies aimed at maintaining the support of various interests groups, the parties must also avoid creating the public perception that they are becoming ideologically extreme. If they create such an impression, they run the risk of alienating and triggering the defection of the remaining moderates within their own party. Thus, it is likely that over the short term, both parties will continue to employ the rhetorical ruse that they are centrist and moderate. But, as the distance between the ruse and the reality grows, the ruse will wear so thin that even die hard moderates who remain loyal to the major parties will be compelled to see both major parties for what they really are, namely, ideologically polarized camps. The differences in these camps are so stark that one cannot help but be reminded of certain parallels between our own political system and certain political systems of antiquity. One is particularly reminded of the parallels between our own political divisions and those which afflicted the Roman Empire. In this context, conservative is to patrician as liberal is to plebeian.

As the proportion of voters who define their political preferences more clearly in ideological terms grows, the two major parties will have increased incentives to modify the strategies they use to maximize electoral support. The Democrats will have stronger incentives to adopt a more overt strategy designed to secure the support of liberals, while the Republicans will have greater incentives to more openly court conservatives. Both parties will tend to assign secondary importance to a strategy designed to secure the support of the ideological center. As a consequence, the parties will tend to become more openly ideological and polarized. As this transformation of the parties occurs, it will mean that the parties begin to more closely resemble  Schattschneider's (1960) idea of what political parties should be. According to Shattschneider's responsible party model, parties which are clearly organized along lines of opposing ideological principles would be able to offer voters clear choices between two distinctively different programmatic alternatives. To the extent that more moderate supporters reject this increasing polarization of the major parties, it may trigger sizable defections of those moderates who remain in the major parties. In turn, these defections will contribute to the potential base of support for a party like the ASP. But due to a continual decline in the numbers and influence of moderates in both major parties, even this threat may not be enough to curb the emergence of increasingly ideologically extreme candidates.

The Implications of Ideological Polarization for the Prospects of Synthesis
The data indicating increased polarization of the electorate supports the notion that there has been substantial movement among mass publics from stage 2 of the 5s model to stage 3. Mainly as a result of media influences, more people have developed a preference for one of the ideological labels. Because these preferences are mainly the result of superficial cognitive processes they are presumably somewhat flexible and superficial. From this point, reaching a higher stage of political sophistication becomes a question of what would it take for people to develop more synthetic views. More specifically, what forces can be identified which would be sufficient to cause the more recent converts to liberalism and conservatism to abandon their attachments to ideological labels. Economic, geopolitical and life cycle changes have all been identified and discussed as possible sources of defection. Neither liberalism nor conservatism nor the political parties which are their principal defenders will be adequately prepared to cope with what may be extreme economic, material  and  geopolitical changes in the coming century. Also, in an increasingly complex political environment, these ideologies may simply begin to wear thin. Consequently, people will begin to search for an alternative which is better adapted to the changed environment. In the process, people will become better able to see the flaws in both of the polar ideologies. And, as a result of ideological conflicts which they are able to resolve subjectively, they may find a superior way of determining  the public interest on their own.

As the informational environment becomes more complex, more and more people will begin to quietly (and almost imperceptibly at first) abandon the polar modes of thinking about politics in favor of more synthetic approaches which are better equipped to deal with complex information. Consequently, the potential will increase for people to shift their allegiances from parties that are organized along lines of polar ideologies to a party that is organized around the concept of ideological synthesis. But whatever the major operating mechanisms become, there is evidence that the public's movement toward polarization represents an advance in its political sophistication. In terms of the 5s model, it represents attainment of the intermediate stages of political sophistication which prepares people to eventually reach synthesis. Admittedly, signs of progress in the public's political sophistication are somewhat tentative. And, these are not the kind of signs that most political scholars would like to see. Most scholars would naturally like to see a sharp increase in the public's knowledge of political facts, for they could more easily claim responsibility for this increase. But, by looking for an increase in the public's knowledge of political facts as a sign of increased political sophistication, scholars may have been looking in the wrong place. Knowledge of political facts has been proven to be a notoriously unreliable indicator of the public's political sophistication (Mondak 1999). And, being a relatively apolitical people, most Americans are not willing to devote the same amount of time and energy to learning political facts, as scholars have themselves. The typical individual simply does not have the time or other resources needed to become proficient in the art of politics. Rather than attempt to gain such knowledge, what most people want is a way to avoid the need for such knowledge, and still be able to determine where their political interests lie. Most people want a way to reduce the amount of political information they feel they need to know in order to make rational political decisions, or those which are in their own interest. However, it should be recognized that essentially rational actions in the more limited framework of "what best serves an individual's interests over the short term" may later prove to be irrational over the longer term.  Nonetheless, ideological labels serve the purpose of helping individuals to better assess their interests over the short term, in the most efficient manner.

The convergence of the various forces identified thusfar suggests that the number of synthesists is increasing and that this group can be expected to gain the upper hand in political decision making at some point in the future. What is more open to debate is the exact chain of events that will lead the public to progress from stages 3 and 4 to stage 5 of the 5s model.

Further Implications of Ideological Polarization for the Prospects of Synthesis
In terms of the 5s model of political sophistication, ideological polarization is characteristic of an intermediate level of political sophistication. When a sufficiently large number of people reach this intermediate level of political sophistication, it represents a dramatic increase in the potential for the public to reach the highest stage of political sophistication. And while it is possible for people to bypass one or more stages of the 5s model on the way to higher levels of political sophistication, as more people attain higher levels of political sophistication, the probability in creases that these people will reach the highest level of political sophistication. Thus, given the current state of ideological polarization, the most important implication which the 5s model has for future political developments is that a state of high polarization represents an enhanced potential for the American public to eventually achieve a higher stage of political sophistication which involves synthesis. It also highlights the possibility that the ideologically polarized political parties which have become such a defining feature of contemporary American politics, could one day succumb to a third party challenger. And finally, it highlights the possibility that the public may achieve genuine ideological synthesis, mainly by means of its policy preferences.

Holding a synthetic ideology manifests itself at the level of concrete policy alternatives in the form of closely related policy dyads. For example, attitudes towards the environment and nuclear energy can represent one such dyad. In the current political context, a strong stance on environmental protection is more commonly associated with the political left. Conversely, a strong position in favor of nuclear energy is more closely associated with the political right. Yet, the two views are perfectly compatible and are even complementary if you accept the premise that nuclear energy is better for the environment than burning fossil fuels to generate electricity. The primary reason that one can be a strong proponent of nuclear energy and can also be a strong environmentalist rests with the awareness that there are relatively small risks of environmental contamination associated with power generation facilities which use nuclear fuel on the one hand, and with the awareness that nuclear energy is more environmentally friendly than alternative sources of energy which are currently viable. Hence, within a synthetic framework, it is possible to be both a strong environmentalist and a strong proponent of nuclear power. Whereas, if one maintained an unconditional allegiance to either liberalism or conservatism, it would require that one also support kindred movements on either the left or the right.

Environmentalists regard themselves almost uniformly as liberals because they depend on their alliance with other liberals to help their own cause. Thus, in order to reinforce their affiliation with the political left, they are prohibited from supporting nuclear power. Conversely, conservative proponents of nuclear power would seem to be prohibited from supporting strong environmental causes. Yet, in terms of the cognitive processes involved in reaching synthesis, and current political exigencies aside, it would seem that one can be a strong environmentalist and a strong proponent of nuclear energy, without experiencing cognitive dissonance. This fact illustrates the promise and the prospects for ideological synthesis, or the ability of the average American to adopt an alternative to the ideologies of liberalism and conservatism as a means for conceptualizing their own interests, and as an alternative means for defining the public interest. This also illustrates that the potential for Americans to reach the highest level of political sophistication remains well within the realm of possibility.
 

Copyright 2003 By Alex Van Allen