NAT9

MAN'S DUAL NATURE

The Evolutionary Origins and Functions of Man's Dual Nature
The Two Poles of Human Cognitive and Temperamental Essence
The Dyadic Trait of Aggressivity-Sociability
Inventory of Major Polar Dyads
Conclusion: Translating Man's Dual Nature into a System of Natural Law

The Evolutionary Origins and Functions of Man's Dual Nature
From what has been revealed thusfar, it becomes readily apparent that man has a dual nature. The natural order is replete with dualities, or sets of opposites. Human nature is merely an extension of the natural order. Man evolved a dual nature comprised of sets of dyadic traits, to provide him with a wide variety of adaptive responses to the extremes he could potentially face in the natural world. The main features of man's dual nature are the sets of cognitive, affective and behavioral traits which correspond with his capacities and propensities. These traits are dyadic in the sense that they can be classified or arranged in pairs of virtual polar opposites. The poles which constitute the major categories into which individual elements of the dyads can be classified represent the bounds of man's cognitive, affective and behavioral potentials. An example of a dyadic trait would be the fight-flight response.

An animal with no fight or flight response to enable it to respond to dangers in its environment would not survive long in the natural world. Consequently, humans evolved a capacity for both tendencies. We have temperamental propensities and capacities which can lend themselves to either type of behavior, as the situation demands. As a result, our temperamental essence is a composite of potentially conflicting capacities. But merely because we have potentially opposite tendencies in our nature does not imply that there is any contradiction in our nature. It merely suggests that one tendency or one element of a dyadic trait will be more appropriate in one context, and that the opposite trait or capacity will tend to be more appropriate in a different context. This is the general principle that we are to extrapolate from our dual nature, for the purpose of determining a system of natural law. But, attempting to extrapolate general principles from our nature to serve as the foundations for a system of natural law would still seem to involve certain difficulties.

Not all aspects of man's nature will be equally suitable as a basis from which we should extrapolate the rules, laws or social conventions upon which our societies should be "naturally" based. Again, man is endowed by his evolutionary legacy with great diversity in his behavioral repertoire. This diversity is designed by nature to facilitate his survival in response to a variety of environmental challenges. Elements associated with one temperamental pole will be more "contextually appropriate" and more conducive to his survival, depending on the circumstances he is facing in a given situation. And, some aspects of his behavioral potential will more typical of his normal condition than others, and will be more generally conducive to his survivability under the circumstances he most commonly encounters.

In general, man is naturally more at peace than at war. His relationships with other men are more commonly characterized by cooperation than by conflict. Under the circumstances that have prevailed over the course of his evolution, the social aspects of his nature have tended to be more conducive to his survivability. Consequently, these traits evolved as the stronger tendency in his nature. Yet, even in the midst of generally peaceful relations with his fellow man, man has had to retain some vestige of his capacity for aggression and violence, because, over the course of his evolution, he would have occasionally needed this capacity. Even today, there will be circumstances when man will occasionally need to rely on his capacity for violence or aggression to further his survival. Man needs a capacity for violence either when contesting with other groups of men over scarce resources, or when defending himself against the small minority of men who, as a result of unfavorable genetics or environmental influences, have demonstrated aberrant behavioral traits that place them in contention with the rest of mankind. These tendencies, which are dysfunctional in a larger species context; are atypical, and they depart from the general behavioral tendencies of human nature. But, when man faces individuals who exhibit such atypical tendencies, and as these tendencies pose a threat to the larger interests of the species, he must be willing to defend himself by whatever mean are necessary, including the use of violence and the threat of violence. Under circumstances where he must confront individuals with aberrant tendencies, man will need to rely on his capacity for aggression (those aspects of human nature which pacifists might unequivocally denounce as antisocial and uncivilized) for his own self defense. Under more peaceful circumstances, man will simply need to retain the capacity for aggression to facilitate his competition with outgroups. The aggressive component of competition is presumed to be the functional equivalent of the aggressive component in violent conflict.

The laws of evolution have decreed that man should compete with other human groups over scarce and valuable resources in the determination of the species interest. These laws have also insured that those with the most genetically favored (functional) traits shall survive and overcome the opposition. Actually, periods of such intensely violent conflict or competition between human subgroups have been the exception rather than the rule. Such conflicts are not characteristic of the prevailing temperament of the vast majority of men, our recent history notwithstanding. Yet, from many historical accounts, one might be led to believe that mankind is an extremely warlike species. But, history tends to focus on salient and pivotal events to some extent, and wars tend to be among the most salient and pivotal events. Most historians would agree that throughout the greater part of his history, and including the period before recorded history, man was more likely to be at peace than at war.

Because man has lived under conditions of relatively low population density for the greater part of his existence, his contacts with other groups would have tended to be sporadic. Any conflicts over resources he needed for survival would have tended to be intermittent. Violent contention over resources only becomes likely when sudden increases in population place a strain on available resources. In short, extended periods of violent competition over resources has not been typical of man's evolutionary experience. Still, man must retain his capacity for violence to help him adapt to anomalous situations that have not been typical of the greater part of his evolutionary experience. The fact that man must retain such "primitive instincts" as the propensity for violence to aid his survival illustrates that nature's laws, and elements of man's inherited behavioral repertoire may not be entirely in accord with humanist ideals. This is especially true of certain humanistic ideals which tend to coincide with one pole of human temperamental essence. If values or ideals associated with one pole of man's temperamental essence are referenced exclusively in designing man's social institutions, and if values or ideals associated with the opposite pole of man's temperamental essence are ignored, we will be left with an incomplete picture of man's total essence and an incomplete understanding of human nature. This would be an inadequate basis for designing an optimal system of natural law. It is necessary to reference man's total essence (the entire range of values that is associated with the poles and various points between the poles) in order to develop the most functional ideology, or the belief system that will be most likely to serve his interest as a species.

Again, the process of evolution has given rise to man's dual nature. Both poles of his temperamental essence must be referenced when attempting to engineer a belief system that will prove optimal for the species. As part of his evolutionary legacy, nature has provided man with a broad repertoire of temperamental, cognitive and behavioral capacities. These capacities have afforded him potential advantages in response to a broad range of environmental challenges he has encountered over the course of his evolution, Evolution has determined the normal range of these capacities, based upon man's cumulative response to the environmental challenges he has faced over the course of his evolution. This sum total of man's cognitive, affective and behavioral traits which define the aggregate or net tendency of the capacities that man has been endowed by evolution is what we speak of generically as "human nature." Out of this range of capacities, certain aspects will be elicited and favored by certain environmental demands and opportunities while other aspects of man's potential will remain latent. But, we should not be misled into believing that the set of potentialities which remains latent and the set which becomes expressed are both static.

Which traits remain latent potential and which become manifest human nature is dynamic. The mix of latent and expressed traits is constantly in flux and is responding to changing environmental challenges, even as a general tendency attempts to pull those aspects of man's nature which are manifested in a certain direction, in spite of environmental conditions, or to return them to the state that has, on average, proven to be best as a response to the environmental challenges man has had to face over the course of his evolution. This being the case, the concept that we develop of human nature will have little meaning unless it is regarded as a synthesis between the biological organism and its interaction with its environment. This is a practical and dynamic understanding of human nature. To serve as a basis for an optimally functional system of natural law, our understanding of human nature must consider contextual challenges to the species, as well as net cognitive, affective and behavioral predispositions.

As it is being defined in this text, natural law is a set of rules governing the construction and operation of human society that can be logically extrapolated from our knowledge of human nature, which will prove maximally conducive to human survivability. To this definition should be added the qualification that a system of natural law must take into account the environmental challenges man is facing at a particular point in time, in order to prove optimally functional or maximally conducive to his survivability. To expand upon this definition even further, creating an optimally functional system of natural law also requires devising a set of rules for ordering society which are based upon knowledge of net human predispositions, as revealed by social science. This includes knowledge of those cognitive, affective and behavioral tendencies which are, in effect, cultural universals and which comprise aggregate human nature, or man's strongest and most prevalent predispositions. Because the understanding of natural law in the natural law tradition did not fully account for such considerations, its validity must be questioned.

The above criteria suggest that what currently passes for natural law, or natural law as it has it has come to be known to us, mainly through Christian theology, represents a skewed, unrepresentative and dysfunctional understanding of natural law. It is skewed mainly by the fact that its principal architects (medieval Christian clerics) were themselves susceptible to forming views of human nature which are more closely associated with one pole of human temperamental essence, largely to the exclusion of views that are more closely associated with the opposite pole of human temperamental essence. Unavoidably, the predominance of one aspect of the human psyche in their thinking led them to develop a somewhat incomplete, unrepresentative and distorted understanding of human nature. From the flawed and incomplete understanding they had of human nature, these clerics extrapolated wrong principles of natural law.

Christian clerics developed an understanding of natural law based upon values and ideals that are more closely associated with one of the major poles of human temperamental essence and which largely neglects values, ideals and practical considerations that are more closely associated with the opposite pole of human temperamental essence. Because they were not even aware of such things as "the poles of man's temperamental essence" and because they had no conception of human nature from the standpoint of its evolutionary origins and functions, Christian clerics could not reference such criteria in developing their views of natural law. Correspondingly, they failed to see how the set of temperamental traits which was most representative of their group could distort the views they had of human nature. In short, they failed to see how their own temperamental predispositions might color their ideals and thought processes. Modern academics, clerics, philosophers, jurists, ethicists and a host of others have fallen into a similar trap.

To devise an optimally functional system of natural law, both poles of the human psyche must be brought to bear and both must be understood in terms or their evolutionary origins and functions. One must also be constantly aware that both poles of the human psyche are at work in one's thinking. Depending on one's innate temperamental predispositions, one or the other pole can become a predominant influence on one's thinking. To counteract such influences, one must make a constant effort to critique, reconcile and synthesize these opposing tendencies. Similarly, one must make a constant effort to prevent either pole of man's temperamental essence from dominating one's thinking. In addition, one must be cognizant of the larger species interest and one must reference this in one's thinking. Because the current understanding of natural law which evolved in close conjunction with Christian theology neglected such considerations, and because its values are more representative of one pole of the human psyche, it bears the distinctive marks of ideological distortion. As such, it is an inadequate basis for an optimal system of natural law, or one that will prove maximally conducive to the survivability of the species.

Man has the ability to consider his own species' interest in the abstract. That is, through the knowledge he gains from experience, and in conjunction with reason, he can extrapolate. He can anticipate his own future, he can understand cause and effect, and he can regulate his own behavior to maximize his survivability over the long term. And, when science allows him to expand his knowledge of his own essential nature, and when he is able to grasp the concept of the evolutionary origins and functions of certain aspects of his nature, he is capable of developing an even better picture of how to advance his survival in the future. If his system of natural law does not incorporate this knowledge, then it will not only remain deficient, but it will actually constitute a threat to his survivability.

For instance, man can anticipate scarcity. Correspondingly, he can see the need to regulate his reproductive impulses to accommodate the species interest, i.e. he can control his population. Exercising such self restraint in order to avoid suffering and death is natural. But, discipline is required to gain knowledge of the threats that are facing the species. Discipline and restraint are needed to see one's actions in the context of the species interest and to learn how to avoid pain and scarcity. Exercising such discipline and restraint is natural, when the knowledge that demands it is available. Prior to gaining knowledge of the environmental challenges he faces (the knowledge that is most relevant to his survival as a species), man will be prone to behave in ways that are less than maximally conducive to his survival.

Man has cognitive, affective and behavioral predispositions which act somewhat independently of reason and knowledge. The reproductive impulse is a perfect example. If man does not know that by freely exercising this impulse he will add to his future suffering (or that he will threaten his own survival, or that he will commit actions to the detriment of the species, thereby ultimately harming his own interest) then, in the absence of this knowledge, and in the absence of any norms which would tend to constrain his actions, he will freely exercise this impulse. Yet, in tandem with reason and knowledge of the probable consequences that will result from his actions, he may impose strong inhibitions on the exercise of what would otherwise be a strong natural tendency. Alternatively, he may sublimate the tendency so that it becomes expressed in a more functional form. In this case, he would be exercising his reason and knowledge of his current circumstances to override the reproductive drive.

Attempting to Extrapolate Natural Law Principles From Nature
Owing to its complexity, it is very easy to extrapolate wrong conclusions from what we observe in nature. But the signals that we get from nature are not conflicting, just as our dual natures are not conflicting, if they are viewed in a larger evolutionary framework. In the animal kingdom, we must look to see how a specific aspect of nature evolved to enhance the survival of certain animals in a given environment. For example, one can say that because one observes a big fish eating a little fish in nature, this implies a natural right of the strong to rule over the weak. But such cavalier logic ignores many important details. Characteristically, larger fish do not eat smaller fish of their own species. More commonly, they engage in a social behavior such as schooling, for their mutual protection against predators. In many cases, even solitary species do not generally attack smaller members of their own species. In those cases where such attacks are common, this form of predation tends to be functional for the species. In cases of cannibalistic practices among certain crocodilian and fish species, these species are programmed to respond indifferently to any small moving object as a stimulus-food source. That such a food source happens to be a member of its own species is apparently dysfunctional, until one realizes that such random predation helps the larger animal committing the predation to more quickly attain the size it needs to become less vulnerable to predation itself. This predation also serves to thin out what may be a surplus of its own species in a given area, which contributes to the health of all the remaining members of that species in the area. Hence, in some species, cannibalism results in a natural geographic separation for members of the same species. It tends to thin out and disperse individuals of the same species for their mutual benefit. On balance, this form of predation is functional and became an evolved response. Admittedly, some times it may not work out this way, but natural selection, evolution and instinct are mainly concerned with what works best for a species on average, over an extended period of time, and over a broad range of environmental conditions.

To postulate such scenarios would not appear to do us any good. For no general principles applying to man can necessarily be deduced from the behavior of other species. It would seem that we have a better chance of finding foundations for natural law if we attempt to extrapolate from what we know about our own natures, based upon observations of individual behavior and faculties; our knowledge of what tends to work in human society; and our knowledge of what conduces to "human" survivability. Such information can provide us with a base from which we can begin to make a crude but generally accurate determination of what functions are served by certain characteristics.

At the aggregate level, naturally occurring variations in human temperaments and capacities, taken together, tend to advance the interest of the species. Thus, we may assume that diversity "within a range" does afford enhanced survival value for the group that possesses it. It is also fair to assume that when diversity extends beyond this range, it tends to become dysfunctional. Dysfunctional traits in the form of genetically based temperamental anomalies are occurring all the time in the course of evolution. This is the way evolution works. Evolution is constantly generating random variations to determine what works best in a given environment. Those variations that work best tend to become part of our genetic makeup. It is an integral feature of evolution that variations (both those which conduce to survival and those which do not conduce to survival), occur routinely to see what works best in a given set of environmental circumstances. Yet, of all the traits that we have been endowed with by the process of evolution, we will be variably predisposed to express or develop certain ones in response to certain environmental challenges or opportunities.

The capacities which makeup our dual nature can remain latent, they can become expressed as a result of an inborn predisposition, or they can become either expressed or latent as the result of environmental influences. The fact that important elements of our dual capacities can be expressed or can remain latent, or that, on balance, they can tend to cancel one another, has led many social scientists to the false conclusion that, as a species, we are tabula rasa, or a blank slate. According to the blank slate view, we do not have a repertoire of "natural" behavioral tendencies or capacities (which are enhanced or retarded by socialization) to which the label "human nature" can be neatly applied. Evolutionary processes strongly suggests something different about our essential nature as human beings. These processes suggest that we evolved a variety of capacities and tendencies to make us more adaptable under a broad range of environmental circumstances. Variations in capabilities and temperaments are programmed into the human species so that at least some individuals in a subgroup will be better able to cope with a given set of environmental challenges. By virtue of their predominating natural predispositions, some individuals will be more likely to survive in response to a given set of environmental challenges than others.

In addition to rendering us more survivable as a species, the variety that is programmed by evolution into our nature pays other dividends as well. Specifically, the distribution of traits in a human population or subgroup translates into cultural forms. In more advanced cultures, the normal distribution of traits inherent to our dual nature naturally lends itself to the formation of a complex division of labor. In turn, the division of labor sets the stage for the formation of social hierarchies. The fact that social hierarchies tend to emerge from these variations in traits (which occur within the normal range or the normal distribution) further suggests how these traits are differentially valuable in response to a given set of environmental circumstances. The fact that they are unequally distributed in the general population will make some traits more socially and economically valuable than others.

As it translates into the division of labor, the unequal distribution of traits in a population means that certain individuals will be more predisposed to develop different talents. Some individuals will be more naturally predisposed (by the presetting of their natural switches) to express and develop one set of traits over another. They will be similarly predisposed, to express one element of a cognitive, affective or behavioral dyad than another. This "presetting" of temperamental "switches" may be typical of the general population, or, under more rare instances, it may represent an atypical switch setting which tends to be relatively rare in all human populations. The resulting temperamental propensity or cognitive capacity can either be amplified or attenuated by environmental influences, and may represent an advantage or a disadvantage for the individual .

The Two Poles of Human Cognitive and Temperamental Essence
Part of our ability to adapt to a changing environment is afforded by having a diverse repertoire of temperamental propensities and capacities. This diversity of propensities and capacities is programed into our nature by the evolutionary process. For instance, when threatened by either naturally occurring environmental extremes or by members of our own species, we need the capacity for aggression. This aggression response has come to be more closely associated with one pole of our dual natures, or with one pole of our temperamental essence, which we will call the "hard " pole. But, we also need a capacity for cooperative interaction. This capacity has come to be more closely associated with the pole that we will call our "soft" pole. The two opposing capacities associated with these opposite adaptive responses are not necessarily constantly waging a tug of war in the individual. Rather, they are analogous to switches. When one switch is turned on, the other switch tends to be turned off. Innate cognitive, affective and behavioral predispositions act in conjunction with environmental influences to determine which switch will be turned on in response to given environmental stimuli. It is only when both switches (those corresponding to the two poles of a dyadic trait) are turned on simultaneously that confusion results. Normally, this only occurs in the process of initially deciding which switch is contextually appropriate in a given situation, or which one is to be turned on most of the time.

Which aspect of a given survival related dyad becomes dominant will vary from individual to individual as an innate tendency, and also as a tendency determined by environmental influences, or by the situation. Conflict between two aspects of a dyad (as can occur when environmental factors send us mixed signals as to which element of a dyad is most appropriate in a given situation) is bound to occur on occasion. However, we have reason to help mediate this conflict and to determine its winner. By extension, synthesis is just as much of a natural capacity as the polarization which results from allowing one pole of our temperamental capacity to dominate our psyche.

There is a dialectical relationship between experience and knowledge on the one hand, and the expression of temperaments on the other. The reasoning process should ultimately determine which temperamental propensities become developed and expressed in response to a given set of environmental challenges, and which should remain muted. Even so, because our "switches" are to some extent preset, or predisposed to be flipped toward either one pole or the other, reason will only tend to cast the deciding vote in cases where individuals have already acquired considerable knowledge (of both polar ideologies in relation to the challenges the species is facing at a particular point in time) necessary to fully deploy reason.

Extrapolating Natural Law Principles from Human Temperaments
Accepting that we have dual sets of potentials which define the two poles of man's temperamental essence, we are still left with the problem of how to extrapolate a set of natural law principles from this dual nature. Are these aspects of our nature embodied in our polar essence destined to point to conflicting principles? As such, aren't they an inadequate basis for natural law? This would only be the case if we fail to mediate the opposing temperamental capacities which comprise the poles of our temperamental essence with reason and knowledge of the species interest; and with knowledge of the challenges the species is facing at a particular point in time. But how can we expect knowledge of the species interest to be compatible with what evolution tells us? Actually, there should be no contradiction between the species interest (as determined by reason and knowledge of our current condition) and the composite of our innate cognitive, affective and behavioral tendencies. We evolved to maximize our survivability. And knowledge, properly deduced and applied, should only enhance our potential to maximize our survivability.

Still, we are left with the apparent problem of having to extrapolate a set of natural law principles from our dual nature. Given our dual nature, what principles can we infer as a basis of natural law, even if we are able to identify the origins and functions of certain aspects of our dual nature; and even if we are able to understand our dual nature in an evolutionary context? What does evolution tell us about the purpose of this apparent conflict in human nature that is manifested by this duality? How can man be vested with qualities that might advance his survival in one situation but which would seem to threaten it in another? How could these opposing capacities have evolved? This is where the ability to reason and acquire knowledge comes into play.

Reason and knowledge are the mediating mechanisms, or the mechanisms which determine our switch settings, even though for every individual, the initial switches will be "preset by the factory" in one direction or the other. The final switch setting will tend to be determined by experience, or by environmental factors. We should not ignore the potential of innate tendencies to determine these initial switch settings any more than we should ignore environmental influences. The biological presetting of these switches can be very important because, in the absence of suitably powerful environmental influences, or influences which are sufficient to override the initial switch setting, the default settings will tend to prevail. And, these default settings will tend to confer survival advantages. In addition, under certain circumstances, experience will merely tend to reinforce or provide redundancy backup for the default temperamental settings that determine which aspects of our dual capacities should be expressed in a given situation, and which should remain dormant or latent. Thus, even without reason and knowledge, nature would not render us perpetually schizophrenic, or even ambivalent.

Once again, our dual natures evolved as part of a scheme of diversity in our behavioral repertoire, and as an adaptive response to different circumstances and environmental challenges. In some degree this scheme of diversity mirrors the process of evolution in man. It gives man a diverse set of tools to solve a variety of potential problems he will encounter in trying to enhance his survivability. Some of the tools man is given by evolution will have greater survival value in one context, while others will have greater value in another context. For instance, in certain contexts, man needs the capacity for aggression to further his survival. In other contexts he needs the capacity for compassion and sociability. In a highly socialized and cooperative society a premium is placed on man's capacity for sociability and cooperation. By contrast, his aggressive instincts, which may have been more useful in a state of nature, can be a handicap in civilization, if they are dominant aspects of his nature.

In a hierarchical and highly structured social setting, man's cooperative and communicative skills are required to advance his survival. In this situation, the aggressive instincts which may have favored man's survival in another environment will tend to entropy, and will be rendered latent. Alternatively, or when they become expressed because of temperamental variations in combination with environmental circumstances, they may tend to be dysfunctional. This capacity for violence may have been a functional trait in response to environmental challenges which man faced at some point in his evolution, but to the extent that they are dominant aspects of his nature, these same traits may be relatively dysfunctional at a later stage of development. Fortunately, this innate "capacity" can be overwritten with socialization and essentially negated in those cases where this trait is closer to the surface. The differential predisposition among men towards violence is a result of the naturally occurring and overall functional variations in the gene pool manifesting themselves as differentials in temperaments between individuals. Such differences predispose some in a subgroup to be either more reluctant and or more ready to respond with violence given essentially the same environmental stimuli. Thus, the differential predisposition to exhibit such traits as aggression and violence (and crime) is at least partly inherited and partly based upon underlying temperamental and cognitive variations between individuals in interaction with specific environmental stimuli.

Different social behaviors and capacities will prove to be relatively more functional in one environment and in response to one set of environmental challenges than another. For some animals, given their genetic characteristics and the particular environment they face, sociability and communication are more functional and adaptive responses than aggression. Even as these animals retain the capacity for "flight or fight" these are underlying secondary capacities which are, in the main, overwhelmed by the tendency to cooperate, to communicate, and to be sociable. Whereas, for other animals which secure their survival by different means, aggression and being solitary will tend to enhance survival more. In human beings it would seem that evolution has reached its pinnacle. We are given the capacity for a broad range of tendencies, and we are free to choose depending on the circumstances that we find ourselves in.

The fact that the capacity for language is clearly a dominant aspect in our natures suggests that we are, on average, naturally more predisposed towards sociability and cooperative interaction than aggression. But, this capacity for language could just as easily manifest itself as sublocal speech or as introspection rather than sociability. However, insofar as the full development of this capacity tends to depend on sociability and communication to some extent, it is more likely to be associated with the qualities of sociability. Here again we have a choice as individuals. We can choose for one tendency to become expressive while the opposing tendency is rendered latent, or conversely, we can choose for both to become expressive, as in the case of the person who is equally at home being communicative or solitary. Thus, the human repertoire of behavior or that for which we have a natural capacity runs the entire length of the behavioral spectrum ranging from highly sociable and gregarious to the solitary and the violent. Depending on the context, all capacities have their functions. The more natural capacities an organism has, the easier it will be for the organism to adapt to a broad range of environmental challenges.

While a given social structure may assign a higher value to those with marginally greater cognitive capacities, nature may not, under all circumstances. There may be situations when numbers and brute force can win over intelligence in nature. For instance, if the ice age returns, or if society is otherwise thrown into chaos by a manmade disaster, those human beings which are most rugged and able to procure resources from their environment, even by means of violence, will be more likely to survive. On the other hand, to the extent that the species is able to develop cognitively through education, it may better ensure its own survival. By using our intelligence we may be better able to overcome the effects of an ice age or of a man made disaster. As a general tendency, evolution favors intelligence because intelligence is functional and conducive to survival. And, in recognition of its utility, intelligence seems to be a universally valued trait in human society (although some societies tend to value it more highly than others).

In a state of nature, the more intelligent tend to be better hunters, they are better at avoiding conflict with superior forces, they are more stealthy and cunning, and they are better able to defeat superior forces through guile, strategy and the use of superior technology. Hence, even in nature, superior intelligence and sociability confers advantages. Why it has taken so long for a species like man to evolve which has our level of intelligence is a mystery which only nature can answer at this stage. The answer to this question could be no more complex than the fact that nature works as fast as it can, and it just took some 3 billion years for a species as intelligent as man to evolve. In cosmic terms, 3 billion years might not be an excessively long time for the trait of intelligence to evolve. By some estimations, 3 billion years is only about one fifth of the age of the universe. Alternatively, the reason that intelligence took so long to evolve might be as simple as specialization. A species might only tend to evolve that level of intelligence which is sufficient to allow it to occupy a certain niche or to allow it to become highly specialized. Intelligence may tend to evolve to this point and then may tend to go no further. It may have only been recently that an evolutionary niche became available which was suitable for the development of higher levels of intelligence such as that which is presumed to exist among humans. But why intelligence does not appear earlier in earth's natural history is, at this point a matter for philosophers to decide and is not our concern. Regardless of the reasons, intelligence tends to increase man's genetic fitness

Man is also able to increase his individual genetic fitness (thereby contributing to the genetic fitness of the race) by being competitive within his own subgroup or with other subgroups. At other times he may have to compete as part of a group, which demands cooperation. Overall, the genetic fitness of the species will tend to be enhanced through intraspecies competition (competition between human subgroups) to establish a social and reproductive hierarchy which is maximally conducive to species survivability. A system of economic competition based upon merit, will tend to be functional insofar as it allows those with certain cognitive talents to rise in the hierarchy and have greater access to survival related resources (money and property). By contrast, under current arrangements, which are more neutral with regard to eugenics, the lower class enjoys greater reproductive success than the propertied class.

The Dyadic Trait of Aggressivity-Sociability
One of the best examples of man's dual nature is found in his capacity for aggression versus sociability. Once again, man evolved a dual nature as an adaptive response. Man evolved sets of opposing and seemingly conflicting capacities to allow him to adapt to a broad range of environmental circumstances. For instance, man developed a "capacity" for violence and aggression, for, at times, violence and aggression will be necessary to insure his survival and that of his proximate gene pool. Conversely, man developed a capacity for sociability to facilitate cooperative behavior which will tend to enhance his survivability in other circumstances. The capacities of aggression and sociability represent the two ends or poles of a dyadic trait.

We can represent the trait of aggressivity as a continuum or a single bipolar trait which is comprised of opposite tendencies that allow man to adapt to a broad range of environments and circumstances. Adaptability is afforded in the range of these capacities. Hence, there are opposite poles of human temperament and opposite sets of capabilities/tendencies distributed in the gene pool. These will tend to manifest themselves differently in all individuals in order to accomplish the species relevant goal of diversity, such that in some individuals, one trait will be closer to the surface and more easily expressed in response to a given environmental "trigger" while in other individuals, the same trait will be more likely to remain latent. The fact that certain traits are more likely to be expressed by certain individuals than others, will depend very much on how environment "throws the bi-polar switches" of individuals within a single human subgroup. In terms of the aggressivity-sociability trait, this will translate into a predisposition for some individuals to be more capable of violence or aggression than others, while conversely, others will be more predisposed towards sociability. The innate propensity for conflict and sociability will be present in all members of the gene pool in some degree. But, for some individuals, one or the other trait will be closer to the surface and more easily activated by environmental stimuli (the switch will be preset to favor the expression of the trait) And conversely, in other individuals the trait will be less likely to be expressed by virtue of the opposite underlying switch settings.

Thus, it is in our natures to be violent, when the occasion demands it, and peaceful, when circumstances permit it. Similarly, it is in our natures to be sociable or asocial, depending on the situation. This raises the question: Which of these dual tendencies is the predominating or defining characteristic of human nature generally? At the individual level, the answer to this question obviously depends on the individual and the circumstances. But at the aggregate or the species level, the answer is more easily determined. In the general population there will be a normal range or an average distribution of tendencies; there will be a net tendency of the distribution of a certain trait which is most characteristic and defining of the species as a whole. This distribution may in some degree be the result of the unique genetic makeup of a certain population or subgroup, or it may be more the result of certain unique cultural influences on this population. But whatever the root cause, it will result in a differential distribution of tendencies such that some in a group will be more or less predisposed to respond violently to a given set of circumstances. Once again, as a matter of defining the parameters of natural law, we must be concerned mainly with averages, general tendencies, normal ranges and variations, even as we do not neglect consideration of the extremes .

It is the general disposition of the species to want to avoid conflict in most circumstances, but not to reject the option of conflict categorically, and under all circumstances. It is the general disposition of the species to recognize the occasional necessity of violence in response to certain threats. We have the inborn capacity to embrace violence when it is necessary, as a tool to further our own interests or the interest of the species, even as we are equally predisposed to reject violence as the first option. Those who would embrace violence as a first option and those who would reject it under all circumstances are atypical and do not represent the general tendency of the species. Rather, such individuals represent the extremes or the poles which mark the ends of the normal range of temperaments for the species on the dimension (trait) of aggression-sociability.

By virtue of their predisposition to respond to a given stimulus differently from the vast majority, individuals who are predisposed to exhibit extreme temperamental responses are maladapted under normal circumstances or those circumstances which the species is most likely to face, but may be extremely well adapted to very rare and unusual circumstances. Still, If either of these types were to become most representative of the species in the course of its evolution, the human species would have been rendered less survivable, unless environmental extremes were such that they began to favor individuals with one or the other set of traits. Thus, as a species, we do not tend to be either pacifists or warmongers. We retain the capacity to be either, even as we prefer to be peaceful. We are watchful and vigilant and reserve the right to use force to defend ourselves in dealing with our fellow human beings. By contrast, if you slap a pacifist, he will presumably not slap you back and will allow you do violence to him with impunity, if he truly lives according to the principles of pacifism. Whereas, with a normal human being, he may at first recoil from you blows in self defense, but he will not rule out to the option of using force against you in his defense. Nonetheless, the general tendency of the species is to want to avoid conflict, even as there are individuals who are more predisposed to embrace violence than others

The fact that a trait such as aggression is latent does not mean that it should be rejected categorically as a mode of behavior. For, there may be certain contexts in which aggression is an appropriate response. But it is up to our reason and our knowledge to make the determination of when the use of violence is a contextually appropriate response. The fact that the capacity for aggression evolved means that it exists for a purpose. It evolved for the purpose of being available "for occasional use only" and when circumstances demand it. The presence of this latent capacity for violence as part of our evolutionary legacy is nature's way of telling us that we should not reject the option of violence categorically, but that we should also only be willing to use it when necessary. The presence of this latent capacity is also nature's way of telling us that we may face threats to our survival, or we may face threats to the survivability of the species for which violence or the threat of violence are the appropriate responses. However, because our capacity for violence does tend to be latent, and because it is not routinely expressed or close to the surface in most individuals, points to both the appropriateness of its "occasional use" and clearly suggests that it should not be rejected as an option "under all circumstances." In other words, we should not unconditionally embrace pacifism or reject conflict as an option. Rather, we should recognize that occasionally there will be threats to the species interest (or the individual's interest) for which violence or the threat of violence are the appropriate remedies. The existence of the capacity for violence as well as its latency is nature's way of telling us that while we should not be hawks, neither should we be doves. For even as being sociable may be the stronger tendency of our natures, we should never lose sight of the fact that we evolved the latent capacity for violence because we may face threats to our survival for which violence is the appropriate response.

When a person's survival is threatened, their propensity for violence, or their capacity to commit violence in self defense will tend to become an expressed and temporarily predominant aspect of their natures. But, the expression of this trait tends to be situationally dependent. For, as a general rule, survival is not under immediate threat due to conflict. Hence, the capacity for violence (or the propensity to commit violence) has not evolved as a dominant or defining aspect of our natures as human beings. It remains a latent capacity which we can summon to the surface as the situation demands. How easily the capacity for aggression is activated is not only a function of the natural presetting of our temperamental switches, but it is also a function of socialization and environmental influences The fact that either of these tendencies can become latent or expressed aspects of our natures, depending on the context or the demands of the situation, highlights the role which socialization can play in our expressed natures.

Our dominant or expressed tendencies may be overridden by environmental influences. They may be corrupted and even neutralized by the influences of socialization. Whether their alteration constitutes corruption or functional neutralization partly relates to context and partly relates to whether the tendencies are part of a dyad (and hence part of a bipolar complex) or whether they tend to stand alone as unipolar trait. Attempts to circumvent natural behavioral tendencies which are more unipolar in nature, or which do not have more nearly exact opposites, cannot be justified on natural law grounds, with one "apparent" exception. In cases when the species is facing overpopulation which poses a threat to its long term survival, it would seem necessary to subvert the reproductive drive or the sex instinct. The reproductive drive or sex instinct is a unipolar trait. When the species is faced with overpopulation, suppression or control of this instinct would seem to be conducive to survival. Yet properly, man does not have a reproductive drive, but he has a sex instinct. When faced with overpopulation, he does not need to suppress the sex instinct, he only has to prevent conception. We have technology that allows us to continue to exercise the sex instinct without its resulting in overpopulation (contraception). So properly, this apparent exception is no exception at all. In this instance, the urge to have sex (a unipolar trait) is not suppressed or subverted. Rather, we have used our technology (reason and knowledge) to control its outcome on the basis of what reason and knowledge have told us, namely, that we are facing a situation of overpopulation.

Given all the dyadic traits which comprise our natures, and given all the potentially conflicting behaviors which these temperamental propensities could give rise to; how is it possible to draw any firm conclusions about human nature? How is it possible to define our essence as a species? How is it possible to extrapolate principles to serve as a basis for a rational and optimally functional system of natural law? At least where the aggressive-sociability dyad is concerned, we have been able to determine which aspect of our nature is more typical of the species. Without qualification we can say that sociability is the more typical trait. We are naturally sociable creatures, even as we retain the latent capacity to be aggressive. We naturally abhor and avoid the killing of our own kind, even as we retain the capacity for violence in self defense. Such traits best characterize the "nature" of the species, and they help define our temperamental essence. Still our picture of human nature is far from being complete. The following section is designed to give us a more comprehensive picture of man's dual nature.

Inventory of Major Dyads
From what has been revealed above, it has become apparent that man has a dual nature. This dual nature manifests itself in sets of dyadic traits designed to afford variable survivability under differing conditions. This dual nature further manifests itself further in a dichotomy that includes cognitive, affective and behavioral traits. A brief list of some of the more important traits which manifest themselves in dyadic form, is featured below. Many of these traits can be readily associated with one of the major poles of human temperamental essence. While this list is not exhaustive, it is should be sufficient to give an idea of the major poles of our temperamental essence, and how these poles translate into a preference for certain values, attitudes and beliefs. Some of these traits can be readily assigned to one of the major polar, temperamental categories, while other traits are more difficult to assign.

You should also note that some of the dyads are similar and involve fine gradations of difference. This suggests that the same general predispositional trait is operating across a number of conceptual areas, and manifests itself in a slightly different form, depending on the specific circumstances. For instance, the same basic temperamental dynamics may be at work in aggression and submission on the one hand, and in assertiveness and submissiveness on the other. But, a different level of intensity is implied between aggression and assertiveness. One may be aggressive in dealing with one' subordinates or with one's competition, but this is a different level of intensity from the aggression that one would presumably exhibit towards one's enemies in the heat of battle. The following list of polar dyads is not exhaustive and is merely illustrative.

active-passive
agressive-timid
dominant-submissive
honest-dishonest
loyal-disloyal
courageous-cowardly
trusting-suspicious
charitable-miserly
altruistic-egoistic
empathatic-insensitive
expressive-reticent
inquisitive-disinterested
interested-indifferent
reflective-unreflective
alert-innattentive
sophisticated-simple minded
retrospective-prospective
subjective-objective
knowledgeable-ignorant
intellectual-hedonist
cooperative-competitive
antisocial-sociable
introverted-extroverted
self critical-overconfident
disciplined-lax
retributive-forgiving
happy-sad
depressed-energetic
attractive-repugnant
affection-hate
masculine-feminine
principled-anomic
absolutist-relativistic
tolerant-intolerant
orderly-chaotic
regimented-spontaneous

The preceding list of traits illustrates how natural cognitive, affective and behavioral tendencies of mind manifest themselves in major human conceptual, emotional and behavioral propensities. In a sense, "behavioral" relates to physiological autonomic responses; conceptual relate to operations of cerebral cortex; while "affective" relates to emotions. In some degree, these traits reflect the nature of reality itself which has been imprinted on the structure of the human mind over the course of evolution. In some degree, the nature of reality is already reflected in the structure of the systems of abstraction that we use to represent reality.

What some will perhaps find interesting is that a number of the traits listed can be readily classified according to their proximity to the major polar ideologies used in political discourse (i.e. liberalism and conservatism).This suggests that there is a certain primal, timeless quality to these dominant polar belief systems. By extension, most politically literate people are apt to have a fairly good implicit understanding of which traits are more closely associated with which ideological label. For instance, if you ask a conservative to describe a liberal he would probably use such terms as subjective, intellectual, relativistic, trusting, expressive and empathetic. If you ask a liberal to describe a conservative, he would likely use such terms as absolutist, intolerant, disciplined, overconfident, antisocial, and retrospective. But, if you ask conservatives to describe themselves, they would probably use such terms as prospective, knowledgeable, optimistic, orderly, knowledgeable, etc. And if you ask a liberal to describe themselves they would probably use such terms as tolerant, principled, self-critical, sociable, objective, reflective, knowledgeable, honest, charitable, etc. Once again, the fact that so many elements of these primal dyads can be associated with liberal or conservative ideologies suggests that there is in fact a certain timeless, primal quality to these polar belief systems.

Conclusion: Translating Man's Dual Nature into a System of Natural Law
For a society to be maximally progressive, stable and conducive to human survivability, it must be constructed in accordance with human nature. Moreover, it must have a firm understanding of various aspects of human nature in the context of their evolutionary origins and functions. Properly understood, human nature is a window into everything that has proven conducive to our survivability in the past and much of what is likely to prove conducive to our survivability into the future. Yet, given man's dual nature, it is admittedly not always easy to extrapolate laws from human nature. And, when we encounter human tendencies which are of a dual nature, or which seem to contain conflicting tendencies and conflicting implications for natural law, how are we to decide between them?

In virtually every instance of a dyadic trait, one element of the dyad will prove to be most functional and most typical of the propensities of most people, under normal or average circumstances. What is typical of most people most of the time should be among the most important reference points we use when attempting to extrapolate principles of natural law from human nature. In cases where we must decide between opposing aspects of a dyadic trait, priority must be assigned to one tendency either by virtue of its relative strength, its incidence, or the net natural tendency for its expression. The challenges facing the species at a particular point in time must also be a consideration. An important point to remember when attempting to extrapolate principles of natural law from our nature is the need to distinguish ideals from real tendencies of thought, feeling and behavior. Ideals about human nature often result when a group projects its own unrepresentative qualities onto human nature. By contrast, real tendencies of thought, feeling and behavior correspond to the aggregate cognitive, affective and behavioral predispositions with which we have been endowed by evolution. Presumably, these natural tendencies of thought, feeling and behavior evolved to serve purposes which will remain relevant even at this "advanced" stage of our development.

Of all principles in nature from which we can hope to extrapolate natural law, none has greater force than the survival instinct. From this strongest of human tendencies we can extrapolate the natural law principle of the need to maximize the survivability of the species as the foremost aim of a system of natural law. And, when the interpretation of natural law, or what has been mistaken for natural law has become destructive of this end, the foundations of society can no longer claim legitimacy on grounds of natural law. Lacking this legitimacy, a society becomes increasingly susceptible to all kinds of upheavals. Most importantly, it becomes susceptible to the challenge posed by those who actually do champion beliefs which are in closer accord with natural law. But, we are not yet at the point where we can extrapolate a comprehensive set of natural law principles on which to base such a challenge. Despite having made substantial progress towards establishing the basis for a optimally functional system of natural law, or one which is in closest accord with both the species interest and with human nature, the task still remains of examining certain major dimensions of human nature in greater detail. These major dimensions are replete with implications for a system of natural law. In the next three chapters we will explore three such dimensions in our quest to place natural law on a more rational footing.