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THE MEANING OF "KULTURKAMPF"
In German, KULTURKAMPF means "culture war." There is little doubt that America is currently experiencing a culture war. On one side are the so called "liberal-progressive" forces, attempting to promote their vision of what our society should be. On the other side are cultural and religious conservatives, attempting to preserve what they believe are values which are best for our society. Ultimately, who wins this battle between opposing value systems will play an important role in deciding our fate as a people, and as a civilization. At this point, the outcome of the contest is far from certain. Both sides can rally strong groups of supporters to their causes. Both sides can appeal to "transient" majorities, mainly because the American people themselves are so ambivalent and divided over cultural and moral issues. Especially among the younger generation, their moral compass is spinning wildly, as they search for some sense of direction. This moral ambivalence will not be without potentially serious consequences for society. And, as I argue in this site, there are "natural" consequences for a people who have lost their way, or who have failed to find it in the first place. That is, there are consequences for those who deviate too severely from functional-moral principles. And, there are clear indications that, as a people and a nation, we have deviated from such principles.

The American people are now fundamentally divided and "at war" ideologically speaking. The battle lines have been drawn, and a variety of forces have joined the fight. Even though some of these forces have been identified in the popular mind as progressive (which necessarily places those who oppose them in the role of being reactionaries or conservatives), many of these so called progressive forces are actually promoting values which fall substantially short of being "optimally functional." But, any attempt to oppose these forces from the standpoint of cultural or religious conservatism is bound to fail over the longer term, simply because conservatives have their own dysfunctional beliefs holding them back.

Certain beliefs that conservatives have traditionally relied on to make their arguments have lost much of their legitimacy and moral force. Consequently, conservatives lack a rational basis on which to structure an effective counterattack to the liberal-progressive insurgency. For instance, even as many people may continue to accept the basic moral philosophy of the Bible as a general guide to living (it should be noted that there is a substantial overlap in what is considered good conduct according to the philosophy of secular humanism and what is considered good conduct according to Christian moral principles), increasingly, they no longer believe that the Bible should be interpreted literally. They no longer believe that the Bible is the literal word of God, or that it was handed down to man directly by supernatural agencies acting on God's behalf. Consequently, traditional religious beliefs can no longer command the same degree of moral authority that they once did. Even so, as I will attempt to explain below, it may still be possible to establish that certain elements of Christian doctrine are in accordance with "divine will" by completely rational means. That is to say, as the product of human reason, certain elements of the Bible may conform to a rational understanding of "divine will." Our understanding of what constitutes divine will does not need to rest on some irrational basis such as "faith" or a belief in the supernatural.

Attempting to place the otherwise functional moral elements of Christianity on a rational basis, in order to restore their legitimacy, requires a modification of the understanding of God and divine will that has been at the core of Christian theology, but which is not necessarily at the core of Christian moral philosophy. This transformation basically involves an understanding of God and divine will in terms that do not depend on a belief in supernatural agencies. That is, it requires an understanding of God and divine that is similar to that held by Jefferson and other deists. This is basically a naturalistic understanding of God, or it is simply an understanding of God as the sum total of natural laws themselves. Because natural laws have such a pervasive influence on our lives, they can occupy a place in our belief systems that is tantamount to a belief in God. And, if a belief is tantamount to a belief in God, then, for all intents and purposes, we may as well call it a belief in God, even though it does not involve a belief in supernatural agencies of any kind, and even though it is more distant, impersonal and naturalistic, than the understanding of God which has traditionally been more closely associated with Christian theology.

By extension, that which our reason reveals to be consistent with natural laws, or the underlying natural order, we would understand to be "in accordance with divine will." So here we have arrived at a belief in God and divine will that does not conflict with science. Indeed, within this naturalistic framework for understanding divinity, we can think of science as a method for revealing elements of the natural order or "divine will." Now we have removed the belief in God and divine will from its irrational basis (i.e. faith, superstition and a belief in the supernatural) and we have placed it on a rational basis (i.e. a basis in reason and knowledge). And, if the traditional understanding of God as a supernatural entity that intervenes directly in human affairs (rather than as something that has set in motion relatively impersonal natural laws that we are all nonetheless subject to) is completely overtaken and displaced by this more rational understanding of God and divine will, then we should regard this as a positive development. As we will see, this rational view of God and divine will is a critical unifying feature of any belief system which hopes to integrate the best features of liberalism and conservatism, while avoiding their limitations.

The Rise of the Secular-Rational View of the World and Secular Humanism
The religious conservative's view of the world is being challenged, if not completely eclipsed, by the secular-rational view of the world. The rise of the secular-rational view of the world has been a logical result of the advance of science. With the advance of science has come an understanding of the universe which operates solely according to natural laws. In fact, this understanding of our place in the universe is based upon reason, and it is to be welcomed. At the same time as this more rational understanding of the universe has emerged, it has come at the expense of those functional elements of moral doctrine which remain bound by traditional religious belief systems. The secular-rational view of the world has undermined the legitimacy of traditional religious beliefs. Historically, these beliefs have partly depended on a belief in supernatural agencies for their legitimation, which necessarily placed them on an irrational basis. Yet, as illustrated above, it is possible to have a rational belief in God and divine will. It is possible to legitimate our moral belief systems by rational means. Thusfar, neither liberals nor conservatives have been able to appreciate the potential that this holds for the resolution of many of their own conflicting beliefs.

As a consequence of the relentless march of science, the secular rational view of the world has been gaining ground and, except among the least sophisticated members of society, traditional religious views have been in retreat. As a consequence, the Christian church is no longer the symbol of moral authority that it once was. And although the basis of its moral authority in supernatural beliefs was suboptimal by current standards of evaluation, such beliefs allowed the Christian religion to achieve its former greatness in an age when science had not yet progressed to the point where it would support a more rational view of the world. In the relative of absence of a more naturalistic way of understanding the world, such beliefs allowed Christianity to become an important source of moral authority and an important influence on Western civilization more generally. In fact, for the last several millennia, the Christian religion has been the most important influence shaping the course of Western civilization. Because it contained certain myths that people were psychologically predisposed to want to believe, allowed it to play an even more constructive role in human society than it might have otherwise. However, as a more rational, secular view of the world has come into view, with the aid of science, now a more rational basis for the moral principles contained in Christianity must be found. Some have mistakenly attempted to find this source of legitimacy in the philosophy of secular humanism.

Secular humanism attempts to substitute an idealized vision of man (a vision of man as the liberal-progressives would like him to be, according to their values and ideals) for the supernatural authority associated with traditional Christian beliefs. This is as close as the secular humanists could come to giving their own belief system something analogous to "divine legitimation," given that many secular humanists deny the existence of God. Despite such limitations, secular humanists have helped to advance the secular-rational view of the world by challenging the notion that traditional religious beliefs were handed down by God, or by supernatural agencies of any kind, and that, therefore, these beliefs should be completely beyond question. Again, most intelligent, well educated people will have difficulty accepting that the Bible is the literal word of God. As reasonable as their doubts may be, they pose a potential threat to those elements of moral philosophy in the Bible which remain functional. It is an equally a bad thing for people to unconditionally embrace the philosophy of secular humanism, which has emerged as a kind of substitute for traditional religious beliefs among the more educated. This philosophy attempts to place man at the center of the universe, and it tends to discount the idea of a natural order that man needs to both conform to, and to use as a reference point for his own beliefs.

As it originally began to take shape in the renaissance, and in reaction to the excesses of the Catholic church, humanism started out as a good influence. But somewhere along the line this philosophy lost its way when it began to paint a picture of human nature that is at odds with that which is being revealed by the sciences. What is needed is an alternative philosophy that begins with a factually correct picture of human nature, and one which is at the same time grounded in something that transcends man, or something which emulates the transcendental purpose associated with traditional religion, or the belief that man lives for a cause higher than himself.

In reaction to the secular-humanist's assault on traditional religion and moral beliefs, cultural and religious conservatives have fallen back on their belief in the supernatural. In particular, they have fallen back on their belief that the Bible is the literal word of God, or that it was handed down by supernatural agencies acting on God's behalf. Due to its continuing reliance on such beliefs, the religious right has justifiably lost much credibility among more highly educated people especially, or those who, mainly because of their education, have become more receptive to the secular-rational view of the world. Religious conservatives continue to rely on irrational beliefs to support their views. Yet, a more rational means for supporting their views is readily available, provided that religious conservatives are willing to relinquish their belief in supernatural agencies. Since many religious conservatives appear reluctant to do this, the rational critique of our culture and our society cannot proceed from the religious right. Nor can it proceed from the liberal-progressive side of the ideological spectrum either. For liberal-progressives have fallen under the spell of their own illusions, namely, an idealized vision of man which is at odds with certain elements of human nature. Thus, for it to rest on totally rational grounds, the critique of our society and our culture must come from a different direction altogether. A new basis for critiquing society and for legitimating our moral beliefs must be found which does not rely on either traditional religious beliefs, or an idealized vision of man, for its legitimacy. In fact, such a basis can be found in a functional understanding of moral beliefs, or in an understanding of moral beliefs which is consistent with natural law. And, as it turns out, if this approach is taken far enough, it ends up with its own source of "divine legitimation."

The functionalist approach, which will be discussed more completely in the next chapter, can be used to render a more objective and rational critique of society, or one which is free from the distorting influence of the irrational beliefs that remain linked to both the liberal and the conservative views of the world. Thusfar, both liberals and conservatives have either rejected or have failed to appreciate the potential of this approach, presumably, because it would subject their own values to critical examination. Both liberals and conservatives continue to rely on their own myths and illusions. Conservatives continue to rely on the belief in supernatural agencies. Liberal-progressives continue to place their faith in a false vision of man which coincides with their own values and ideals. They further rely on the normative system associated with secular humanism. Secular humanism has no transcendent principles to rely on for its legitimacy beyond its own ideals of what man should be. By contrast, when it is taken far enough (and further than most functionalists themselves are willing to take it), the analysis of society from a functional standpoint can lead to such principles. In effect, it can be used to recreate what is essentially a source of "divine legitimation" within a functional moral framework. And, it can do this by rational means. Neither Christianity nor secular humanism can do this. Therefore, as this site will suggest, both of these approaches to our moral condition are deficient, and both place our civilization at risk.

Values and the Zeitgeist
Whether it is the area of sexual mores, or values relating to happiness, individualism and freedom, the Zeitgeist, or the "spirit of the times," has been on the move. Elements of the Zeitgeist pose a fundamental challenge to the conservatives' world view. The moral upheavals of the 1960s were tame by comparison with the challenges that conservatives are now facing from elements of the Zeitgeist. Conservatives have not been able to use their traditional moral arguments to mount a successful counterattack. As it marches ahead, the Zeitgeist would seem to be unstoppable. However, there are some things that may stand in the way of the Zeitgeist's total hegemony, and its invincibility may only be apparent.

The Zeitgeist contains a number of elements that are in tension with the conservative's view of the world. First, its focus on personal gratification, mainly achieved by sensory means, stands at odds with the conservative belief in moral responsibility, personal sacrifice, and service to the community. In addition, the Zeitgeist tends to support a brand of individualism that conservatives regard as excessive, or one which extends beyond the bounds of what is healthy for a society. We can think of this as a kind of "hyper- individualism" or a kind of individualism which has been taken to such an extreme that it generates dysfunctions which threaten the very stability of society, which conservatives naturally have an interest in maintaining. This is the kind of individualism that will ultimately prove unhealthy for individuals themselves, as it tends to minimize the values of self-control and personal responsibility that are ultimately necessary to maintain a healthy society. This aspect of the Zeitgeist evolved from the attempts by liberal-progressive forces to free themselves from moral constraints that were closely associated with traditional religious beliefs, and which many on the liberal-progressive side continue to believe are outmoded. This aspect of the Zeitgeist has led to the expansion of personal freedoms beyond their traditional bounds, with little thought of the adverse consequences that could result for society. This aspect of the Zeitgeist is also related to an understanding of happiness primarily in terms of "pleasant sensations and immediate gratification." This way of understanding happiness has evolved in tandem with our consumer culture, which equates happiness with the consumption of a wide variety of consumer products.

Under the nearly irresistible influence of our consumer culture, and its ability to satiate a broad range of natural desires at the level of sensation, the focus of life has shifted away from normative restraints and self-discipline of all kinds. The relative scarcity of survival related materials which once made such restraints and self-discipline necessary in earlier times no longer exists. Now, with the material abundance that has been made possible by science and increasing productivity, and despite the imminent collapse of the resource base on which it depends, people in the developed nations have become relatively more "free" from self-restraint and discipline, including the kinds of self-restraint and discipline that is needed to cultivate reason, gain knowledge, and exercise moral judgment. This freedom from self-restraint and discipline also tends to support other values that the Zeitgeist and the liberal-progressive ethos have in common.

Under the influence of the Zeitgeist and its close corollary, the popular culture, attitudes towards work and achievement have come under threat. This is perhaps one of the main reasons why many younger Americans do not excel in math and the physical sciences. Math and science simply require more discipline, effort and focus than other subjects. The popular culture and the ethos of our consumer society generally have combined to create a kind of mental laziness that has thoroughly permeated society, and which manifests itself in a form that is destined to impair the intellectual performance of the younger generation especially. Because the consumer culture has conditioned them to place such a high value on "being entertained and having fun," children, adolescents and young adults of this generation are all much less likely to hold the kind of values that are needed to master difficult subjects like math and science. This is one of the main reasons why Americans are falling behind in the science and engineering race. And, to the extent that the general public has any aptitude for science at all, it has become more likely to have an interest in the "soft sciences," such as the social sciences, for instance. For the masses, under the steady guidance of the consumer culture and the popular culture, the quest for sensation, immediate gratification, and the avoidance of intensive mental effort have all become dominant modes of thinking and being. Reason, knowledge and the ability to form accurate moral judgments have all become casualties in this environment.

The Zeitgeist presents other problems from a normative standpoint. The Zeitgeist would seem to have a fatalistic tone to it, to the extent that it has apparently been caught up in the tide of moral relativism that has swept through the liberal-progressive community. That is, it avoids being judgmental about key moral values, presumably, in order to avoid the perception of "cultural favoritism," to the extent that these moral values might be more closely associated with one culture than another. This is not the tone of a people who have a firm sense of moral direction. Nor is it the tone of a people who have a clear sense of where their society is headed. The key reason the people don't have this sense is that they cannot agree on a set of values or an ideology. As I will attempt to show at various points in this site, this is a potentially dangerous course.

According to the view that is prevalent among humanists, as well as cultural and moral relativists, it is a major aspect of freedom, and hence, it is natural, for people to arrive at their beliefs on the basis of their feelings. That is to say, it is natural for people to adopt values or beliefs which reflect their feelings, and which are not necessarily based on reason or knowledge. Cultural relativists and humanists also advise us that we should not be judgmental about the values that people hold, and that all values are relative to the meaning they have for the individuals who hold them. This presumes that there are no inter-subjectively valid criteria with which we can evaluate values or belief systems. But suppose that the prevailing values in a society have a bearing on how well that society works. And suppose that they also have a bearing on the quality of life that people in that society are likely to enjoy. Suppose that values can be ranked in absolute terms, or according to how well they function to achieve certain universally valued goals. That is, suppose that value systems can be ranked qualitatively. And suppose that reason suggests that some value systems will be more likely to produce desired outcomes than others. If this is the case, and the analysis of values from the standpoint of "how they function" strongly suggests that it is, then merely adopting certain values on the basis of our "feelings or what we want," may not always be the best course.

Many of the values that are prevalent in the Zeitgeist are heavily weighted towards feelings. As a result, reason and knowledge have been playing a less important role in the values that people adopt. Over the shorter term, this focus on feelings may tend to make vast numbers of people happier than they might have been otherwise. But just because certain feelings may be more natural for us to experience "under conditions of relative abundance" does not mean that they will naturally coincide with what is in our best interest over the longer term. If we do not arrive at our values by a process in which reason and knowledge play the most important roles, we could easily set ourselves on a path that will lead to adverse consequences over the longer term. Most commonly, reason and knowledge, rather than proximal feelings, are the proper seat of moral judgments.

Again, under the influence of the Zeitgeist, people tend to form or adopt values on the basis of what they feel and what they want, rather than on the basis of reason and knowledge. This element of the Zeitgeist is closely linked to the consumer culture. By its very ability to satisfy wants, the consumer culture can lead to the steady erosion of values which require more in the way of discipline and self restraint. In effect, it can play a part in eroding the view of the world based on reason. This is the great threat of the popular culture and of our consumer culture more generally. On the one hand, our consumer culture is giving people more of what they want, here and now. But, on the other hand, it may be providing people with what they want at the expense of what they will need in the future. People fail to consider the possibility that by maximizing their personal happiness (with their consumer purchases) over the short term, they may jeopardize their quality of life in the future. Corporate America certainly has no interest in making this point. Corporate America's first concern is with maximizing profits over the short term, even potentially at the expense of the long term viability of the social system as a whole. Because of its fixation on profits over the short term, corporate America cannot have an accurate view of the longer term systemic consequences that may result from its provision of goods and services.

Those aspects of the Zeitgeist which stress immediate gratification have translated into virtually every aspect of modern life. They have even affected the public's reading habits. Under the influence of prevailing norms, most people do not read in order to learn more of what they might need to know in order to maximize their survivability in an environment of relatively greater resource scarcity, such as that which we are now entering. Rather, and for as long as our consumer economy can satisfy most of their wants, they simply read something that they find entertaining and pleasant at a sensory level, or at a lower level of abstraction. That is, they tend to read fantasy and fiction, mainly for diversion. Most people exhibit this tendency, either because they don't want to face certain realities, or because they are not aware that any realities exist which could pose a danger to their way of life in the future. As a result of their failure to come to grips with certain realities, people have been losing the ability to see the big picture. They have been losing the ability to see where their civilization might be headed.

As an additional affect of the Zeitgeist, people have become more likely to read things that make them feel good about themselves, things which appeal to them at an emotional level, or things which tend to reinforce their existing views, rather than reading things that are potentially more difficult, things which require a more intensive application of reason, or things which might challenge their views. As a consequence of such reading habits, people are becoming likely to form ideals or adopt values which may have little or no basis in facts, and which may be at odds with natural law in many ways. People are also becoming more likely to form world views in which sentiments and emotions play a larger part than reason and knowledge. They become more likely to believe things that they want to believe, as opposed to things that are true. This is not a good basis for reaching moral judgments. And, we should not expect that the flight away from reason and knowledge will be without a cost.

According to certain values that are prominent in the Zeitgeist, people are now free to lead what are basically sensation based lives, or lives which are oriented more or less exclusively towards feelings and sensory gratifications, as opposed to reason and knowledge. If this is truly the case, then any apparent mental laziness of the people which causes them to reference their feelings as a source of their values and beliefs, should be excused. It should be excused because it will not necessarily have adverse consequences for society, and will not necessarily be punished by history. Again, perhaps we have reached a stage in our history where the more intense application of reason is no longer necessary for most people. Perhaps we can have a touchy-feely world after all. Perhaps reason can be discounted as a general approach to life and problem solving, except for people who must make a living in the more technical and scientific fields, or in fields that are more dependent on knowledge of unalterable physical realities, where reason will still find an application. Perhaps we have gone beyond the age of reason. Perhaps the need to use reason and higher cognitive faculties was just a historical phase that we had to go through on our way to Valhalla. Perhaps now, we can simply enjoy ourselves like a race of child like animals, as our consumer culture encourages us to do. Perhaps now, we can simply reference our passions and our feelings to tell us which values and beliefs we should hold. Perhaps our feelings and passions, rather than reason or knowledge, are the proper seat of moral judgments after all. Perhaps the vast majority are free to indulge their passions and their feelings to determine their political views, and perhaps this will have no serious consequences for society over the longer term. Perhaps now, people are free to take their societies in a direction that is determined mainly by their feelings and their passions, rather than by reason and knowledge. Which argument sounds better to you?

Under the strong influence of values that are prevalent in the Zeitgeist, the direction of our civilization is being influenced far more by feelings and passions than by reason and knowledge. On its present course, it is likely that our civilization will experience the full range of adverse consequences that follow from the abandonment of reason. It is likely that attempts to engineer our societies to conform with what most people "feel and want" are misguided, just as are attempts to derive moral principles from feelings, unmediated by reason and knowledge. Moral principles are functional principles. Such principles are necessary for a well ordered and smoothly operating society.

The Popular Culture
To a great extent, people today rely on the popular culture to "find themselves," or they use it as a reference point to determine their values and to gain some sense of direction in their lives. This is not the intended purpose of the popular culture. And, when people rely on the popular culture to find direction in their lives, they are likely to form a false, sentiment based view of important social realities that they need to grasp in order to reach accurate moral judgments.

Hollywood does not promote its own economic interests by conveying useful knowledge, or by encouraging people to use their reason to solve important social problems. Rather, it makes its money primarily by titillating the senses and by pushing the boundaries of what is normatively acceptable as a cathartic release from the moral constraints of society. That is, it encourages people to experience a temporary release from some of the very same normative constraints that people must live under in a well functioning society. Consequently, if people who are not already well socialized begin to reference the popular culture in developing their world view, which they will be inclined to do to some extent, they will be more likely to form a world view which is based on sentiments and emotions, rather than facts and knowledge of the real world. That is, they will be more likely to form a world view that is distorted. But equally, people who rely on beliefs that are more closely associated with religious conservatism will also be likely to form a distorted world view. Both world views are systematically distorted, and neither can be used as a reference point to form a more accurate view of the whole over the longer term.

Any attempt to reform the culture which comes from the religious right is destined to fail over the longer term, as religious conservatism and fundamentalism continue to rest on an irrational basis. The "otherworldly" arguments of the religious right simply don't stand up in a society in which the secular-rational view of the world has become the predominant way of seeing things. Yet, if the liberal-progressive forces win the kulturkampf, it will mean that our society will become even more likely to experience potentially extreme dysfunctions.
The critique of popular culture must be conducted from a more ideologically neutral vantage point.

In its current form, the popular culture in obviously designed to appeal to people at a very base, emotional and sensory level. This is the level that a broad audience, composed largely of cognitively and normatively underdeveloped people, can most easily relate to. Consequently, the popular culture will continue to play a dominant role in shaping people's world views until circumstances arise which begin to burn holes in the mass delusions which the entertainment industry has helped to create.

Who is Winning the Kulturkampf?
There are some indications that the liberal-progressive forces may have a temporary advantage in the kulturkampf. But, the word "temporary" should be stressed. The liberal-progressive forces that are involved in steering our civilization include, most notably, academia, the government, major corporations, and the advertising and entertainment industries. The people who occupy these institutions and industries have certain overlapping interests, and, to a great extent, they share important elements of their world view in common. Of these industries and institutions, academia and the popular culture (advertising and entertainment) emerge as the strongest forces involved in the promotion of liberal-progressive ideals. The fact that both academia and the popular culture cater mainly to a group which is naturally more susceptible to influence (i.e. young people) gives them an additional advantage.

Corporate interests also attempt to convey certain values that stack up closer to the liberal end of the spectrum. In their advertising campaigns especially, corporate interests tend to promote an overall world view which merges with and becomes all but indistinguishable from that of the liberal-progressives. And finally, the government in liberal democracies provides an institutional framework that tends to support this world view. In combination, academia, the popular culture, corporate interests and the government help to reinforce a nearly unstoppable Zeitgeist, at least temporarily. However, the Zeitgeist may have an Achilles' heel in at least two respects.

First, the resource base on which the Zeitgeist ultimately depends is finite. Secondly, and mainly due to a misunderstanding of human nature, there are manifold, and as yet largely unrecognized, dysfunctions associated with certain values that are prevalent in the Zeitgeist. That is to say, purely from the standpoint of how they function at a societal level, the Zeitgeist and the liberal-progressive ethos can be expected to generate a variety of serious social dysfunctions. These dysfunctions will eventually impose costs on the average person. When the average person finds these costs unbearable, they will begin to recognize that there really is something wrong with the system and the culture, and that certain extreme measures ought to be taken to correct them. Yet, until these dysfunctions become obvious and begin to impose extreme costs on the average person, the average person will be inclined to go along with the Zeitgeist, simply because it may coincide with what they want, or because it may represent the path of least resistance over the short term.

There are other reasons why liberal-progressive values may prevail over the shorter term. To begin with, these values may coincide with or appeal to the underlying sentiments of a majority of the people. That is, they may tend to appeal to people at the level of their feelings. The moral system of conservatives tends to be more strict and demanding where feelings and emotions are concerned, while that of liberal-progressives tends to be more permissive and indulgent. And, it is simply easier to get people to adopt a more permissive moral program than a more restrictive or demanding one. Simply because the liberal-progressive view of the world requires much less of them in the way of self restraint, it will tend to have a greater natural appeal for people who want to be as free from moral constraints as possible Consequently, it will be especially appealing to many young people.

The current normative environment also provides fertile ground for the growth of skepticism and relativism. And, because of its more traditional roots, even classical philosophy has become a target of this skepticism. At the very least, it has been suffering from benign neglect. Because they live in a consumer culture that encourages them to indulge their passions and to express their feelings, most people end up holding moral views and a view of the world which is based more on feelings and inclinations than on reason or knowledge. Because their beliefs are commonly based on on feelings rather than reason or knowledge, it gives people a sense of freedom. Whereas, more traditional moral systems tended to impose restraint on feelings. Due to prevailing normative influences, people want to be free to follow what they believe are their "natural" inclinations Yet, in many cases, what they mistake for their "natural" inclinations are in fact products of their culture. To the extent that they have any guiding principles in their lives at all, these principles are commonly related to some nebulous ideal about the brotherhood of man, or, alternatively, their ideals are simply a projection of their feelings.

The appeal which the liberal-progressive message has for young people especially is understandable. It coincides more closely with what they want to believe. And, where the adoption of belief systems is concerned, people will generally take the path of least resistance, at least until the dysfunctions of their choices begin to impose unbearable costs on them personally. If the normative message that conservatives are promoting is more abstract and difficult to understand, or if it is less appealing to people at the level of their immediate feelings, people will tend to take the easy way out. And, the average propensity for avoiding cognition will tend to give the advantage to the liberal-progressives. Similarly, if conservatives are promoting a message that requires more in the way of self restraint or personal sacrifices, then, once again, under the influence of prevailing norms in the Zeitgeist, and especially under the influence of a popular culture that encourages freedom from such constraints, it is likely that the proportions of liberals in society will continue to grow. Thus, it is likely that the liberal-progressive forces will continue to gain the upper hand in the kulturkampf, at least until such time as the dysfunctions of their own beliefs begin to impose such costs on people that it triggers a reaction in the opposite direction in society at large. And, by this time, it will be too late to correct things without considerable cost. It seems that in many cases, experience really is the best teacher. And, it may take some extreme and costly failures for the people to learn that they have been on the wrong track. That is to say, they may need to learn the hard way.

The combined strength of academia, the popular culture and a mutually supportive and reinforcing Zeitgeist help to insure that, at least temporarily, the liberal-progressive forces will be more powerful than the combined conservative forces. As a result of these influences, we can expect that our society will continue its moral drift until it eventually encounters the full range of dysfunctions that are likely to result from the further advance of the liberal-progressive agenda. And ultimately, the costs that are associated with these dysfunctions may be what is needed to overturn the Zeitgeist. When the current generation has succeeded in throwing off a sufficient number of moral-functional constraints, and once people begin to feel the consequences that naturally result from the abandonment of certain functional-moral principles, once the people decide that it might not have been such a good idea to go down this road, then, at this point, it will likely trigger a movement back towards the right. But, if those who lead this reaction are dominated by the "religious" right, or even by cultural conservatives, this will not be the best outcome either. This will only lead us back in the direction of another set of suboptimal beliefs which lack moral legitimacy. Thus, any reaction from the right is likely to fail, at least as long as it continues to rest on an irrational basis.

Because conservatism is inclined to resist fundamental changes of any kind (which is at the core of what conservatism is all about), it is ultimately just as likely to generate dysfunctions in our society as liberalism. In order to rectify the major moral lapses in our society, and in order to set our civilization on a safer and more certain course, we need a normative and an ideological approach which rests on a rational basis. Our civilization needs a normative and an ideological movement that is capable of transcending the limitations in the world views of both liberals and conservatives. It needs a normative and an ideological movement that is capable of overwhelming both the liberal-progressive forces and the conservatives in one fell swoop. Throughout this site, I will discuss details of what this alternative normative and ideological movement should look like.

Ideology is the Key to Winning the Kulturkampf
If we accept for the moment that our civilization is in decline, what is main cause of this decline? And just as importantly, what is the biggest obstacle preventing people from being able to recognize that their society is in decline? In a word, it is ideology. Prevailing ideologies, specifically liberalism and conservatism make it difficult for people to see their society from the vantage point that is most consistent with the public interest over the longer term. Because people may not have had any experience seeing things from a different point of view, they may not see anything particularly wrong with the way that society is normatively constituted. And, as long as they are basically getting what they want from life materially, or for as long as the consumer culture continues to deliver, people may not believe that they have any particularly strong incentives to abandon their view of the world. And, to the extent that their world view continues to work for them at a more purely "psychological" level, they may be reluctant to abandon it, even long after it has become dysfunctional at a material level. Because their ideologies continue to tell them what they want to hear, regardless of changing circumstances, it may be difficult to get them to abandon their belief systems for one which is more rational, one that is more factually based, or one that is more functional in absolute terms.

People may be equally reluctant to embark on a course of revolutionary change, or they may be reluctant to think that such change is even necessary, as long as their society can continue to meet their basic wants and needs. In fact, even once their society has begun to experience severe dysfunctions due to the operation of suboptimal ideologies like liberalism and conservatism, the people may fail to identify and adopt the values, attitudes and beliefs that could improve their situation. But even as it may very difficult to get people to adopt the norms that would function best for their society over the longer term, our society continues to undergo important normative changes. Primarily as a result of the influences of academia and the popular culture, our society has been experiencing a cultural and normative revolution of historical proportions. Yet, there are good reasons to believe that many of the changes that have been occurring in this revolution will not be for the better.

Most of the normative changes that have been occurring in our society have been led by the liberal-progressive forces. Again, these forces see it as their mission to alter certain social norms, in order to bring society into closer accord with their vision of what a good society should be. Their intentions seem noble enough. They do not intentionally set out to harm their society, even as they are attempting to advance a set of beliefs which they know will tend to confer disproportionate benefits on them personally, or on others who are similarly situated in society. Of course, they are mistaken in this belief, because their ideologies are mainly a reflection of their own interests. And, the sum of individual interests does not equal the public interest. That is, polarized ideologies like liberalism and conservatism are belief systems that are systematically distorted to favor certain interests in society, at the expense of the public interest over the longer term. These ideologies lead people to believe that what is best for them personally, or what is best for others who are similarly situated, or who belong to their class, would also be best for society as a whole. This is the essence of the distortion that occurs in both liberal and conservative views of the world.

Again, neither liberals nor conservatives set out to intentionally harm their society. Rather, they bring harm to their society as a result of the flaws in their ideals and world views. And, when either group is in a position of power, or in a position to impose its view of the world onto society, certain dysfunctions will naturally tend to result. Both groups begin with faulty, incomplete and distorted conceptions about human nature and, as a consequence, both end up with a polarized and inaccurate picture of the public interest. But just because liberal and conservative ideologies lead to suboptimal conceptions of the public interest doesn't mean that we should discard all systematic ways of thinking or approaching problems. It is possible for an ideology to assume a functional form, or a form that can give us an accurate picture of the public interest over the longer term. Ideology can be the key to a nation's success, or it can be largely responsible for its failure. For our civilization to survive and overcome many of the obstacles that it is now facing, it must have an optimally functional ideology. Such an ideology is necessary to give the people a shared sense of purpose, and a common idea of where they want their civilization to be headed, and what they want their future to look like.

A civilization that is fundamentally divided by suboptimal ideologies cannot provide people with a common sense of direction. It cannot inspire them with a common vision for their future. Effectively, such a civilization is without a sense of direction, and is morally adrift. This absence of a common vision, and the presence of two widely divergent visions (i.e. those associated with liberal-progressives and secularists on the one hand, and cultural and religious conservatives on the other) is one of the greatest threats that is now facing our civilization. The competing world views associated with liberalism and conservatism represents one of the major fronts on which the kulturkampf is being waged. Being able to reconcile these conflicting visions of where our society should be headed and what our future should look like is a major task for this site. As I will attempt to illustrate later in this site, just as ideology can be the source of many of our most pressing problems as a society, it can also hold the solution to restoring national unity and greatness. And even as neither of the polar ideologies is an appropriate model to fully understand our society, the public interest or human interests more generally, they both contain elements that we need to know in order to make our society work better and in order to enhance our survivability. Many of those on the ideological right, and especially those on the ideological left, should recognize this. Perhaps even better than many conservatives, many liberal-progresives should be able to recognize the limitations of their own world view, as they have had training in the social sciences which many conservatives have not. Better than conservatives, this training should allow liberals to see limitations in their own belief systems, by virtue of being able to see how belief systems function more generally.

As a legacy of the Cold War, many on the ideological left continue to see the United States as the bad guy. Consequently, many liberals have no interest in regaining "national greatness." For, in their eyes, national greatness, or any ability that corresponds with greatness, such as the ability to project military or political power, carries the implicit threat of being able to dominate. And, in their view, no nation should have this power. Out of some misguided sense of humanity and the brotherhood of man, these people no longer want the United States to stand out as a "great" nation, simply because greatness would seem to confer the ability to dominate others. They want a kind of social leveling to take place between peoples internationally. And, in their view, if we can't bring other nations up to our level, then, at least we can bring ourselves down to their level. And, under the influence of such misguided ideals, this is exactly where we are headed.

For the operation of their society to be optimized, people must have a common sense of purpose and they must share a common vision of what they want their future to look like. Having an ideology in common is the key to creating such a shared sense of purpose and a common vision. In the past, Christianity provided our nation with its major source of vision. It acted as a kind of social glue. It was a belief system that most of the population shared and believed, in one form or another. Consequently, there tended to be a certain underlying similarity in outlook throughout the society. Christianity represented a shared set of values which led most people to see the world in similar ways. It was a powerful normalizing and homogenizing influence. For the better part of two centuries, Christianity was our de facto "national ideology." And some might even go so far as to say that it was our "understood" state religion. But due to a number of developments over the last two centuries, its authority has been constantly eroded. First, the rise of the secular-rational view of the world has undermined its moral authority. Christianity is no longer as credible as a source of moral authority due to the fact that science has challenged its claims to divine legitimacy. Secondly, members of other religious groups have used this development to get their foot in the door. For instance, Jews have understandably been among the most outspoken and energetic critics of attempts by the Christian church to extend its power into the secular state. And they have been among the most energetic groups that have been involved in attempts to curb its influence on civil society. And even as Christianity and Judaism share some common roots, at other points, there doctrines seem diametrically opposed. Ambassadors of good will from both religions have attempted to downplay the potential conflict between the two religions, but important sources of contention remain. And, the potential conflict between the two religions is only made worse by activists. For instance, using organizations like the ACLU as vehicles, Jews and other groups have been attempting to curb the authority of the Christian church. They have been attempting to reign in its influence on civil society, ostensibly for the purpose of promoting a more secular and rational view of the world. And yet, such measures only tend to further alienate more traditionally minded Christians.

There Are Consequences for Being Wrong, or for Failing to Be Right
Values, attitudes and beliefs are what the kulturkampf ultimately comes down to. And, believing the wrong things can have real world consequences. If the values, attitudes and beliefs of a people are not grounded in extensive knowledge from disparate sources, chances are that the people will miss the big picture. Chances are that the people will fail to see where their civilization is headed. And, chances are, when their civilization is headed in the wrong direction, they will fail to take the steps that are needed to correct its course. In other words, when people fail to base their beliefs about the world on extensive knowledge, the chances are good that they will be wrong. Being right requires a considerable investment in knowledge. This applies to making correct political and moral judgments as much as anything else. To the extent that the culture reinforces values which discourage people from making such investments in knowledge, the people, or a large majority of them, will tend to make serious errors in their political and moral judgments.

There are certain methods that are more appropriate for determining what is true. Too often people don't use these methods. Too often they adopt certain beliefs or values because they find these beliefs or values pleasant or reassuring. In effect, they want mind candy, and they don't want to undergo the more labor intensive process which determining the truth requires. This mental laziness is not likely to go unpunished. People must make the effort to determine if they hold values and beliefs which are most likely to serve the public interest over the longer term. If they fail to make the correct determinations, then their society will suffer, and they will suffer along with it.

Determining which values, attitudes and beliefs are most functional requires being self-critical and reflective. It requires undergoing the potentially uncomfortable process of critiquing your view of the world. It requires critically examining your own values and comparing them with other values. It requires you to ask yourself where did your values come from. Did you arrive at your values by a process of critical self examination, or did you arrive at your values because of some gut feeling? If you answered the latter, you may need to go back and reexamine your values. Where the formation of a world view is concerned, it is always good to consider the possibility that your world view could be missing something, or that it could be outright wrong. It is almost never a good idea to believe anything too strongly, until you have good reasons to believe that your investment in knowledge has been substantial enough to allow you to see the big picture. If people do not have a belief system, or an ideology, which allows them to form an accurate picture of what will be in the public interest over the longer term, their civilization will suffer, and they along with it.

Basically, what people in our society need is an ideology that contains the best features of liberalism and conservatism, while avoiding their limitations. To reach such an ideology requires an understanding of our norms, ethics and ideology in functional terms. That is, it requires people to understand values in terms of the functions they serve for their society. They need an objective standard against which to grade human values and value systems. And, as will be illustrated in the next chapter, such objective standards exists. Value systems can be ranked according to how well they conduce to a well ordered and smoothly operating society. If a certain value or set of values functions well generally, it is considered to be functional. Conversely, if a certain value or set of values function poorly, it is said to be dysfunctional. Of course you can make the argument that the social order which a set of values helps maintain is itself dysfunctional or ranks lower than the optimal. And, this very argument will be made later in this site. In particular, it will be argued that the liberal-democratic form of government, or our own form of government is not the ultimate form, and that a more advanced form lies beyond it.

Making determinations about which social form is optimal requires some rather complex moral calculations. Most people today are unable or are unwilling to perform such calculations. They tend to arrive at their moral or ideological beliefs by a route that is much less labor intensive. That is to say, most people (enough to influence the direction of society) tend to form their moral beliefs (or what they think is moral), by referencing what they "feel" is right, rather than by referencing reason and knowledge, which should be the primary sources of moral and political beliefs. Yet, once again, and largely due to nearly overwhelming cultural influences, people tend to use the wrong approach in forming their moral and political judgments. Perhaps the only thing that can reverse such trends is the extreme dysfunctions in society that such moral lapses will inevitably give rise to. Perhaps after our civilization has been steered onto the rocks, some people will begin to agree that we were probably headed in the wrong direction all along, and that we should probably alter our course in the future. But once it has reached this point, it is commonly too late to save a civilization without having to pay some extreme costs.

Currently, there is no strong force in our society which is advocating the kind of course change that needs to take place. The Zeitgeist remains dominated by values which are more closely associated with the liberal-progressive forces. It has strong institutional support from both the government and from the corporate sector. It has the full backing of the culture industry. And, by and large, it has the support of the people. The people remain oblivious to the dangers that the Zeitgeist poses for their society, and they have little or no conception of the costs it will impose on them personally in the future.

The Sophistication of the Electorate as a Factor in the Kulturkampf
Ultimately, in a representative democracy, the state of government can be blamed on the representatives that the people elect. And, in turn, the quality of their representatives can be blamed on the people. So, it would seem that, at least in a democracy, the people really are destined to reap what they sow. One of the main methods by which people in this country choose their political candidates is on the basis of their likability, or by means of the so called likability heuristic. That is to say, most people do not form their preferences for a political candidate based on where the candidate stands on certain issues or in relation to certain principles. Rather, they based their preferences on whether or not the candidate seems seems "likable," or whether or not they like the candidate as a person. This is not a rational way for people to evaluate candidates in whom the public interest is to be entrusted. And yet, this is the method that people in contemporary America most commonly use to select their political candidates. Alternatively, people select their political candidates on the basis of where these candidates stand in relation to their favored ideological label, or on the basis of party label.

When people rely on ideological labels to make their political choices, they are basically using these labels as a proxy for a deeper understanding of the abstract principles which these labels represent. People who rely on ideological labels to make their political choices will typically support or oppose political candidates based on their perception of where the candidates stand in relation to their favored ideological label. By relying on ideological labels as a shortcut, people feel they can avoid having to learn more about either the candidates or the issues. They make similar shortcuts in their political decisions making when they simply vote straight tickets, or when they rely on party label to make their political choices.

Still another class of voters will rely on a deeper understanding of liberal or conservative ideologies to make their political choices. These are the true liberals and conservatives who form the activist cores of the major parties. Because liberalism and conservatism are both suboptimal ideologies, people who rely on these ideologies will tend to choose political candidates who are less likely to maximize the public interest over the longer term. And, because political decisions have a moral dimension, by referencing suboptimal ideologies (those which are not most conducive to the public interest over the longer term) in making their own political decisions, both liberals and conservatives tend to make decisions about the public interest which are immoral.

The state of the public's ideological beliefs can have a major impact on the overall condition of their civilization. And when their value systems are dysfunctioning, or when they hold beliefs which lead them to an incorrect understanding of the public interest, then obviously, in order to improve the condition of their civilization, or to prevent its condition from getting worse, they will need to change or abandon their beliefs. But to what extent are the people even capable of changing their fundamental beliefs when they don't rely on well reasoned arguments to determine their beliefs in the first place? If no amount of well reasoned arguments can change people's minds, then well reasoned arguments may be the wrong approach. People in this generation may be destined to learn by a method in which reason does not even play a major role. They may be destined to learn in a way that people have learned throughout history. That is to say, they may be destined to learn the hard way. People may only begin to abandon their commitments to ideologies like liberalism and conservatism as a result of experiencing the full range of consequences that naturally proceed from the kinds of moral failures which a commitment to either or these ideologies represents. These failures will eventually impose such terrible costs, that the people will simply be forced to change their values, attitudes and beliefs.

The physical conditions of life are what matters most where stasis and change of belief systems are concerned. And for as long as material conditions of life remain roughly acceptable to them, the people are likely to retain their ideologies, because of the psychological supports that they provide, no matter how dysfunctional or costly these ideologies may be over the longer term. As long as living standards remain high, and as long as conditions remain generally conducive to their happiness, people will be reluctant to undergo the more labor intensive process which reasoned and critical analysis of their society and their belief systems requires. But as soon as things begin to go bad for them in any significant way, they may easily become more receptive to the idea that neither liberalism nor conservatism are likely to serve their long term interests. Until they become willing to look at their belief systems more critically, the fate of their civilization will hang in the balance.

Why Does it Matter Who Wins the Kulturkampf?
Who wins the kulturkampf is important because it will determine the kind of life that Americans will have for many generations to come, and it will determine the ultimate course of our civilization. For the reasons given, if either the liberal-progressives or the cultural or religious conservatives prevail it will not be the best outcome, and it could easily be among the worst. There is little doubt that the kulturkampf will be decided, one way or another, in this century. There are basically two ways to look at the battle and who wins it. According to one view, the fate of our civilization is already predetermined and its course is set. There is little or nothing that we can do as individuals to alter its course. We are more or less just along for the ride. That is to say, according to this view, there is a natural course that our society will tend to follow under conditions of relative freedom. But, this view presumes that we are not already under the influence of ideologies or belief systems which are in some degree not natural or which do not reflect the sum total of our species essence. Even if the dominant ideologies of liberalism and conservatism contain elements that reflect the extremes of our psyche in its more or less natural state, they do not reflect the synthesis of this psyche, which would be necessary to most closely approximate the species interest. Until these elements of the psyche have been reconciled and integrated into one coherent belief system, what is in the interest of the species cannot be envisioned, much less maximized. And, until this is done, we will remain divided, and our course will be anything but natural.

What is most natural for the species is what is most in accord with its interests. That is to say, it is not a natural condition for one or the other dimension of the psyche to dominate our belief systems. In order to reflect the species interest, our fundamental belief systems must be in a synthetic form, or a form which accounts for and integrates the most important inputs from both sides of the psyche. If one side prevails in determining the course of society, it will tend to create dysfunctions and will trigger a reaction by the opposite ideological extreme. Only when the two ideological extremes have been successfully integrated into a synthetic belief system can the species interest be maximized. Synthesis, rather than polarized ideologies like liberalism or conservatism, emerges as the belief system that is most natural and most consistent with our interests as a species.

Still, the idea that we are already on a predetermined course which cannot be altered is in some degree responsible for the attitude of fatalism which some have been inclined to adopt. To some, the course of our civilization is predetermined. The people will follow those values which they are most "naturally" inclined to follow (under prevailing cultural influences and under the influence of distorted ideologies) in the current cultural situation in which they find themselves in, or the values that they form in this environment are the result of the unfolding of their nature. But once again, this view ignores the influence of current ideologies. This ignores the influence of prevailing normative systems associated with the Zeitgeist like secular humanism and values in the popular culture on their psyche. Such ideologies are not natural in any true and complete sense, or they are not natural for us at our current stage of development, and given our current level of knowledge. What is most natural for us has two meanings. What is natural for us given the sum total of our temperaments and behavioral propensities is one thing; and what is natural for us after we have gained certain knowledge of human nature or our knowledge of our own behavioral propensities themselves, is something else. This is what distinguishes a society based on principles of natural law from one which is not.

In the degree that a society is in accord with our nature, mediated by reason and knowledge of our nature, then it tends to be in accord with natural law, and it tends to be stable. Polar ideologies tend to reflect temperaments and interests that are associated with one pole of the psyche but not the other. Consequently, societies which are organized on principles that are more closely associated with one pole than the other will tend to be unstable. They will be unstable in the degtee that they do not reflect the sum total of human interests. That is to say, they are only partial and do not reflect a comprehensive understanding of human interests which in some degree makes them unnatural. Being complete or in a state of equilibrium is more natural (once a certain level of knowledge has been attained, and at a certain historical stage of our development, which we have now reached. Being incomplete reflects imbalance and portends systemic instability down the line.

The other view is that we determine our own nature in a large degree, and that we are free to choose the values we will adopt. That is, we set out to adopt values or ideals that we believe will be best for ourselves, if not best for society. Often these values may coincide with some underlying sentiments or temperamental inclinations that are associated with one or the other temperamental poles we have. If we follow a path of normative development that coincides with either temperamental pole more or less exclusively, it will be the wrong path. For even if the values that people hold are the a close reflection of their sentiments, in the degree that they are not mediated by what reason and knowledge suggests will be in the interest of the species over the longer term, they will not lead us to an accurate conception of the species interest. Even if the people hold values that are a close reflection of their sentiments, if these values are not mediated by a carefully reasoned assessment of their circumstances, or if they are not mediated by reason and knowledge, then following their natural inclinations (depending on their temperamental essence) can easily lead them in the wrong direction, at certain points. That is to say, the feelings people have can lead people to embrace principles which they "believe" to be moral, but which will in fact fail important functional moral tests.

Conversely, if they operate on the basis of substantially less than complete knowledge, and even if they choose values on the basis of reason and knowledge, if they are operating from a very limited knowledge base, people can also be led in the wrong direction. Thus, if the forces of suboptimal reason prevail, or if the forces of sentiment prevail, in either case, we will end up in a place. In either case we will not end up with the best conceivable world and could easily end up with one of the worst. So ultimately, this is what "kulturkampf" is all about. It is about the battle for the life of our civilization. It is about the battle between two prevailing world views, and an emergent world view that is more closely associated with principles of synthesis and functional moral principles. Here, we have identified the three major forces that are involved in the kulturkampf, one of which has not yet made its appearance in any significant way. That is, on one side we have the liberal-progressives, on the other side we have the religious and cultural conservatives, and, in reaction to both of these, we have synthesists. In order to make their case and in order to stand any chance of prevailing in the kulturkampf, synthesists will need to rely on the best arguments of both liberals and conservatives. For once again, the liberal and conservative views of the world contain truths that we should be paying attention to in order to arrive at a more comprehensively rational determination of the public interest. However, synthesists should not expect any help from liberals or conservatives. Liberals and conservatives are locked in a bitter struggle against one another. At least for the time being, it is more likely that the efforts of synthesists will go largely unnoticed by combatant on both sides. This highlights yet another reason why neither liberals nor conservatives can save our civilization. They are are so preoccupied with fighting one another that they are missing the big picture. The task of going beyond these polar ideologies and of piecing together the big picture falls to synthesists.

Perhaps our society really is locked onto some course that is predetermined by our nature. Perhaps it is now on a course which coincides most closely with views and values that are closely tied to average temperamental and cognitive propensities as a species. Or perhaps it is on a course that is mainly a function of our current cultural and technological stage. In either case, perhaps no amount of effort is likely to change our course. Perhaps, as a species, we are predestined to follow a certain course. And perhaps our society is predestined to experience a certain outcome. Yet, if we believe such things, then we must also believe that we do not have freedom of will. For the essence of freedom of will is being "free" to act in ways that are either in accord with our interests, or against them. Reason suggests that we do have freedom of will, and that we can choose either a course that will maximize our interests, or we can choose a course that will not be in our interest at all. Alternatively, perhaps, as a people, we are not even deciding at all. That is, perhaps due mainly to our own moral and ideological ambivalence, we are simply failing to make the moral decisions that would be most consistent with our interests over the longer term. Perhaps we are deferring moral judgments in the belief that they may not be necessary, and that some technological advances will come along to extricate us from our current difficulties as a species. This is most likely a false hope, unless of course you count moral, political and ideological advances as "technologies."