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PEPTALK: POLITICS, ETHICS
AND PHILOSOPHY TARGETING AMERICANS LOOKING FOR KNOWLEDGE
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ABSTRACT
It is the main contention of the work
to follow that "liberal" democracy does not represent the final stage of
man's social and political development, and that it does contain the seeds
of a more stable, "sustainable" and progressive stage within it.
As a form of government, liberal democracy exhibits fundamental flaws at
both an ideological and a material level. These flaws will prove sufficient
to "restart" the historical process, and will lead to the emergence of
a further historical stage. At the psychological and ideological
level, liberal democratic consumer based societies fail to satisfy a variety
of important psychic needs. At the material level, environmental
damage and depletion of key resource like petroleum threaten the consumption
and production base on which liberal democracy has grown so dependent.
A combination of ideological and material forces will eventually combine
to turn "liberal" democracy into a new form of democracy. These conclusions
are particularly relevant to the philosophy of both the A.S.P. and the
A.C.C.
In The End of History and the Last Man, Francis Fukuyama argues that liberal democracy marks the "end of history" and may constitute "the end point of mankind's ideological evolution." Fukuyama posed this argument in the sense that the twin ideals of liberty and equality, upon which liberal democracy is based, could not be improved upon. As liberty and equality are among the highest ideals to which human beings have aspired, a political form which is based upon these ideals is presumed to be inherently stable, and fundamentally free from the kinds of "grave defects and irrationalities" which have ultimately led to the collapse of previous political forms. On these grounds, principally, Fukuyama concludes that "history, understood as a single, coherent, evolutionary process"of the emergence of successively more progressive forms has ended, and that this process has culminated in the political form that we know today as liberal democracy.
In framing his argument, and in drawing his conclusions, Fukuyama relies heavily on Hegel's model of historical processes; particularly Hegel's idea of thesis, antithesis, and synthesis. Like Hegel, Fukuyama tends to see history as the unfolding of successively more rational and progressive political forms. As each successively more perfect political form makes its way onto the stage of world history, the imperfections and internal contradictions which remain within it begin to manifest themselves over time. Once these defects become apparent, and especially, once they begin to adversely impact various interests in society, political forces are generated which are intended to rectify these defects. In terms of Hegel's concepts of thesis, antithesis, and synthesis, the conservative forces that are engaged in preserving a particular political form, due to their recognition of the "truths" it represents, or due to the advantages such a system affords them, would be analogous to the "thesis." Conversely, the progressive forces which are dedicated to resolving the internal contradictions and correcting the defects that remain in a political form would represent the "antithesis."
As the conservative and progressive forces confront one another, the ensuing conflict leads to a further historical stage, and to a more advanced political form, which is relatively more free from the kinds of irrationalities which gave rise to the conflict in the first place. This new political form would correspond to Hegel's idea of "synthesis." To the extent that this new political form still contained fundamental flaws, and was not totally free from irrationalities, it would only represent a "relative" synthesis, as opposed to the "absolute" synthesis which would mark the "end of history." Necessarily, the process of history continues, until such an absolute synthesis is reached. History is presumed to end, according to Hegel's model, when the cycle of thesis-antithesis and resulting synthesis has repeated itself to the point where a political form is produced in which the remaining contradictions are insufficient to generate the kinds of internal pressures needed to give rise to a further historical stage.
Although greatly simplified, this is the basic model for understanding the historical process which both Hegel and Fukuyama seem to have in mind. However, while Hegel's historical process culminates in the absolute synthesis of the Prussian state, for Fukuyama, it culminates in liberal democracy. Fukuyama draws upon a wide variety of world events to form his conclusions, principally, liberal democracy's recent triumph over rival political forms.
Over the past two decades especially, major political events, such as the collapse of the Soviet Union, and the fall of numerous dictatorships around the world, contribute strong support to Fukuyama's claim that liberal democracy constitutes the "end point of mankind's ideological evolution." Having vanquished radical contenders on both the political left and the political right, liberal democracy has emerged as a hegemonic ideological force. In combination with the economic system of global capitalism which it has largely made possible, liberal democracy appears to be the only political form to which nations today can reasonably aspire. And, by comparison with the political forms which it has displaced, namely, monarchism, fascism, and communism, liberal democracy would seem to be more stable and free from fundamental internal contradictions. Being "relatively" free from such contradictions, the forces which might give rise to any further historical stages would seem to be "largely" absent from liberal democracy.
The triumph of liberal democracies over rival political forms would seem to stand as confirmation that liberal democracy is the form of government which most closely reflects certain timeless and universal human aspirations. Liberal democracy would also seem to be the political form which most closely coincides with certain aspects of human nature, and certain ideals which have been recurring themes throughout Western political thought. In particular, the origins of the twin ideals of liberty and equality, can be traced along a path of intellectual development which extends from ancient Greece through the American Revolution. As the form of government in which these ideals achieve their fullest expression, liberal democracy stands as a monument to Western political thought, and to the humanist intellectual tradition more generally. On these accounts, the conceptual arsenal of liberal democracy would seem to contain a virtually invincible collection of intellectual armor, which stands ready to come to its defense. And yet, there would appear to be some very important chinks in this armor. In fact, it may be possible to identify many potential sources of instability which could potentially "restart" history and thereby challenge the notion that liberal democracy marks an "absolute synthesis" or the final, and most permanent stage of mankind's political development.
Despite its obvious superiority to the
rival political forms which have challenged it thusfar, there are ample
reasons to suspect that liberal democracy has limitations which will at
some point prove sufficient to deny it the status of "the end point of
mankind's ideological evolution." There are reasons as well to suspect
that liberal democracy is not totally free from the kind of fundamental
contradictions which represent "seeds" that could give birth to a "more
absolute" ideological synthesis. Even at this early stage of its hegemony,
potentially powerful forces can be identified which could challenge liberal
democracy, and which could conceivably give rise to an even more stable,
progressive, and lasting political form which is even more free from fundamental
contradictions.
For a number of decades, Marxist scholars in the former Soviet Republics were confident that Marxism marked the end point of the historical process. Why should the conclusions of Western scholars that history has culminated in liberal democracy be any less suspect? First, there are the obvious signs of success which liberal democracy has enjoyed, at the expense of rival political forms. Most scholars in both the East and the West now accept that consumer oriented liberal democracies tend to do a much better job of satisfying the basic human needs and the material wants of their people than any of the leading systemic alternatives on either the political left or the political right. Consequently, consumerism would appear to be a major source of internal stability for liberal democracies. By comparison with other political forms, liberal democracy would appear to be the system which is most conducive to human happiness, and which seems most capable of producing the material conditions under which people wish to live. And yet, liberal democracy, and by extension, consumerism, does not even begin to address the totality of human psychic needs, as evidenced by the continued role of religion and a panoply of other phenomena which function as "ideological surrogates."
Traditionally, the religions which have had the closest association with liberal democracy, namely, Judaism and Christianity, have provided individuals with a source of transcendental purpose and moral authority which could not be provided by liberal democracy, or by the pursuit of material concerns alone. As a source of higher meaning and moral authority, religious beliefs in general have contributed to the "regime stability" of liberal democracies. Yet, increasingly, this source of regime stability has come under threat itself, partly as a result of the spread of a science based, naturalistic understanding of the world. As one of the most important by-products of the enlightenment and the industrial revolution, the propagation of a secular world view has presented a direct challenge to the more literal, orthodox interpretations of traditional religious beliefs. As a result, traditional religious beliefs have tended to lose legitimacy as a source of moral authority. Consequently, it can be argued that this loss of legitimacy has contributed to the erosion of the normative foundations upon which liberal democracy has been built.
As the moral authority of traditional religions has declined, the major secular belief systems which ostensibly served ideological functions similar to those of religion, and which competed with liberal democracies, have experienced an even more dramatic decline. Yet, for certain individuals, these mass belief systems provided a source of meaning and higher purpose. To the extent that individuals continue to have ontological needs for which belief systems are the best solution, the combined loss of both transcendental and secular sources of meaning around the world has left an "ideological vacuum." To the extent that such an ideological vacuum exists, the potential for the appearance of an ideology which is capable of posing a systemic threat to liberal democracy, has grown.
In the relative absence of viable ideological alternatives to liberal democracy, a host of "ideological surrogates" have served to partially fill the ideological vacuum left by the decline of transcendental belief systems or by the demise of secular alternatives to liberal democracy. These surrogates take a number of forms, but may be generally defined as any category of activities which either entertain or provide diversion, and thereby prevent individuals from engaging in the kinds of critical thought processes which could undermine the social or political order. As such, ideological surrogates would include a host of physical and cognitive activities which tend to contribute to regime stability; such as sports, entertainment, hobbies, interpersonal relationships, vocational pursuits, and especially, "consumption." By satiating both physical and psychological desires, the activity of consumption leaves less and less of a justification for either questioning or challenging the social, economic, or political order. When people are basically getting what they want out of life, at the purely sensate level of existence, they are much less inclined to challenge the fundamentals of the political order. Consequently, a vital consumer economy provides an important source of stability for liberal democratic societies. On these grounds, principally, it can be argued that liberal democracies, as they are currently constituted, have become dangerously dependent on consumerism for their high degree of internal stability; and that if conditions were to arise which threatened this basis of support, liberal democracies could easily prove to be not quite so timeless and so stable.
To the degree that consumerism serves as an ideological surrogate, or takes the place of a more sophisticated belief system designed to satisfy important ontological needs, and which serve similar functions as full blown ideologies, a consumer based society appears vulnerable to the charge that it is unable to provide the individual with a higher sense of meaning or purpose, beyond the acts of production and consumption. At least the rival ideological forms with which liberal democracy has had to contend were ostensibly better at providing individuals with a sense of collective unity and higher purpose. On these and similar accounts, it can be argued that the singular concern with generating and then satiating individual material wants might ultimately prove to be the Achilles' heel of liberal democracy.
Preserving the bonds of community which serve as the basis for civic and political life more generally would seem vitally necessary to the preservation of liberal democracy. A number of scholars, both ancient and modern, have noted the tendency for personal affiliations and community life to suffer as individuals become more preoccupied with material concerns, and with the attainment of wealth, in particular. A general moral decline would inevitably seem to attend growing affluence and the rising standard of living which have become the principal aims of consumer based liberal democracies. In short, when a society's principal activity is consumption, or the pursuit of wealth, history suggests that these activities are inevitably associated with moral decadence and a period of decline. A host of political philosophers ranging from Epicurus to Rousseau have grasped the potential weaknesses of a political system which becomes too greatly preoccupied with material goals. In fact, the corrupting influence which wealth is presumed to have upon morals is one of the oldest and most well established themes in Western political philosophy. The exceptional ability of liberal democratic societies to satisfy material wants and to generate wealth would inevitably seem to create the conditions which tend to undermine the values on which liberal democracy depends.
A number of modern scholars have identified the popular culture as the the principal vehicle of moral decline in liberal democratic societies. As an offshoot of a larger consumer culture, popular culture can be thought of as a powerful ideological surrogate, to the extent that it preoccupies individuals with sensory stimulation, rather than facilitating higher cognition and critical thought. From one point of view, critical thinking skills are associated with an increase in political sophistication, which one would expect to favor democratic institutions. But, from another point of view, regime stability of liberal democracies is enhanced by providing people with diversion. According to at least one school of thought involved in the "liberal" critique of liberal democracy (the Frankfurt school), popular culture is by far one of the most powerful diversionary influences, which masks problems inherent to life in a liberal democratic society. What can be seen from one point of view as mere entertainment, can be seen from another point of view as a "functional" suppresser of "dysfunctional" pressures on a political system. Leading conservative critics (Bork, 1996; Berman, 2000; et. al.) have also identified popular culture as one of the principal vehicles for moral decline in liberal democratic societies. However, the supposed excesses of popular culture are only one manifestation of a larger phenomenon which involves the unprecedented expansion of a variety of "personal" freedoms more generally.
If the principal founders of the United States were alive today, it is doubtful that they would be inclined to give their blessing to the "form" which many of our accepted freedoms have taken; the popular culture being a case in point. Of course, no one can say for certain who the founders would side with in the conflict between "cultural" liberals and "cultural" conservatives. But based upon the belief in the dignity of the individual that becomes apparent in many of the writings of Thomas Jefferson in particular, it is likely that he would strongly object to a culture that detracts from this dignity, or one which routinely depicts man as a hedonistic and unprincipled being. Similarly, Jefferson would likely have a problem with the popular understanding of freedom, as it is embraced today. A careful reading of their principal works reveals that neither Madison nor Jefferson, nor any of the other founders, understood freedom primarily in terms of freedom "to" as much as they understood it in terms of freedom "from". In other words, the founders understood freedom primarily in terms of freedom from despotic rule. The understanding of "personal" freedom that is common today would seem to be a corruption of the term "freedom" as it was generally used and understood by the founders. To the extent that this new, more "liberal" understanding of freedom is a departure in practice from the original intentions of the founders, it may represent a potentially powerful destabilizing force in modern liberal democracy.
The principal economic activity of all major liberal democracies involves the provision of consumer goods and services. The ability to provide a high standard of living would appear to stand as a natural bulwark against social instability in liberal democracies. By extension, liberal democracies would appear to have grown critically dependent on the physical resources needed to sustain the high rates of production which are necessary for maintaining a high standard of living. The depletion of certain natural resources required by the production process on the one hand, and environmental problems that result from this process on the other, suggest that an ever increasing standard of living is not infinitely sustainable. If living standards should come under threat, due to either the depletion of resources, or due to environmental damage resulting from the production process, such developments could easily undermine the stability of liberal democracies, and threaten to restart the historical process.
In becoming excessively dependent on consumerism as a source of internal stability, liberal democracies have made themselves particularly vulnerable to disruptions in the supply of those resources which are needed to maintain the cycle of production and consumption. Inevitably, consumption at current levels must lead to the depletion of certain nonrenewable resources, or must place strains on renewable resources, which are critical to the production process on which a high standard of living depends. Petroleum stands out as the single most important material resource on which liberal democracies depend for their economic vitality, and, by extension, their internal stability. Thusfar, despite periodic shortages which are artificial in nature, and which are typically related to transient political events, petroleum availability has not run into "hard limits." When a natural resource encounters hard limits, the "ability" to produce the resource consistently falls short of the demand for the resource. At projected rates of consumption, we may not encounter hard limits on petroleum for another 50 years; by which time alternative sources of energy will likely be supplying a major portion of our energy needs. However, even if alternative energy sources are developed and become economical, there still remains the problem of producing a wide variety of consumer goods which depend upon depletable resources like petroleum for their manufacture. The relative increase in the scarcity and the cost of petroleum can be expected to have dramatic ripple effects throughout consumer economies, as the cost of every product which is in any way dependent upon petroleum for its manufacture or distribution increases.
The possibility of resource depletion and environmental collapse, accelerated by a system of global capitalism, stand out as legitimate arguments against the economic system which liberal democracy has fostered, and upon which it has grown dependent. Such arguments, which typically emanate from the political left, have yet to be fully incorporated into the "liberal" democratic ethos. If the values which serve as the basis for such arguments were fully incorporated into a political form, or if they were successfully melded with liberal democratic values, the logical resultant would be a democracy which would look far different from "liberal" democracy. This new form of democracy could easily lead to the "considerable abridgment" of what we currently take for granted in the way of a broad spectrum of individual freedoms; key among these being reproductive freedoms. State sanctioned population control, more stringent regulations on land usage and development, and other similar measures designed to conserve resources, become easily conceivable in an overpopulated world with limited resources. And even if people recognized the need for these measures and democratically adopted them, the resultant political form could no longer be accurately described as "liberal" democracy . The emergence of such a new political form, to deal with conditions of scarcity, or to deal with a "decrease in relative abundance," would mark a further stage of history, to the extent that this form proved more lasting, stable, and "sustainable" than "liberal" democracy. On this account as well, liberal democracy would appear to contain the seeds of further synthesis which have the potential to restart the historical process.
According to Hegel's understanding, the historical process reaches its terminus when a political form has been created in which all remaining fundamental irrationalities have been eliminated and in which all fundamental remaining contradictions have been resolved. The ultimate political form would also be the form which most closely reflects a total understanding of human nature. Consequently, the end of history thesis presumes that there are certain constants of human nature, and that when man's essential political institutions have evolved to the point where they most closely reflect a full understanding of this nature, or when man has achieved "a form of society which satisfied its deepest and most fundamental longings" human political forms would have reached a point at which there would be no fundamental changes in its underlying principles and institutions.
To the extent that liberal democracy more closely conforms to certain timeless aspects of human nature than alternative political forms, the claim that liberal democracy marks the end point of mankind's ideological evolution would seem to have some legitimacy. Yet, there are reasons to suspect that it may not reflect a total understanding of human nature. For our concepts of human nature and human progress are largely a legacy of the humanist movement. Consequently, those events that we interpret as signs of historical progress are largely defined in terms of the fulfillment of humanist ideals themselves.
If we are to interpret the claim that history has ended, and culminated in the political form of liberal democracy in its strictest sense, then, by extension, we are led to believe that history has ended for all time, and that liberal democracy represents the "absolute" synthesis, or the final end point of human social evolution. And, within the conceptual bounds of the humanist principles upon which it is based, "human" history has ended. For what constitutes "human" history is defined mainly in terms of progress towards the fulfillment of certain "humanist" ideals upon which liberal democracies are based, and whose conceptual origins can be traced back to our earliest philosophical traditions. In fact, what we know today as "liberal" democracy appears to mark the logical culmination of a historical process that has been taking place for thousands of years. On the one hand, it represents the fulfillment of democratic ideals which can trace their origins to ancient Greece. On the other hand, it marks the fulfillment of other humanist principles which are more closely associated with various enlightenment philosophers ranging from Kant and Hegel, to Rousseau. As humanism, and what it means to be essentially human has come to be known by way of these traditions, it might be more appropriate to ask: How could liberal democracy not be the end of history? Considered within the framework of humanist principles, to suggest that history could possibly culminate in any other political form would seem to violate the integrity of the entire historical model upon which Western philosophical traditions have been built. This would not only seem to pose a direct challenge to Western liberal democratic values and to the intellectual traditions which underwrite their legitimacy, but it would also seem to threaten to turn the entire humanist project on its head. Correspondingly, one might expect there to be great intellectual resistance to any conclusions other than the conclusion that history has ended, and that it has culminated in liberal democracy. And, while Western scholars like Fukuyama readily acknowledge that liberal democracy may still encounter numerous "operational" difficulties, to the extent that liberal democracy still represents the essential fulfillment of the humanist project, both it and the humanist project mark conceptual points beyond which we cannot see.
The fact that we can conceive of continuing human activity outside of humanist ideals does not immediately threaten the validity of the end of history thesis, as Fukuyama himself has pointed out (Fukuyama, p. xii). For we can readily conceive of continuing thought, action, and dialogue outside of the conceptual limits of liberal democracy, which could possibly result in the emergence of some new social and political forms. Such forms, were they to challenge liberal democracy, might suggest a restart of the historical process. For, under certain circumstances, a new variant of one of the former chief protagonists of either the political left or the political right might reassert themselves and pose yet another challenge to liberal democratic hegemony. Yet, the appearance of such challengers, and the conflicts that would likely ensue between them and liberal democracies, would not constitute a "restart" of history, except in the degree that the conflict led to the creation of a political form which was more inherently stable and more free from internal contradictions than liberal democracy.
Because liberal democracy is the political form which history suggests is both most internally stable and most capable of integrating useful changes (i.e. most progressive), within our current conceptual framework, liberal democracy would appear to represent an optimal synthesis of progressive and static forces. As such, it would appear to most nearly reflect "human" nature or, at least, the nature of the man who has been "enlightened" through recognition of the superiority of the principles associated with humanism and democratic theory. Actually, it may turn out that "the nature of man" as understood in the context of humanism, may not correspond to the totality of human nature. The understanding of human essence, as it has come to be known by way of the spirit of the enlightenment, and in the context of humanist traditions, may prove to be incomplete. For this understanding of man was not informed by modern scientifically based knowledge of human behavior.
The concept of man which has emerged from the enlightenment may prove deficient on other counts as well. If a case could be made that the concept of man which emerged from the enlightenment was biased, or that it tended to favor certain groups who had a vested interest in preserving certain philosophical traditions, or a certain world view, then such concepts of man may prove to be time bound and culturally relative. Even if the concepts of man inherited from the enlightenment turn out to be superior in practice to any of the alternatives which have emerged so far, they may still be time bound and culturally relative. On these accounts, the understanding of man which we have inherited from the enlightenment may not completely or accurately reflect the totality of human nature as it actually exists. For again, knowledge of certain underlying human propensities is only now being revealed with the help of modern social science. In the absence of such knowledge, how could the timeless constants of human behavior possibly be known in their entirety?
In opposition to this, one might argue that the timeless constants of justice and democratic principles which serve as the foundations for liberal democracy do not derive their legitimacy or meaning from "scientific knowledge." Rather, they are based upon some type of "a priori" knowledge which is available to all men, without the benefit of science. In other words, these constants are what men tend to learn about themselves naturally, just by virtue of living in society with other men. Thus, according to this view, the principles upon which liberal democracy is based, being "self evident truths," cannot be improved by science. Consequently, it is entirely possible that the core principles upon which liberal democracies are based, and which have been derived chiefly from the ancients, and from enlightenment philosophers, may yet prove sufficient to provide the conceptual underpinnings for a political system which is best suited to man's nature. Understood in these terms, the main purpose of modern social science is merely to add to our ability to explain our actions, and we should not look to science to reveal anything fundamentally new about our inherent natures as men. This being the case, we should not expect social science to reveal any new principles which could be used to prescribe the forms which our political institutions should take. Yet, it is the whole premise of the modern "social engineering" project that social science can be used to prescribe how we should model our social, economic, and political institutions. If social science cannot further our understanding of human nature, and if it cannot recommend the forms that our political institutions should take, its legitimacy and its importance would seem to be brought into question.
If man's nature is substantially static, but is only now coming into full view with the benefit of modern social science, then how could a social and political form correspond to this nature when it is based on ideals which formed centuries ago without the benefit of this knowledge. If static, then man's nature must conform to a biological essence which science is only now beginning to understand. Alternatively, if man's nature is not entirely static, but is constantly evolving, then how could a particular political form, e.g. liberal democracy, always conform most closely to this nature. In either case, liberal democracy could not be said to conform completely to a "timeless essence" of man, and no single political form could possibly mark the culmination of man's political evolution.
If human nature is not a timeless quality which is somehow tied to the biological essence of the species, but is more largely a social construct, or the product of human conventions, then it is constantly changing and evolving. If man's nature is constantly evolving, then the political form which is most in accordance with that nature must also be constantly changing and evolving. Consequently, no political stage could represent the end of history. And yet, admittedly, there may be aspects of liberal democracy which are essentially timeless, or which reflect parts of the total human essence, which can come into view without the benefit of science, and which are important features of the most lasting and stable political form, in a particular epoch.
We can conceive of human activity continuing outside the conceptually closed system of humanism. Similarly, we can imagine alternative political forms presenting themselves as a challenge to liberal democracy. And yet, in the degree that these alternative social and political forms fail to accurately or completely reflect true underlying human nature in some greater degree than liberal democracy, such actions would not constitute a "restart" of the historical process within the strict definition of this term. History could only be restarted by the emergence of a more "advanced" social and political form, or one which was more free from fundamental internal contradictions on the one hand, and which more closely accounted for or reflected the totality of human essence on the other. Yet, within the context of humanist ideals, this would not appear to be possible. For within the context of humanist ideals, liberal democracy is the culmination of the historical process and is the full realization of human ideals. Liberal democracy will continue to mark the end of "human" history in so far as the bounds of human history are defined in terms of the fulfillment of humanist principles upon which liberal democracy is based.
These difficulties illustrate that the end of history thesis is subject to at least two interpretations. On the one hand, liberal democracy does mark the culmination of history as the political form in which certain ideals associated with the long history of democratic and humanist traditions have been realized. On the other hand, Homo Sapiens are quite capable of thoughts and actions beyond these ideals. And presumably, unless they are incapable of social evolution, or unless their essential natures as men have run into some natural evolutionary boundaries endemic to the species, other as yet undiscovered principles for organizing human societies may emerge. These principles may serve as the basis for an even more perfect social and political system which more closely reflects an "absolute" synthesis of certain ideals and tendencies that are inherent to human nature as it already exists. Alternatively, such principles may reflect a more complete synthesis of human nature, as this nature has been reconstituted, due to either social or biological evolution.
To be most stable and enduring, a social
and political form must most closely reflect and account for the totality
of human nature. It must be the political form which most nearly accounts
for the naturally occurring diversity of human predispositions and interests.
It must also be the form which has been most successful at integrating
those potentially conflicting strains in human nature to form a stable
ideological matrix. In the degree that certain liberal democratic ideals
have strong inherent appeal, they would be major parts of the optimal ideological
matrix. For the most part, and in comparison with previous historical stages,
liberal democracy appears to represent the political form which most nearly
reflects naturally occurring human desires. But, as illustrated above,
there are important reasons for suspecting that liberal democratic values
do not represent the total matrix, and that these values do not as yet
reflect a complete understanding of man. Moreover, to the extent that liberal
democracy has not yet reconciled conflicting values associated with a variety
of political and philosophical traditions, and not yet incorporated these
values into
its own framework, the argument can
be made that it still provides grounds for a further historical stage.
Arguably, the fundamental values associated with liberal democracy do not reflect a complete understanding of human nature, and these values are in need of mediation or tempering by other values with which they may "currently" be in tension. For instance, the value of liberty would seem to be in a need of mediation or tempering by values which emphasize order, predictability, service to the community, and values which occasionally call upon the individual to subordinate his interests and preferences for the sake of defending the higher principles upon which the system depends. To these values can be added the need to ascribe a higher purpose to personal activity than simple satiation of an endless supply of individual tastes and desires. These alternative values, rather than opposing liberal democratic principles, could conceivably be made to complement them. They could conceivably be melded with the twin principles of liberty and equality to form a stable ideological matrix.
Do to their relative permanence and strength as central themes in our political discourse, key liberal and conservative values would appear to strike responsive chords deep within the human psyche. Consequently, these values may represent important parts of the total essence of man which have not been either fully reconciled with each other, or have not been fully accommodated within a liberal democratic framework. To the extent that these values have somehow been left out of the mix, it suggests that fundamental points of potential instability remain within liberal democracy.
The expression of conflicting political, ethical, and philosophical strains which are nurtured in political discourse, and which face off against one another in the world of politics, represents one of the most dramatic and enduring features of liberal democracies. The fact that there is continuing conflict between these opposing ideological forces, and that they continue to be separated by such a wide gulf of sentiments and opinions, is clear indication that they exist only in their unreconciled, unmediated, and unsynthesized forms. As such, they provide the basis for the polar political movements of the left and the right which characterize the "normal operations" of liberal democracies today. Yet, at some point, potentially, these unmediated forms, or these polar ideologies, would appear to have potential to form a higher synthesis. To the extent that there is an active debate and a well developed dialogue between liberals and conservatives, there are grounds for believing that fundamental problems which will lend themselves to discussion in a liberal-conservative framework can be reconciled substantially in a dialectical process and synthesis of which Hegel spoke. To the extent that an even more durable and stable ideological matrix can be imagined, in which important elements of the left and the right are present in a mediated, and synthesized form, then "liberal" democracy does not have clear title to the "end point of mankind's ideological evolution."
The pinnacle of human social and political development would presumably involve the appearance of a political form in which the most important and potentially conflicting underlying strains of human nature had been "more completely" reconciled to yield an optimally stable and lasting ideological matrix. Liberal democracy arguably constitutes such a matrix in the current historical epoch. However, there are signs within liberal democracy which suggest that an even more stable and enduring ideological matrix is possible. Specifically, the persistence of strong, unrepentant, and deeply entrenched liberal and conservative factions in liberal democracies like the United States seem to stand out for their potential to achieve a higher synthesis. To a large degree, these groups on the political left and right have succeeded in polarizing the political process. In so doing, they have alienated large numbers of potential participants in this process who tend to have more moderate or eclectic views. If an ideological synthesis could be formed from key aspects of the political left and the political right; if a political doctrine could be promulgated which was based upon this synthesis; if the doctrine thus formed were more free from the contradictions which manifest themselves in the rhetoric and ideologies of the major factions (i.e. the major parties); such a doctrine could potentially break both the duopoly on political power held by the ideologically polarized major parties, and the atmosphere of divisiveness which characterizes the political process in the United States today. To the extent that it is possible to formulate such a doctrine, and to the extent that such a doctrine could become a viable political force, it would pose a potentially serious systemic threat to "liberal" democracy on the one hand, and could go far towards reconciling the opposing liberal and conservative factions on the other.
In the degree that important values
associated with the political left or the political right have not been
reconciled with each other or have not been successfully melded with liberal
democratic values, liberal democracies remain susceptible to disruption.
Moreover, it can be argued that any political system which does not place
these values on a par with the liberal democratic ideals of liberty and
equality is effectively truncating a part of the human essence with which
it is in disagreement. Correspondingly, it may be argued that the "humanistic"
value base, by failing to fully encompass or account for these alternative
values, is not comprehensively human. Were certain values associated with
the left and the right to be reconciled with one
another and fully integrated with liberal
democratic principles, we could no longer speak of the resultant political
form as "liberal" democracy.
In order to legitimate the claim that liberal democracy marks the end point of mankind's ideological evolution, it becomes necessary to substantiate the fact that liberal democracy more closely reflects and accounts for the totality of human nature, in a way that previous political forms have not. It becomes further necessary to prove that liberal democracy more fully accounts for human nature, than any conceivable alternative. Considering the complexity of human nature, these are demanding criteria. For a system can be imagined which features alternative values with which liberal democratic values are in tension, but in which these alternative values could be made to complement liberal democratic values. It can be argued that these alternative principles, are just as important, and are just as much a part of man's essential "humanity" as the twin principles of liberty and equality. On this account, it can be argued that these alternative values deserve a place of coequal importance with the principal liberal democratic values of liberty and equality, and deserve to be included in the repertoire of a "humanism," more broadly understood. Furthermore, it can be argued that these alternative values, are just as timeless, and reflect aspects of the human psyche that are just as necessary for a lasting and stable political form as the twin ideals of liberty and equality.
To the extent that the opposing tendencies of man remain unreconciled or have not been successfully combined to produce a stable ideological matrix, a political form which most nearly reflects the essence of man has not been produced, and the "end point of mankind's ideological evolution" would not appear to have been reached. The optimal political form, it can be argued, involves a more complete reconciliation of underlying aspects of human nature, than occurs under liberal democracy. It may also involve a more complete integration of values from the political left and the political right with liberal democratic values, so as to create an optimally stable ideological matrix. Such an ideological form would be immediately recognizable as distinct from what we know today as "liberal" democracy.
There are important values associated with both the political left and the political right which have not as yet been either reconciled with one another, or successfully integrated with liberal democratic values. Nonetheless, it is possible to conceive of an alternative political form in which these values have been successfully reconciled and integrated with liberal democratic values to yield a new ideological matrix which is potentially more progressive, stable, and lasting than liberal democracy. One can imagine other essentially democratic forms in which the twin principles of liberty and equality are not so central, or in which they are mediated by other important values. Indeed, one can imagine a democracy which is more centrally concerned with such values as duty, sacrifice, and service to the community, or one which is more oriented towards communitarian values, as opposed to one which is more inclined towards radical egalitarianism and individualism. A democracy which places such alternative values at the forefront of civic and political life we might no longer feel comfortable calling "liberal," and it could very easily resemble something far different. But, if such values came into being by means of a powerful and enduring popular consensus, and if that consensus came about in reaction to what were perceived as certain excesses of "liberal" democracy, or in response to certain changes in the physical environment, the resultant political form would be no less democratic than "liberal" democracy. And yet, it might contain substantially fewer internal contradictions, or "seeds" of further synthesis. Such an alternative to "liberal" democracy would not necessarily be opposed to the humanist values and the spirit of the enlightenment which has made such a large contribution to the ideological underpinnings of liberal democracy. In fact, such a new form of democracy could go far towards reaffirming many of these values, in a way that modern liberal democracy fails to, due to certain excesses.
While liberal democracy may mark the end of the historical process conceived within the closed system of its own humanist ideals, and while it is undoubtedly the best system yet, it is possible to conceive of an even more advanced stage of human history which more completely accounts for the totality of human nature. Though it may not be possible to improve upon liberal democratic ideals as they pertain to "certain aspects" of man's political essence, a social and political form which is based upon these entirely, to the exclusion of other important ideals, may ultimately prove to have no legitimate claim as the pinnacle of man's social and political evolution. For, it can be argued that there are values associated with other intellectual and political traditions, which tend to be undervalued within liberal democracy, but which are just as important as the liberal democratic values of liberty and equality. On this account, it can be argued, that liberal democracy does not reflect the totality of man's nature. The humanist traditions which helped to form the conceptual foundations of liberal democracy somehow failed to reflect a complete understanding of human essence, as this essence has come to be known since the enlightenment.
For a political system to have legitimate claim as the ultimate political form, it would seem necessary for it to more closely reflect total human essence than any conceivable alternative. In other words, it would need to take into account a more comprehensive set of values, even potentially opposing values, and successfully integrate them with liberal democratic principles. It is clear that the liberal democratic ideals of liberty and equality correspond to important parts of this total human essence. Nonetheless, these values do not, by themselves, represent the "total essence" that a more comprehensive or "synthetic" humanism might encompass. Hence, a political form which more closely corresponded to this total essence, and in which the opposing aspects of this essence were more completely reconciled and integrated, would seem to have greater title as the political form which marks the "end point of mankind's ideological evolution". In such a political form, liberal democratic principles would only be "major" elements rather than "the" major elements. Consequently, we could not properly call this form "liberal" democracy.
To accept the claim that liberal democracy marks the end of history demands that we accept that the twin principles of liberty and equality cannot be improved upon as ideals. If these ideals cannot be improved upon then, presumably, they are without inherent flaws or weaknesses. If they are without inherent flaws or weaknesses, then, presumably, they cannot be carried to excess, or taken so far in practice that they generate internal instabilities in a political system. But, both liberty and equality exhibit a tendency to turn into something else, when they are allowed to become the principal focus of a political system like liberal democracy. For, taken to their extremes, these twin principles upon which liberal democracies are based tend to beget opposites, or near opposites. Taken to their extremes, liberty devolves into hedonism, and equality devolves into tyranny (Bork, p.11). Once these extremes have been reached, it can be argued, the twin principles of liberty and equality tend to generate "corrective" systemic pressures which force their return to more moderate forms. A greater normative and political emphasis on the need for collective concerns serves to counter excessive individualism, just as a more meritocratic emphasis tends to counter excessive egalitarianism.
Thus, even the twin principles of liberty and equality would not seem to be absolutely free from a tendency towards contradiction. And, on this account, liberal democracy would seem to contain the seeds of a further synthesis, or of a further historical stage which is, at once, more stable and enduring. And, if the twin principles of liberty and equality can in fact be carried to such an excess that they generate corrective or "reverse" pressures within a political system, then arguably, it is not liberal democracy which marks the end of history, but rather, a system which esteems the values needed to "temper" the excesses of liberal democracy, just as highly as the principles of liberty and equality. When the principles of liberty and equality are insufficiently mediated by other principles with which they are in tension, we should strongly suspect, that the resultant political form does not mark the end of history, nor does it represent the most progressive and yet stable and lasting political form
A political form which openly embraces such "corrective" values in tandem with the core values of liberty and equality would not be called "liberal" democracy on the one hand, and could easily prove to be a more stable and lasting political form on the other. To the extent that liberal democracies fail to embrace such corrective values and place them on a par with the values of liberty and equality, fundamental flaws may be said to remain in liberal democracy. A political form which would address these flaws would represent a more advanced ideological form which has a more legitimate claim as the "end point of mankind's ideological evolution."
It is uncertain whether Fukuyama would concede that this evolution to a political form that we would no longer feel comfortable calling liberal democracy would constitute a restart, or a continuation of history that supposedly ended with liberal democracy as its final stage. Fukuyama's conceptual "out" might involve the claim that liberal democracy remains the ultimate political form, or an absolute synthesis, and that any departure from liberal democracy should not be interpreted as the attainment of a higher stage. Rather, any departure from liberal democracy would represent a regression to a lesser, more incomplete synthesis. On this account, the appearance of an essentially new political form beyond liberal democracy would not immediately qualify as a continuation of history. This is certainly true in one obvious sense. For if the excesses of liberal democracy should be allowed to reach their natural end point, the "resultant" would represent a less complete synthesis, and the emergence of a more unstable political form than "liberal" democracy. However, this repeat of old history, as opposed to the making of any new history, still does not address the question of whether "liberal" democracy, with all its attendant values and intellectual baggage, marks the absolute synthesis of human political development. To the extent that the core liberal democratic values of individualism and egalitarianism could be carried to such an excess that they constitute a destabilizing force, some "other" kind of democracy would seem to mark the end stage of history.
It is possible to imagine a viable synthesis of liberal democratic values with values which are currently more closely associated with both the political left and the political right. Yet, admittedly, at this stage there is considerable reluctance to envision such alternatives. For the ideological infrastructure which would be necessary to accomplish the successful mediation, synthesis, and integration of the liberal democratic values of liberty and equality with values on the left and the right has not yet presented itself. To the extent that such a framework is absent, liberal democracy has arguably failed to completely digest the truths associated with other traditions, and it has failed to fully incorporate these truths into its way of thinking.
Having vanquished radical political forms on both the ideological left and the ideological right, and having apparently relegated all alternative political systems to the dustbin of history, liberal democracy appears to stand at the gateway of a period of ideological hegemony of unknown duration. Basking in the light of liberal democracy's victory, the majority of Western political scholars seem content to believe that history has ended and culminated in liberal democracy on the one hand, and that there are no important historical truths associated with alternative systems on the other. Yet, according to the German sociologist Karl Mannheim (Mannheim, 1936), within each of these alternative systems there may be grains of truth which liberal democracies neglect at their peril. If these grains of truth are not assimilated, much as a grain of sand is coated by the oyster, they may eventually become irritants which will threaten to "restart" history. The political form which would represent the successful assimilation of these grains of truth would be one in which liberal democratic values were important elements, but one which we would not immediately recognize as "liberal" democracy. This higher stage we might characterize as "dialectical" democracy. In such a democracy, one could expect there to be a continuing dialogue between "transiently conflicting values" or shifting priorities over to time, to deal with changes in the environment. But, because a more enduring consensus had been reached over fundamental values which extend across ideological lines, the range of disagreement which would characterize the normal operations of such a democracy would be greatly reduced from what it is presently in liberal democracy. In effect, such a stage would more closely resemble the political form which could result from a "science of politics" envisioned by Mannheim. According to this view, there is no absolute end point of history, though there may be a political form which is best suited to a particular historical epoch. Thus, history is best understood as a continuous dialectical process involving progressive succession of ever more rational forms. And while particular principles may be carried over from one historical form to another, or from one epoch to another, in a form that is mediated by other principles, no single political form will prove absolutely timeless. Although, to the extent that a political form is more rational than those which have preceded it, it may also prove "more" timeless and stable than those which have preceded it. On this account, each successive historical stage is closer to being an "absolute" synthesis than the stage which has immediately preceded it. Understood in these terms, it would be safe to regard liberal democracy as the most stable, progressive, and timeless political form which has "yet" to appear, and the one which is most appropriate to the current historical epoch. However, it should be recognized that liberal democracy becomes increasingly susceptible to displacement by the "next highest stage" in the historical process, as the next historical epoch approaches.
Unless we subscribe to a view of biological determinism, human essence itself is constantly changing and evolving, though certain constants may prove to be "relatively" timeless features of a particular historical epoch. Despite relatively timeless constants of a particular epoch, human nature will change and the political form which is most in accord with that nature can also be expected to change. Thus, the political system that is most closely in accord with this constantly changing essence cannot be static, but must be constantly evolving as the product of a long chain of adaptive responses to a changing environment. Liberal democracy can easily qualify as the most stable political form yet, or the form which marks the culmination of political evolution within the current political epoch. Within this epoch, the twin values of liberty and equality may prove to represent relatively timeless constants which may be carried over to the next historical epoch in a mediated form.
Understood in these terms, liberal democracy
may mark the end of history for the current historical epoch. But, we should
not reasonably expect it to be the end of history "for all time to come."
And, because we have no certain way of determining when the current historical
epoch will end, or what chain of events will bring about its end, we should
be alert to forces which could have this effect. If we accept the end of
history thesis as is, and without substantial qualifications, we are being
blinded to the possible threats to liberal democracy down the line. On
this account alone, it is not to early to begin to identify and examine
those forces which have the greatest potential to restart the historical
process. Nor is it too early to propose what may, in a changed environment,
and in a different historical epoch, succeed liberal democracy as the political
form which will mark the "next" end of history. These are the tasks for
the work that is to follow.
REFERENCES
Bork, R. (1996). Slouching Towards Gomorrah.
New York: Harper Collins
Berman, M. (2000). The Twilight of American
Culture. New York: W.W. Norton.
Fukuyama, F. (1992). The End of History
and the Last Man. New York: Free Press.
Hegel, G.W.F. (1988). Introduction to the
Philosophy of History. Translated by Leo Rauch. Indianapolis: Hackett
Mannheim, K. (1936). Ideology and Utopia.
Harcourt, Brace, Jovanovich: New York
COPYRIGHT 2000 BY JAMES H. COWARD
COMMENTS ON THE FEATURED ARTICLE BY THE A.S.P./A.C.C:
There is considerable resistance in
the academic community to the conclusions reached in the above article.
In fact, it is such a taboo subject to suggest that liberal democracy is
not the end of history, that the author was prohibited from using the subject
as a possible dissertation topic, even before he wrote the article. Despite
such resistance, it is the current opinion of the A.S.P./A.C.C., that the
somewhat alarming conclusions reached in the above article are essentially
correct. All that remains to be answered is the all important question
of timing. Specifically, when will conditions be ripe for the next historical
stage? When will the A.S.P. get its big chance to restart history? You
decide.
