American Centrist Coalition

THE AMERICAN CENTRIST COALITIONTM

"PEPTALK" IS NOW AVAILABLE ON CD.

WHETHER YOU ARE A LIBERAL, A CONSERVATIVE, OR A MODERATE; IF YOU BELIEVE THAT OUR REPUBLIC IS HEADED IN THE WRONG DIRECTION, AND THAT NEITHER THE REPUBLICANS NOR THE DEMOCRATS ARE LIKELY TO TAKE IT IN THE RIGHT DIRECTION; THEN YOU NEED TO READ THIS BOOK.

PEPTALK: POLITICS, ETHICS AND PHILOSOPHY TARGETING AMERICANS LOOKING FOR KNOWLEDGE
To request a free Table of Contents and Introduction, write to: ava333@mindspring.com

CONTENTS OF THIS SITE

PART ONE: ABOUT THIS SITE
PART TWO: PURPOSE OF THE AMERICAN CENTRIST COALITION
PART THREE: A FEW WORDS CONCERNING IDEOLOGY
PART FOUR: FLAWS WITH LIBERALISM AND CONSERVATISM
PART FIVE: FLAWS WITH PURE CENTRISM
PART SIX: THE PHILOSOPHY OF NET-CENTRISM
PART SEVEN: SELECTED STATEMENTS OF NET-CENTRISM
PART EIGHT: THE NET-CENTRISM-THIRD PARTY NEXUS
PART NINE: CORRESPONDENCE, MEMBERSHIP, CONTRIBUTIONS

PART ONE: ABOUT THIS SITE
Welcome to the AMERICAN CENTRIST COALITION WEBSITE. Like other sites that are part of this network, this is a high need for cognition site. It requires some thought. It is mainly aimed at graduate students and professionals in the social and behavioral sciences, though with a little effort, it can be understood by many average Americans. And, its importance and relevance to the average American should not be overlooked. So even if you have no professional training in politics, give this site a try.

By and large the internet is a rather shallow information medium. Most websites are designed to stimulate the senses rather than the thought process. That is why most serious scholars and graduate students continue to rely on "the stacks" in libraries of major research universities. This site, along with the majority of others which will form this network, attempts to break the internet mold and to make serious, high quality political information easily accessible through the internet. All the sites in this network are only made possible by your contributions.

PART TWO: PURPOSE OF THE AMERICAN CENTRIST COALITION
The main purpose of the AMERICAN CENTRIST COALITION is to educate the public in the philosophy of NET-CENTRISM as an alternative to the polar ideologies of the left and the right, and as an alternative to the vacuous and unprincipled non-ideology of pure centrism. Net-Centrism is based upon the premise that, depending on the issue, the greatest truth may reside on the political left, on the political right, or it may contain elements normally associated with either the left or the right. In the public policy arena, champions of both the left and the right routinely distort the truth to serve their own personal interests, or the interests of those with whom they most closely identify. Because the political environment is polarized along lines of liberal and conservative ideologies, the resultant public policy choices tend to be restricted, and often do not reflect the long term national interest. Conversely, centrists stake out positions on issues that are close to the ideological center. Centrists employ this strategy in order to avoid the controversies associated with more extreme positions, or in order to avoid the difficult reasoning process required to uncover the relevant facts about particular issues. Ultimately, pure centrism, or seeking to occupy the ideological middle for its own sake, is a failed strategy, and makes for equally bad public policy choices. On any particular issue, the best arguments may be more closely associated with either the ideological right, the ideological left, or they may be synthetic and contain elements of both. It is when individuals fall into the trap of holding either liberal or conservative views across virtually all issues that they commit a cardinal sin against the public interest. On some issues, the liberals have the best arguments and the balance of truth on their side. On other issues, the conservatives have the best arguments and the balance of truth on their side. And on yet other issues, the truth is synthetic and entails combining arguments from both sides to yield policies that are "optimally functional" or maximally conducive to the long term welfare of a particular society. Engineering the most functional ideology, or the belief system which is maximally conducive to human interests more generally, involves forming a complex synthesis of liberal and conservative views.

PART THREE: A FEW WORDS CONCERNING IDEOLOGY
Any sets of guiding beliefs which give individuals direction and meaning in their lives are ideologies in the broadest sense of the term. More precisely, ideologies are value, attitude and belief systems which are associated with a particular perspective or world view. Ideologies like communism and fascism, or even liberalism and conservatism, tend to be narrowly tailored to serve the interests of particular groups in society, rather than the long term interests of society as a whole. Such narrow and short sighted ideologies tend to give all ideologies a bad name. Being aware of the stigma attached to such ideologies, most people prefer to think of their own value, attitude, and belief systems as non-ideological. Yet, all belief systems are essentially ideologies, simply by virtue of the personal-psychic and social-systemic functions they serve.

Since virtually everyone has an ideology which influences how they perceive and interact with other members of society, the best ideology that can be hoped for is one which is "comprehensively rational" or derived from a broad, eclectic knowledge base. In other words, for an ideology to be optimally functional for human beings individually, and maximally conducive to human interests collectively, it should be grounded in facts and knowledge rather than myth, speculation, or distortions of fact. Neither liberalism nor conservatism qualify as broad based, eclectic ideologies. Their knowledge bases are necessarily small, because they were conceived at a time when the social and behavioral science knowledge base was relatively small. The truth about human society is far more complex and synthetic than the polar ideologies of liberalism or conservatism allow for. Consequently, neither the principles of liberalism nor conservatism, considered alone, are adequate guides where the determination of public policy is concerned.

In its classical sense, ideology refers to one-sided and necessarily distorted beliefs aimed at advancing particular interests in society, often to the exclusion or to the detriment of the best interests of society as a whole. But, as mentioned above, there is also a more comprehensive, neutral sense of the term ideology as a "belief system" which serves certain necessary personal and social functions. The most functional ideology is a belief system which is relatively free of distortion and which is relatively superior to other belief systems at advancing aggregate interests, or the interests of society as a whole. Such a belief system is required because certain vital personal-psychic and social-systemic needs cannot be satisfied by other means. The psychological "need" for religion is an example of this.

The dominant political ideologies of our time (liberalism and conservatism) fail to address total human systems. Therefore, they are relatively incapable of assessing which policies are most likely to result in the greatest benefits for society over the longer term. Being narrowly focussed, they ignore a whole range of long term systemic consequences. They are much better adapted to advance the immediate interests of particular groups within society, without regard to the way such interest advancement affects competing groups within society, and without regard to the long term welfare of the social system as a whole. As part of their ingrained practices and approaches to solving social, economic, and political problems, liberals and conservatives commonly mistake a limited and one-sided aspect of the truth for the whole truth. In forming a picture of the way society works, and a conception of the common good, liberals and conservatives generalize from their own narrow experiences and knowledge base, and they project these generalizations onto the whole of society, often with disastrous long term results.

The best, or the most functional ideology will have the highest truth content. The truth requires an ideology which is highly synthetic and derived from an extensive, eclectic knowledge base. But despite its size and complexity, the most functional ideology need not be so esoteric that it is beyond the comprehension of the average person. For actually, because the ideology is synthetic, rather than polar, and because it attempts to appeal to self interest at a very basic level of reasoning, (rather than through highly abstract principles) it is actually easier for the average person to grasp and accept than the more abstract polar ideologies of liberalism and conservatism. Consequently, the average person (who is not already strongly committed to either liberalism or conservatism) may be more likely to adopt a synthetic ideology as a guide to living.

Learning the basics of such a synthetic ideology is necessary to see society from the standpoint of the whole, or from the standpoint which would tend to coincide with the long term best interest of a particular society. This standpoint is analogous to the so called "Archimidean Point" or an ideologically neutral vantage point from which individuals could theoretically view a society, if they were foreigners, and complete strangers to its conventions. This ideal vantage point of ideological neutrality is also known as the Xenophyte Perspective. The term "Xenophyte" (pronounced zee-no-fight) is derived from the Greek xeno, and denotes a "class of foreigners."

PART FOUR: FLAWS WITH LIBERALISM AND CONSERVATISM
Both the intellectual sophistication, and in some cases, the substance of many liberal theories are without parallel on the conservative side. Largely due to the conservatives' rejection of theory as a matter of principle, conservative arguments often lack the abstract nature of leading liberal arguments. Purely as an intellectual matter, many liberal arguments are unsurpassed for their sheer complexity and conceptual elegance. Hence, many leading intellectuals and theorists often find liberal arguments to be more appealing. Staple conservative arguments often have more appeal among populists, and are often aimed at a less well educated, less knowledgeable audience. Correspondingly, many academics and other highly educated professionals (who are eager to gain or maintain acceptance within their profession) often fall into the trap of endorsing a liberal idea precisely because it happens to enjoy a close association with the ideological left, and not because of its veracity.

Thus, as the two polar ideological forms have evolved in the United States, conservatism tends to be more of a populist ideology, while liberalism tends to be more of an elitist ideology, though both ideologies claim supporters at the mass and elite levels. Neither liberalism nor conservatism adequately reflects the views or interests of the majority of Americans. The differential appeal to mass and elites, and the differential attention to theory and practice, represent fundamental flaws of, and dividing tensions between, liberalism and conservatism. Conservatism is biased against theory while liberalism is biased against experience which challenges its theories. Many such arguments against liberalism and conservatism exist.

A majority of liberals and conservatives tend to arrive at their respective ideologies on the basis of a preexisting "global affect" or a strong feeling which colors and predetermines their views on just about everything. Both liberals and conservatives tend to form or adopt ideas to match their underlying, preexisting sentiments. These sentiments, which are the product of natural temperamental inclinations interacting with environment factors, predispose certain individuals to form or adopt certain ideas about certain issues, even in the relative absence of careful reasoning or detailed knowledge of facts about these issues. Thus, the ideologies of most individuals who describe themselves as either liberals or conservatives is sentiment based, rather than based upon knowledge of the formal principles associated with either liberalism or conservatism. Hence, a majority of the people who claim to be either liberals or conservatives tend to hold their ideologies somewhat superficially. Nonetheless, the more highly educated ideological elites often hold their own ideological views on the basis of some formal knowledge of liberal or conservative principles.

PART FIVE: FLAWS WITH PURE CENTRISM
On rare occasions, good centrist arguments (most commonly synthetic arguments which contain liberal and conservative elements, but which happen to be endorsed by those who claim to occupy the ideological middle) emerge to challenge both liberal and conservative views. Typically, these arguments have few natural defenders and are soundly attacked by partisans on both the ideological left and the ideological right. In the past, such arguments would seem to have had little potential to attract a strong base of popular support. But this state of affairs may be changing. A broad based coalition of liberals, conservatives, and centrists is not only possible, it is a reality. This coalition asserts its power in every election, but tends to be weakly organized along lines of principles, which is a major weakness. In addition, it is a changing coalition, never being driven by the same combination of interests, commitments, or views, across elections.

Centrist views most commonly result from an individual's ideological indecisiveness. Commonly, individuals will opt for a centrist stand on a particular issue when they are uncertain about the correct policy choices surrounding that issue. In rare cases where a genuine compromise between liberal and conservative views marks the most functional policy point, a centrist stand on an issue may be the best course. But when a strategy of opting for the ideological center across many issues is pursued, optimal policy choices do not tend to result. Pure centrism is a failed strategy for the simple reason that different truths about society will tend to support either liberal, conservative, or synthetic positions on given issues.

Moderates and pure centrists, as their labels suggest, tend to lack the ideological zeal which is so vital to the mobilization of the electorate and to the success of mass movements. A higher proportion of centrists and self described moderates are politically inactive than is true of the more emotionally charged liberals or conservatives. A primary reason for this lack of commitment and energy is the lack of a coherent ideology in the center, or one which is eclectic, synthetic, and which spans the entire ideological spectrum in its component parts. Such an ideology can only properly be spoken of as centrist in its net tendency, as it is a combination or synthesis of elements of the left, right and center. On certain issues, conservative arguments will be more credible, on other issues, liberal arguments will prove more acceptable, and on yet other issues, a truly synthetic solution will be called for.

Occupying the ideological middle for its own sake is ultimately an untenable strategy. Pure centrism betrays an underlying sense of uncertainty and an inability to firmly decide either one way or the other on important issues. Centrism is essentially non-ideological and has little to offer in the way of structure or unifying principles. Centrism does not inspire confidence or commitment among the general public and has little potential of gaining a mass following. It is hollow as an ideology. If a unifying principle could be identified for centrism which would give it any coherence at all, that principle would be its own pervasive uncertainty. Uncertainty is the safest strategy for those who have neither the time nor the inclination to ferret out the relevant facts on the issues. But, uncertainty is a fundamentally malignant and dangerous course when the threats that a civilization is facing demand action. Finally, pure centrism, which seeks to occupy the middle ground for its own sake, is just as bad as siding with either left or right on all issues, as a matter of blind principle. For, at times, the facts will tend to support one side or the other. Presumably, neither liberals nor conservatives have a monopoly on the truth.

PART SIX: THE PHILOSOPHY OF NET-CENTRISM
The term NET-CENTRISM is a fortuitous appellation, for there are some early indications that the internet generation is in fact moving towards a rejection of both classical liberalism (conservatism) and modern humanistic liberalism. There are further indications that substantial segments of this generation hold views which closely coincide with the tenets of Net-Centrism or with "Xenophytism" (pronounced zen-ah-fit-ism).

Net-Centrism is designed to promote the viability of social systems as such, rather than to confer disproportionate advantages upon any particular group within a social system. Net-Centrism is a complex, synthetic alternative to the relatively simplistic liberalism and conservatism which tends to be held by most current day political activists. But while Net-Centrism may be more conceptually complex than liberalism or conservatism, many of its most elemental parts can be easily understood by the average person (see PART SIX: SELECTED STATEMENTS OF NET-CENTRISM).

Those who subscribe to the philosophy of Net-Centrism (Net-Centrists), or Xenophytism (Xenophytes) make no claim to be free from ideology. For Net-Centrism and Xenophytism are definite ideologies in the sense that they are belief systems. But, these belief systems stand a greater realistic chance of being objective and in the long term interest of our society than do the ideologies associated with the left, the right, and with the major political parties in the United States today. Consequently, these ideologies stand a better chance of being maximally conducive to human interests at the aggregate or species level, than do the polar ideologies. Because there is truth about human society at various points along the ideological spectrum, depending on the particular issue, the most functional ideology, or the best belief system for the species, is necessarily synthetic, or the result of a combination of elements of both.

As facts and truths about human society span the entire ideological spectrum from left to right; and as the degree of truth over a wide range of issues is thought to favor neither liberals nor conservatives; the most functional ideology is held to be Net-Centrist. That is to say, its net tendency is centrist, for its liberal components tend to balance out its conservative components. Due to the extensive knowledge base from which it is derived, its synthetic framework, and its unifying principles, Net-Centrism subsumes and incorporates the knowledge bases of both liberal and conservative thought within its own knowledge base. Thus, to be true synthesist, one must be a student of all the great liberal thinkers, and all the great conservative thinkers. To fully understand and begin to solve the great problems associated with human society requires extensive knowledge of both ideological extremes.

The political philosophy of Net-Centrism begins with important selected works in the social and behavioral sciences as its raw materials, or its primary knowledge base. These raw materials are refined (critiqued) and synthesized (integrated) to yield a comprehensive view of the whole (a systemic viewpoint). The final product of this process yields an ideology (a belief system) which spans the entire spectrum from left to right. That is to say, it contains parts which are currently more closely associated with either the political left or the political right. It is easy to dismiss such an ideology as being incoherent or inconsistent, until one becomes aware of its unifying principles. Close examination reveals that Net-Centrism is replete with unifying principles which, taken together, yield a complex ideological matrix.

The concept of attempting to view social problems from the standpoint of the whole is among the more important core concepts and unifying principles of Net-Centrist philosophy. Attempting to achieve this standpoint involves maintaining a constant awareness of the biases associated with both the left and the right, and making a constant effort to avoid these biases in one's own thinking. When one attempts to grasp a particular social, economic, or political problem from the standpoint of the whole, one is attempting to view society in terms of what can reasonably be expected to be maximally conducive to both its progress and its stability as a social system. Taking the extra effort required to achieve this view is motivated by the quest for a comprehensive social, economic, political, legal, and theological philosophy which is optimal, or most functional for the species.

Among the three most important organizing principles of the AMERICAN CENTRIST COALITION are synthesis, the standpoint of the whole (analogous to the Xenophyte Perspective), and the systems approach, or attempting to understand social problems in the context of the total system, in order to reach optimal solutions, or prime policy points. This approach transcends the leading political ideologies of our time and promises to yield public policies which are superior to both. The following two examples illustrate the synthetic-systems approach as it is applied to two complexes of closely related issues:

EXAMPLE 1: The Crime Causation-Punishment-Social Welfare Nexus
Determining the relationships between the crime rate, punishment for crime, and social welfare measures designed to prevent crime demands a synthetic understanding of crime causation. Crime causation is one of the most complex and enigmatic social phenomena known to man. This causation involves both social and individual factors in varying degrees. In any particular case, either set of factors may "overwrite" the other, and prove determinative. It is therefore extremely difficult to generalize from such a complex sequence of causation to pinpoint the exact causes of crime in a particular case. But, suffice it to say that certain social welfare measures are thought to have the potential to offset certain criminal tendencies as they interface with a given social structure. In the United States, and in most developed nations generally, the crime rate tends to go up when the economy is bad. For obviously, when people become economically desperate, they are more likely to resort to crime merely in order to survive. And yet, there are many examples of people in other parts of the world who live under far worse conditions than our own poor and unemployed, who do not characteristically resort to crime in order to survive. How then are we to account for the apparent differences in the relationship between crime and economic conditions across cultures? Clearly, the fact that such differences exist at all suggests that either individual or cultural differences are to blame for our own crime problem. This much is obvious. But determining the extent to which one or the other group of factors is responsible for our our crime problem will influence the kinds and levels of resources we are willing to allocate to address the crime problem.

The stark differences in crime rates between cultures suggests that differences in value systems and social structures are mainly to blame for our crime problem. The only reasonable alternative to this conclusion would be that differences in biological makeup, i.e. racial differences, are mainly to blame. Understandably, there is great resistance among social scientists to the biological determination of criminal propensities. There is equal resistance to the view that any culture is in any way superior to any other culture. But, where crime is concerned, some social structures and some value systems are clearly more resistant to crime than others. And to the extent that order is a virtue and disorder is a vice, those societies which are more lawful would seem "superior" to those which are less lawful. On this dimension at least, the United States cannot make any claim that its culture is superior.

Determining how much blame for crime is to be assigned to individuals, versus social and economic factors, will determine how much of our national resources we are willing to devote to those social welfare measures thought to reduce criminal tendencies. If more blame for crime can be assigned to "individuals" rather than cultural differences, or if individuals are held to be more largely responsible for their criminal acts than the societies in which they live, then more resources should be devoted to law enforcement than to social welfare. But if a larger part of the crime problem can be blamed upon our own societal values and culture; or if our high crime rate is in fact largely an externality of our popular culture, or is in some other way endemic to the American psyche; then individual culpability for criminal acts would seem to decrease. Consequently, increased expenditures on a social welfare safety net designed to reduce criminal tendencies will become more easily justifiable.

If we are able to conclude that our high crime rate is largely an externality of our popular culture, then how could we expect government to deal with this? Providing people with an adequate social welfare safety net will not isolate them from the influences of the popular culture, and may even contribute to this criminal influence. For people receiving public assistance will be better able to afford television sets to facilitate their consumption of a popular culture which predisposes them to commit crimes. Alternatively, perhaps we should compel the culture industry to only produce products which convey "functional values." In short, perhaps a program of state sanctioned censorship of the culture industry is called for. Freedom of speech could remain protected in virtually all other forms. But in the case of artistic expression, or where the creation of myths and fantasies which could serve as bad examples for our youth is concerned, restrictions would apply. Perhaps we should levy a special consumption tax on the products of the culture industry in much the same way that we tax other products known to have little socially redeeming value. Finally, in assessing blame for criminality related to the popular culture, we must ask if individuals themselves are more to blame for the damage to their psyche and related criminal propensity which might result from their consumption of popular culture. In short, does responsibility lie with the individual, values and all, prior to the effects from consumption of popular culture? These are all important questions which we will attempt to answer in the few paragraphs to follow. How we end up answering these questions will greatly influence how much and what kinds of resources we are willing to dedicate to combat the crime problem. If we assess all blame on individuals and say that society and culture have only a small part of the responsibility for crime, then quite obviously, we will not be willing to devote a large portion of our national wealth to social welfare measures. Conversely, if we determine that causes for crime are largely societal in nature, we would be willing to devote a much larger portion of our national wealth to the construction of an adequate social welfare safety net.

The suspected contribution to crime causation made by social and economic factors should not completely blind us to the possible ways in which biological factors such as temperament and intelligence contribute to crime. Here again, the waters of causation are murky. For there are admittedly many different dimensions to intelligence, just as there are many different temperamental predispositions. The kind of intelligence that would appear most critically related to criminality in this culture is that which relates to the average capability to master that abstractions necessary for functional social interactions and contributions. In other words, mathematical, and verbal reasoning capabilities are the main capacities required for one to occupy a place in our social division of labor to which economic rewards are attached. To the extent that one is handicapped in the acquisition of the basic mathematical and verbal reasoning skills necessary to compete for life sustaining resources in this culture, other factors remaining equal, one would appear to be at increased risk of criminality. Relatedly, normative training is not as easily internalized, understood, or respected by persons with low intelligence. And when low intelligence occurs in combination with certain temperamental tendencies, the effects can be amplified. We should not immediately discount the relationship between low intelligence and crime (which a number of prominent sociobiologists have brought out in their studies of criminal behavior) merely because some sociologists don't like to consider it. There is at least some organic-biological link related to the way a person's temperament and intelligence interface with a given social system, which predisposes one to commit certain crimes. Thus, having a certain temperament and a certain IQ may constitute more of a criminal predisposition in one society than it does in another. For abstract intelligence and reasoning skills are not as highly valued in more primitive societies as they are in more technologically advanced societies. A powerful argument can be made that low intelligence is more of a factor in crime causation in industrial societies than it is in many third world societies. In highly industrialized nations, the lack of cognitive skills places one at a relatively greater disadvantage in the competition for scarce resources than is the case in less developed nations. In societies which place a premium on cognitive skills, there will tend to be more pressure on the person of low cognitive ability to engage in criminal activity, merely in order to survive. But this is only a small part of the picture of crime causation. Culture and social structure are involved in the origins of crime in other important ways

There tends to be considerably less normative inhibition in many industrialized societies, when compared to the traditional cultures which still exist in much of the developing world. Many of the developing nations still have strong traditional social and religious practices in place which discourage resort to crime, even in the presence of extreme poverty. And, because the extremes of wealth and poverty in many third world settings may not be as apparent as they are in many developed nations, there tends to be less "relative" deprivation. Suffering and material deprivation in these settings are shared experiences which do not constitute as much of a criminal tendency as they do in societies where differences in wealth are more apparent. In addition, there is relatively less influence in the third world from a popular culture which operates at cross-purposes to the goals of socialization, though admittedly, this influence is growing. And this is perhaps one of the most important parts of the crime equation differential across cultures. As a consequence of the combination of these factors, there are often dramatically lower levels of serious crimes, expressed as a per capita figure, in many third world countries. This is particularly true of Asian countries with relatively strong value systems which encourage hard work, education, and family commitments.

The contribution to crime causation made by a dysfunctional popular culture has often been cited as a major part of an overarching crime paradigm. In the Unites States and most industrialized nations, a popular culture exists which glorifies action seeking and which tends to minimize both the seriousness and the consequences associated with deviance. However, it should be recognized that in order for a dysfunctional popular culture to constitute a key causal determinant of crime, it must occur in combination with other environmental factors, such as the absence of a proper normative orientation. First and foremost, proper normative training is a parental responsibility. In the Unites States today, there tends to be the wholesale abdication of this responsibility. Many parents, working or not, tend to rely on the popular culture as a surrogate baby-sitter and child care expert, which is a formula for disaster. As more and more children and adolescents receive an increasing part of their socialization from the popular culture, they are becoming desensitized to the nature and the consequences of the deviance which is a dominant theme in popular culture. In short, their consumption of popular culture has the effect of reducing their inhibitions to engage in such deviance themselves. This problem can be traced to basic human imitative behavior. Kids see deviant acts on TV, and without proper normative inhibitions, and with little fear of consequences to begin with, kids are inclined to imitate these acts in real life. Whenever parents deliver their kids to the popular culture, their normative development is in peril, or seriously open to doubt, even given the best of biological traits. Though cause and effect is difficult to establish, it is reasonable to assume, given the current state of social science, that a relatively high crime rate is to a considerable degree an externality of the culture industry operating in tandem with the abdication of parental responsibility.

Weakened social bonds, inadequate normative training stemming from the wholesale abdication of parental responsibility, and a popular culture which serves as the conveyor of dysfunctional values, are all to blame for the crime problem in the United States today. This problem cannot be adequately addressed without aggressively attacking all the roots of the disease simultaneously. And here is the main paradox for crime control. Children and young adults from well socialized, functional families can receive relatively high levels of exposure to a dysfunctional popular culture and experience relatively little effect. The truly dysfunctional effects of popular culture tend to fall disproportionately on children and young adults who are already at risk due to normative inadequacies in their own families. The entertainment industry is only partly to blame. Popular culture is merely a contributing factor in crime causation, and then, only in certain cases.. There is no clear line of demarcation between where the entertainment industry's contribution to deviant behavior ends, and where the parental contribution begins.

Recognizing how murky the waters of crime causation are, the entertainment industry points out the fact that many people are not adversely affected by its products. Just as the tobacco industry has been able to seize on the fact than many people smoke from an early age without developing cancer, the entertainment industry is able to assert that other factors are to blame for a high crime rate. From this limited and one sided truth, the entertainment industry pleads with an ever louder voice that its product should not be blamed at all for the emergent criminal propensities of American youth, and that its product (the popular culture) does not constitute a public health. There is a strong element of truth to the entertainment industry's argument, just as there is a strong element of truth in the tobacco industry's argument that smoking does not cause cancer. For in millions of people who are not already genetically predisposed to develop particular forms of cancer, smoking does not cause cancer, though it may increase the risk of cancer. A parallel argument can be made by the spokesmen of the entertainment industry. For those who are not already at increased risk, popular culture does not cause criminal propensities to manifest themselves. If people are otherwise properly socialized, the potentially harmful effects of popular culture tend to be negligible. This is all true. But for at risk groups, the effect can actually be quite large. And it is this fact that the entertainment industry is unwilling to acknowledge, for there is simply too much money at stake. The entertainment industry lobby must fight this fact every step of the way, in the same fashion that the tobacco lobby fought the initial claims that smoking caused cancer. To even admit that this fact is partially true would seem to invite an avalanche of lawsuits, much as those which have recently fallen on tobacco companies. But, it seems that the entertainment industry has little to fear in this regard. For the lines of causation between popular culture and increased risk of criminality are much more difficult to establish than the lines of causation between tobacco and cancer. The truth is that "for individuals with a certain genetic makeup, the use of tobacco products increases the risk of developing certain types of cancer." Similarly, for individuals with certain intelligence and temperaments, combined with certain deficiencies in normative training, heavy exposure to popular culture increases the risk of their criminality.

Recognizing the difficulties which anyone faces in proving such arguments, the entertainment industry is bound to maintain its course of denying that any substantive causal link exists between consumption of its products and the increased risk of criminality. Typically, the further this industry can push the limits of normative acceptability, the higher the revenues from its productions. And, as it is currently constituted, the American psyche works hand in glove with this tendency. Its little use trying to assess exactly how our culture has ended up at such a base level. But the fact that it has achieved this level means there is a strong market for the products of an entertainment industry which has very few normative inhibitions to begin with. With billions of dollars annually, tens of millions of Americans routinely reward the entertainment industry for the outrageous, the bizarre, the sexually perverse, and the violent. The most rapacious consumers of popular culture are people who want feelings and diversion, not thoughts or intellectual development. Consequently, we have a popular culture that is grounded in sensation rather than cognition. Until consumers change their behavior and begin to boycott the entertainment industry en masse, and on a prolonged basis, the entertainment industry cannot be expected to reform itself from within. Its cardinal values are opposed to such reformation. It is decadent by design, and herein lies its greatest appeal to a public which is itself decadent and eager to throw off the constraints of more traditional normative inhibitions.

For its part, the entertainment industry feels that it is just responding to the preexisting demand for its product. If the popular culture has become vulgar, it is because the public has become vulgar and responds best to products which mirror its own normative characteristics. Hollywood is simply giving people what they want. However, it should be noted that there is two way causation here. Large segments of American society have in fact become more vulgar and permissive, and Hollywood has responded accordingly. But, Hollywood has also pushed the envelope of vulgarity and permissiveness in a way that reminds one of the tobacco industry's effort to boost the nicotine content of its cigarettes. Hollywood has an interest in making its products as alluring and as addictive as possible. Hollywood's current attitude towards the possible harmful effects which could result from the consumption of its products is roughly comparable to the tobacco industry's initial policy of denying that a causal link existed between tobacco consumption and cancer. The entertainment industry more generally is currently inclined to deny that any possible link exists between its products and crime causation.

From yet another point of view, by offering the public a product which easily constitutes a public health threat, (in this case a threat to its mental health) the entertainment industry is merely catering to the hedonism which has always been most closely associated with our lower classes. That crime and lower class hedonism seem to go together is a well established pattern in American society, and an important aspect of a far more complex crime paradigm. This pattern is certainly not true of all societies, and it has no necessary association with lower socio-economic status per se. Rather, the pattern of lower class hedonism and accompanying criminality tends to manifest itself more dramatically in countries with relatively high standards of living. Without the status or economic rewards to enjoy, and often with little prospect of attaining the more valued compensations of the larger societies of which they are a part, segments of the lower class cling to hedonism as an escape. For millions of people who feel they cannot successfully compete in American society, hedonism becomes a way of life, with all of its attendant problems of drug usage, alcoholism, and not least of all, criminality.

Conclusion
So far we have identified parents, the popular culture, relative differentials in wealth across cultures, and biological makeup, as key causal agents in the problem of crime. No doubt all are to blame in varying degrees. The exact degree to which any of these causal agents is to blame in an individual case cannot be determined with precision. This makes generalization difficult, if not impossible. No wonder empirical evidence is so uncertain, given the complexities of causation. But, it may be well past time to abandon the search for a precise line of causation and time to rely instead upon what many criminologists knew or suspected all along. We should attempt to break the causal link where we have the power too. We at least have the power to rob criminals of their principal excuse for committing certain crimes. We can deny criminals their "liquor store defense," or the claim that they robbed the liquor store to get money to buy food. For every dollar we invest in the basic subsistence of the underclass, we may actually begin to see a significant reduction in certain violent and property crime rates. And here emerges the essence of the crime and social welfare nexus.

Despite powerful social influences which are largely beyond our control, we may reasonably expect that in American society, with its own unique combination of causative factors, criminal tendencies will increase as economic conditions worsen and as unemployment rates rise. To reduce the tendency for crimes to arise from economic necessity, an industrial society more generally needs a social welfare system that is both efficient and Spartan. In this context, efficient means that it catches the people who need to be caught in the social safety net, gives them diversion where needed; opportunity for self-improvement when they seek it; and most importantly, it gives them basic subsistence. This is basically a liberal view which attempts to address some of the social conditions thought to contribute to crime. But, such measures also take away substantially from the individual excuse for committing crimes. Once this excuse for resorting to crime has been removed (by having proper social welfare programs in place designed to satisfy basic subsistence needs) it serves as the justification for the conservative policy preference for stiff penalties. Thus, on the related issues of crime, punishment, and social welfare policy, we find that we have arrived at a synthetic solution and prescription for change which contains both liberal and conservative elements. The best social welfare strategy is somewhat liberal. The best punishment for crime is somewhat more severe than current practice. There would appear to be truth on both sides, the truths are connected, and are not contradictory, as many liberals and conservatives would have us believe.

EXAMPLE 2: Population Management-Environmental Protection Nexus
A synthetic argument can also be made on the related issues of population control and environmental protection. First, we begin from what should be the common sense proposition that population management and environmental protection are inextricably linked. Conservatives are generally less concerned about either of these related problems, as both environmental protection efforts and population control are seemingly opposed to maximum sustained economic growth. From the economic conservative's point of view, the rising tide of population means increased consumption, larger markets, and for those who have capital to invest, increased profits. The fewer environmental constraints on industry, the higher the profits. This is all true, but these are limited and one-sided truths which must be qualified by others truths about how the world works. Taken in isolation from other truths, these truths tend to coincide most closely with the immediate short term interests of stockholders. Such views do not adequately account for the interests of other groups in society, nor do such views take into account externalities, or the long term prospects for society that will result from continual increases in consumption and production.

However, both stockholders and corporate executives may be moderating in their attitudes towards growth. This moderation involves a line of reasoning that is creeping into the conservative psyche. Hence, a forward thinking conservative stockholder might concede to the following argument: "I can see that unregulated population growth is having an undesirable effect on my own quality of life. The increasing population density of the community that I live in has definitely resulted in additional traffic, noise, pollution and a host of other problems for me and my family. My quality of life is declining as a direct result of continual increases in the population density of my community, and that of surrounding areas. I have reached the point where the marginal utility of a higher return on my investments does not exceed the value that I attach to the most important aspects of my quality of life. Consequently, I no longer support a policy of growth for my community. I can also see that as certain material resources become more scarce, there may well be both a declining rate of profit and a higher unit cost on the products which I purchase myself. In view of these considerations, I am becoming more and more friendly to the idea that government should place limits on family size. I will not defend individual freedoms indiscriminately whenever they impinge upon my own right to enjoy life. I do not enjoy living in an overly populous society, nor do I enjoy the prospects which such a society promises for my descendants."

Whether or not they are currently willing to publicly acknowledge it, millions of liberals and conservatives alike could find themselves in basic agreement with the above argument. Many would agree as well that the issues of quality of life, standards of living, and environmental protection are all closely related to population density. The strength of these relationships has been masked in recent years by the steady advances in productivity and living standards which have been made possible by technological innovations. But, such increases can be expected to taper off in the near future, and the issue of population control will once again find its way to the forefront of public debate. Admittedly, the current environment of proliferating individual "rights" is not an encouraging backdrop for the reemergence of the population control issue. But hopefully, and before it is too late, people will begin to realize that at some point the exercise of individual freedoms must be restrained for the long term welfare of society. Placing reasonable limits on reproductive rights would insure that everyone can still exercise these rights. It would insure that every couple that wanted children could have children, within reasonable limits, determined by the constraints of finite resources in an increasingly overcrowded world. But, it would say to those families who would exceed these limits that they do not have the right to impose costs on the rest of us. Our quality of life can only be maintained or potentially improved at a fast rate by placing limits on aggregate population levels.

Again we take up the argument to which increasing numbers of conservatives must concede: "Just as I am led to support an absolute population ceiling, I necessarily reach the conclusion that immigration should be cut drastically, merely as an expedient to stay within this ceiling. Thus, as a logical matter, and though I am a staunch capitalist who is heavily invested in stocks; I end up siding with the liberals on the environmental issue; I end up siding with the populists and nativists on the immigration issue; and on the issue of population control, its anyone's guess as to who characteristically opposes such ideas more, liberals or conservatives."

The primary unifying principle and common dimension to all of the views stated in the conservative's argument is the perception of self-interest mediated through the standpoint of the whole social system. If one genuinely attempts to look at the big picture over the long term, one can easily see that as global population increases, the availability of resources will come under pressure, despite any significant gains in productivity made possible by future technological advances. Similarly, one can see that population growth means that depletable resources like fossil fuels will be consumed at a faster rate. As resources like fossil fuels become more scarce, profits for multinational corporations may still continue to increase over the short term. But, costs for consumer purchases will rise as well, as the scarcity of certain natural resources exerts upward pressure on prices. Thus, the conservative's argument concedes, however reluctantly, that continuing growth is a double edged sword.

Again, we recruit the conservative's view: "I can see that competition for scarce resources will intensify and may easily adversely impact the quality of life for me and my children. I also become inclined to believe that markets can expand more with the present population base, merely by increasing living standards of those who are already here, than by adding to their total numbers. By preserving resources for long term use, any possibility of eventual collapse from over-utilization/depletion can be forestalled. The idea of control by the state to achieve such noble ends, merely as a matter of principle, is not anathema to me, nor should it be. I can see the good of establishing an absolute and unbreachable population ceiling. The ceiling could be achieved domestically by strict controls on immigration, and by tax incentives to discourage large families. Compliance should not be totally voluntary and should be tied to a system of incentives and penalties. For, like most people, I am not inclined to make such sacrifices to benefit the community unless I am reasonably sure that everyone else will be so inclined."

Conclusion
An effective population management program is needed both to protect the environment and to sustain long term economic viability. The need to contain population growth can even be viewed as a national defense priority. If population increases place enough pressure on our resources, national defense will thereby be imperiled. The cycle of rising population, rising productivity, and rising levels of resource consumption will eventually be broken one way or another. The cycle will most likely be broken when certain depletable resources approach "depletion," or when the cost of their extraction and production makes them prohibitively expensive (along with all the products which depend on these resources for their manufacture). Once this occurs, standards of living will decline significantly, in spite of continuing increases in productivity made possible by technological advances. Thus, if we do not soon embark on an aggressive program of population control, we will experience a significant decline both in standards of living and in quality of life. This decline will take place concurrently with technological advances which, under different circumstances, would promise to greatly improve our quality of life and standard of living. Alternatively, we can break the runaway consumption-production cycle in a way that involves much more modest sacrifices; namely, through population control.

Section Summary
Net-Centrism offers a comprehensive alternative to liberal and conservative ideas of the best way to achieve the public interest. Many liberal policies call on conservatives to give up something. Conversely, many conservative policies call on liberals to give up something. Net-Centrism distributes costs more or less equally, and calls upon all to give up something for the long term benefit of the social system. In its view, such sacrifices will eventually pay rich dividends for everyone. Failing to make such sacrifices will eventually impose unbearable costs on everyone.

Individual sacrifice, especially the sacrifice of individual liberties to achieve a common good, is not a popular theme with either voters or politicians. Unfortunately, in a society which places overwhelming stress on the assertion and expansion of individual liberties, individuals tend to be blinded to the cause and effect relationships between the exercise of these freedoms and their own quality of life. Blame for social problems is shifted elsewhere, as it is politically incorrect (to liberals and conservatives alike) to suggest that certain fundamental social, economic, or political problems might be tied to a particular excess of personal freedom. It is considered political suicide to offer people a cure for their social ills if that cure entails a treatment which is the least bit distasteful, not to mention painful. In fact, there is little doubt that personal freedoms have extended into a dysfunctional range in a number of areas. Such freedoms might not have been dysfunctional when they were first recognized as individual rights, but merely due to their exercise over time, and the resultant changes in our social and physical environment, they have become so.

All of our most basic freedoms involve trade-offs. Anytime I am persuaded that I should give up certain freedoms, it should only be with the expectation that I will receive freedoms which I will value more than those I give up. The greatest freedom that anyone can have is the freedom from suffering. Regrettably, it appears quite likely that the continued exercise of some of our current freedoms is paving the way for our future suffering, or for that of our descendants. Sadly, unless we place necessary constraints on our reproductive behavior, the era of massive suffering and death which most of us (including many historians) thought ended with World War II, may not yet be over. Resource depletion and population pressures have historically led to wars. Thusfar, our society has failed to come to grips with a fundamental contradiction which could threaten its very existence in years to come. On the one hand, we have a seemingly unquenchable thirst for economic growth, consumer goods, and a high standard of living. On the other hand, we have finite resources.

In the final analysis, freedoms must be considered in the context of the dividends they pay in the way of other freedoms. If, as a matter of law, I give up the freedom to enter my neighbor's yard and take his possessions. I receive an enormous dividend from this small sacrifice of freedom. I gain bigger freedoms in return. All of my neighbors are deprived of their freedom to enter my yard and take my possessions. Similarly, we should only be willing to give up those freedoms which may reasonably be expected to substantially enhance our quality of life. But, when such freedoms are identified, we should be willing to give them up, if only for the sake of improving our children's quality of life. Absolute reproductive freedom is a case in point.

PART SEVEN: SELECTED STATEMENTS OF NET-CENTRISM
The following section contains several summary statements of key aspect of Net-Centrist ideology, or if you prefer, principal aspects of the "Xenophyte" philosophy. Each summary statement can be assigned a number that corresponds to a location on the left-right scale, or the ideological continuum. The hypothetical scale is numbered one through eleven. The ends of the scale correspond to the extreme liberal point of view (number 1 on the scale) and the extreme conservative point of view (number 11 on the scale). The middle of the scale (number 6), corresponds to the pure centrist, or neutral position. The number assigned to the summary statement indicates the net score of the summary statement, or where the summary statement falls in relation to the left, the right and the center. Note that for purposes of this list, there is no distinction between a pure centrist position, which may not entail a real view on the particular issue, and one which is arrived at through a calculation in which the liberal and conservative elements happen to cancel one another out (a synthetic view). As stated, numbers 1 and 11 correspond to extreme liberal and conservative views, respectively. Numbers 2 and 10 correspond to less extreme views of the left and the right. Numbers 3 and 9 correspond to strong liberal and conservative views. Numbers 4 and 8 correspond to more moderate views, but views which can still be identified with either the left or the right. Numbers 5 and 7 are only weakly associated with either the left or the right respectively, and are more closely associated with a centrist view. Number 6 is the neutral or pure centrist point.

How Net Scores on Summary Statements are Determined
The following examples illustrate how a net ideological score, or approximate location along the liberal and conservative continuum, is assigned to each of the summary statements. In EXAMPLE 2: Population Management-Environmental Protection Nexus above, a number of important considerations must enter into the calculus used to determine the net score. The idea that the individual should submit to discipline and not do anything adverse to the general welfare can no more be claimed by liberals than it can by conservatives. Both liberals and conservatives espouse different ways of arriving at the general interest, and given the correct circumstances, both would require the individual to sacrifice for the collective benefit. Hence, the idea of personal sacrifice, standing alone, is neutral. But the idea that government should interfere in such a traditionally hallowed province of personal activity as the determination of family size, would seem to represent an unprecedented and highly intrusive statist measure which would send the policy to the far left of the scale. But, the determination of its final score must take into account a number of likely future events, including likely changes in public receptivity to the policy. Such receptivity is largely a function of the perceived need for the policy and the perceived seriousness of the threat which the otherwise intrusive statist measure is intended to remedy. In wartime and times of crisis generally, a measure which might be perceived as statist and far to the left can be cast in the more acceptable light of civic duty, and necessary personal sacrifice. What was potentially seen by the public as an unwarranted statist measure thus becomes a more ideologically neutral measure. Such measures have much of their sting taken away by the public's realization of their necessity, and by the corresponding willingness of the vast majority to make sacrifices to achieve a common good. In this case, the score assigned to population control would be conditional upon the public's eventual realization of the threats posed by over-population. Despite such appealing logic, based on probable future events, we will nonetheless factor in current attitudes towards the policy and assign it a score of four points to the left. For, if such population control measures were proposed today, they would be perceived as a highly intrusive, statist measures. The fact that compliance with the proposed measures will be optional (though not without tax penalties), and that non compliance will not result in the assessment of criminal penalties, will serve to move the policy two points towards the center. Thus, the net score of this summary statement/policy recommendation is approximately two points to the left of center, for a net score of 4.

In a more abbreviated illustration of the method used to assign an ideological location or net score to these summary statements, consider the policy on social welfare. The policy advocated in the summary statement dealing with social welfare calls for a liberal social welfare safety net. At this point, assign it 3 points to the left for strong liberal, but not radically liberal. (Radical or unprecedented liberal policy would be assigned a score of 4 or 5 points to the left.) To ameliorate the leftist position of the policy, there is a call for work requirements for all benefit recipients. Such requirements are more closely associated with moderates and conservatives. Hence, the policy is moved two points to the right of center. Thus, the net score for the summary statement on social welfare is 5, or 1 point to the left of center.

Social Welfare Policy (Net score of 5)
Though the nation is currently enjoying strong economic conditions, we should not expect these conditions to continue indefinitely. At some point in the not too distant future, there will be a need for a sound social welfare policy to provide material support for those thrown out of work by an economic slowdown. At the same time, the need will exist to prevent starving the private sector of jobs creating capital. In other words, we must have a social welfare policy in place which does not threaten to bankrupt the private sector with oppressive taxation on the one hand, and which does not threaten the unemployed with starvation on the other. The cornerstone of such a policy should include work requirements for those receiving public benefits, in return for adequate benefits (i.e. a living wage). If necessary, create a civilian public works corps, provided it does meaningful work for which there is a large measure of public support.

Criminal Penalties Policy (Net score of 8)
Under a system which provides adequate social welfare measures (such as that which is advocated), the culpability of the criminal increases, as does the legitimacy of harsh penalties.

Population Control Policy (Net score of 4)
Our quality of life and the quality of our environment are intimately linked to our numbers. The earth has a definite "carrying capacity" and there is every reason to believe that this capacity has been reached or exceeded. In the United States, we can probably accommodate no more than about 25 million additional people without imposing unacceptable costs on ourselves and future generations. These costs can be measured in terms of quality of life and environmental degradation. Establish an absolute population ceiling of 300 million (we are currently at about 275 million). Encourage sound domestic population policy through a system of tax incentives designed to favor small families (under 4 children per family). Encourage a responsible population policy globally by linking it to foreign aid.

Environmental Protection Policy (Net score of 5)
There is good environmental policy and there is radical-emotional based policy. Two of the best non-radical measures of protecting the environment are population control and recycling. Environmental causes have often been denied mainstream acceptability because they are so often championed by the idealistic and the uninformed. Nonetheless, an environmental policy slightly left of center is advocated, principally to afford endangered species greater protection. The establishment of an agency to regulate captive breeding programs for endangered species would be a good idea, if it made permits for owning and importing endangered species for breeding purposes more easily obtainable by qualified individuals.

PART EIGHT: THE NET-CENTRISM-THIRD PARTY NEXUS
Overview
Finding itself torn between undesirable alternatives, the American electorate is in constant flux. On the one hand there is the Democratic party, attempting to pass itself off as centrist, while still burdened with hard core liberals who have no other place to call home. On the other hand is the Republican party, stigmatized by its own unwanted stepchildren, the religious right. The need for a third party which speaks to the mainstream and which is not burdened by the extremes of the left or the right is manifest. But until relatively recently, the prospects for third party viability have been dim. Why is a third party more likely to be successful at this time? To begin with, a third party is only as good as its ideology and the public demand for its ideology. Third parties have characteristically met with little success because they had little to offer in the way of ideologies that the vast majority of Americans could find acceptable.

Reasons for The Failure of Third Parties
In the United States, minor political parties, also known as "third" parties, have historically enjoyed very little success in their attempts to compete in a traditionally two party system. Among the more commonly cited reasons for the failure of third parties are inadequate financial resources and the institutional barriers posed by state and federal election laws. By making it difficult for third party candidates to get on the ballot in most state and federal elections, such laws prevent both the proliferation of third party candidates and the further fragmentation of the popular vote. Hence, these election laws may actually tend to benefit democracy "under normal circumstances." But while election laws are an important barrier to third party viability, the failure of third parties cannot be blamed on these laws entirely. Third parties have failed to mount a successful challenge to the major parties for reasons which are wholly unrelated to the institutional obstacles which they must face from a two party system which is generally hostile to their existence. Perhaps the single most important reason for the failure of third parties is doctrinal, or ideological failure. In short, third parties have failed to advance a set of ideas which the vast majority of Americans would find acceptable, and which they would prefer over the ideas advanced by the major parties.

Some Characteristics of Third Parties
Most third parties have a membership which is small and politically insignificant. Many third parties do not even offer candidates for office. Rather, their organizational mission is simply to keep the torch burning for ideas which they believe are just temporarily out of favor. In V.O. Key's system of classification, these parties are known as "continuing doctrinal parties." They continue they exist, on paper at least, but they have little or no effect on the political destiny of the nation. However, their lack of mainstream acceptability does not result so much from the scarcity of candidates willing to run under third party labels as it does from the inadequacies of their doctrines. Typically, these parties espouse ideas which are so extreme that they stand little chance of ever gaining a mass following. In order to become viable, the fundamental challenge for a third party to overcome is at the level of its doctrine, or its ideology. Third party viability depends on doctrinal viability.

Environmental Changes Affecting Third Party Viability
In recent years a number of important changes in the social and political environment have increased the chances for third party viability. First, there are indications that the segment of the population which is dissatisfied with the political process is growing. One of the most immediate indications of this rising level of dissatisfaction is the growing pool of non-voters and independent voters. Presumably, third parties can more easily recruit members from both of these groups. A second important development which has tended to increase third party viability is the rising general level of education. The number of individuals who have had the benefit of a secondary education has substantially increased over recent decades. It should be noted that higher education does not necessarily or immediately translate into an increase in the public's level of political sophistication; nor does it automatically result in an increase in the public's interest in politics. But inevitably, as people become more educated, they also become better able to understand the complex world of politics. And at some stage, presumably, a higher proportion of them will take a serious interest in political affairs. They might actually begin to read books, journal articles, and relatively demanding websites like this one. But, at the present time, more education has simply translated into a greater "superficial" interest in politics, especially among the 18-35 year old age bracket. Nonetheless, this increase in superficial interest in politics is a necessary step in the process of growing political sophistication.

As a greater proportion of the public begins to achieve a higher level of political sophistication, it becomes better equipped to see through the rhetorical ruses and ideological deceptions employed by both of the major parties. Being better able to see through the limitations of the polar ideologies associated with the major parties (liberalism and conservatism), more people become alienated from the major parties and begin to seek alternative parties and ideologies which they believe will better serve their long term interests. And, once its level of political sophistication has reached a certain point, the public actually becomes more capable of conceptualizing important issues in "synthetic" and non-polar terms. This development in particular makes it more likely that people will seek alternatives to the major parties, which continue to operate on the basis of antiquated liberal and conservative frameworks. Such developments represent important preconditions which tend to favor the prospects of a specific type of third party; namely, one which is based upon some form of ideological synthesis. However, in all fairness, alternative interpretations should also be examined.

The record numbers of independents and nonvoter can also be read as a sign that the vast majority of Americans are content and are merely exercising a "healthy disinterest" toward what they regard as the increasingly distasteful world of politics. After all, in a time when so much economic opportunity exists, only those with second rate abilities would be attracted to a career in politics, or so the common belief goes. But, there are at least two important reasons for suspecting that the increasing rate of voter non-participation may be largely due to other reasons. First, as the major political parties have become more polarized, or as they have become more consolidated along lines of liberal and conservative ideologies, the strength of their rank and file members' allegiance to them has tended to weaken. Presumably, this weakened allegiance is due to the increasing "ideological distance" between the parties' rank and file members on the one hand, and the parties' core activists and elites on the other. Secondly, as ideological polarization of the political process has intensified, popular alienation with the electoral process appears to have grown. This has had the effect of triggering substantial defections from the major parties. These defections have caused the ranks of independents and nonvoter to swell. The close correlations between the growing ideological polarization of the major parties (as measured by congressional votes along party lines), rising numbers of defections, and the rising numbers of independents and nonvoter cannot be easily discounted. It would seem that the major political parties are suffering from a problem which has historically been more closely associated with the smaller continuing doctrinal parties. Specifically, by catering to the more extreme views of their unrepresentative core activists, or by subscribing to these more extreme views themselves, the elites of the major parties have alienated many of their rank and file followers who have traditionally held more moderate and synthetic views. In effect, the major parties are exhibiting some of the same signs of doctrinal failure that have been historically more closely associated with the minor, doctrinal parties. Thus, many voters have defected from the major parties because these parties espouse ideas which they regard as unrepresentative and not in the nation's best interest. All of these conditions converge to increase the potential of third party viability.

Assuming that the conditions which favor third party viability have improved, what might be the minimal criteria for a third party doctrine to become viable? Quite obviously, the doctrine would have to be more synthetic (less polar) than the leading alternatives. Moreover, it would have to match the prevailing views of the vast majority on most issues. These criteria presume that mass publics currently hold a synthetic ideology which is less binding and more flexible than the polar ideologies of liberalism and conservatism. These criteria further presume that by means of a synthetic belief system, individuals are better able to assimilate various ideas which are currently more or less closely associated with either the left or the right. And finally, these criteria presume that the general public has chosen a synthetic ideology because it believes such a belief system will better serve its long term interests than will the polar ideologies.

Numerous attitude surveys indicate that the vast majority of Americans are not strongly liberal or strongly conservative across all issues. Rather, they tend to hold a complex mixture of liberal and conservative views, based upon their perception of self interest. For most people, holding such a mixed bag of views is not a source of "dissonance" or the psychological discomfort that results from holding inconsistent beliefs. For typically, most people do not have enough formal knowledge of the principles of liberal or conservative ideologies to serve as grounds for dissonance in the first place. Hence, within their own conceptual frameworks, holding such ideologically disparate views does not necessarily entail any inconsistencies. For the vast majority of Americans, their potentially conflicting views (liberal beliefs on some issues and conservative beliefs on others) are integrated at the level of "perception of self interest." In other words, within their own conceptual frameworks, these views are perfectly consistent. These views only appear inconsistent within the conceptual frameworks used by ideologues who demand exclusive commitment to their favored set of ideological principles.

Ideological Failure of the Major Parties
A major reason for the failure of major parties to adopt a broad eclectic ideology and the corresponding tendency to be associated with the left and the right is thought to stem from an inability to integrate certain liberal and conservative principles or issue positions to form a new and internally consistent whole. Because neither of the major parties have had much success at synthesizing the ideologies of liberalism and conservatism, they have been consistently unable to endorse a liberal stand on one issue, and a conservative stand on another issue, without appearing inconsistent. Similarly, they have been unable to propose "synthetic policy alternatives" without threatening their base of coalitional support, which tends to be organized along polar ideological lines. Hence, both of the major parties have become ideologically constrained, polarized, and unrepresentative in their public policy choices. The vast majority of the core activists of both parties tend to be issue group activists. In other words, they represent or are closely affiliated with interest groups. The Democratic party has become a bastion of special interests on the left while the Republican party has provided a home to special interests on the right. Correspondingly, the strongest supporters of these parties are in many ways unrepresentative of mainstream, majoritarian thinking.

Because the internal political process of the major parties is so polarized along ideological lines, it fails to present voters with an adequate range of policy alternatives. By attempting to either appease or appeal to their most enthusiastic and committed supporters (who, not coincidentally, are often their more radical and extreme supporters), candidates of the major parties succeed in alienating individuals who hold more complex, reasonable, and synthetic views on most major issues; i.e. liberal on one issue and conservative on another. Consequently, the public comes to regard the entire political process as illegitimate, and participation in that process declines.

Political elites of both major parties tend to have more knowledge of abstract political principles, or the formal content of liberal and conservative ideologies. Consequently, one might expect them to be under greater pressure to maintain ideological consistency in their views across issues. In running for office, candidates of both major parties also have strong political incentives for maintaining ideological consistency across issues. For by maintaining such consistency, it is easier for these candidates to build the coalitional support they need for re-election. Wearing the badge of either liberal or conservative has distinct advantages within the power structures of the Democratic and Republican parties, respectively. These advantages become apparent when one is trying to gain the emotional support of the more radical, energetic, and vital core activists of both major parties. Because political motivation is such a valuable commodity in an era of widespread disinterest in politics, candidates from both major parties can generally be counted on to embrace certain brands of ideological extremism, in order to secure support from their more motivated and ideologically extreme constituents. For its part, the less extreme rank and file of the major parties can be generally counted on to quietly accept whatever choices of candidates or issue positions which the elites and activists select for them. Consequently, the political process becomes further polarized and unrepresentative.

Ideological unrepresentativeness of the major parties is related to a number of trends in American politics, including dealignment, decline in voter participation, and the concomitant increase in those who identify themselves as independents. These trends correlate with both increasing levels of formal education in the general public and with the mass dissemination of information about key political issues by the media. For those with the time, ability and motivation, careful processing of this information can easily lead to the adoption of views which are not reflected in the issue positions advocated by the major parties. In short, it can lead them to adopt a synthetic doctrine.

Design Parameters for a Viable Third Party Doctrine
The form and content of a potentially viable third party doctrine is determined by a number of practical and theoretical considerations. To stand the best chance of gaining mass support, the doctrine would have to strike a responsive chord with those who are most alienated from the political process, particularly those who have distanced themselves from the major parties due to polarization and the resulting perception of unrepresentativeness. The doctrine would also have to closely parallel the belief systems of mass publics more generally. In short, it would have to be more synthetic than the beliefs of the party elites and core activists of the major parties. Its platform and core principles would have to contain a mixture of policy points associated with both the left and the right, which closely coincided with the views of the majority. Alternatively, on those issues where the majority has no views, or only weakly formed views, the doctrine would have to be cogent enough to persuade them. Admittedly, these are demanding parameters for any doctrine to have to meet. But meeting these parameters is the only thing that will give a third party a fighting chance in the United States today. And, in an environment in which the aforementioned dynamics favoring third party development are operating, a fighting chance may be all that a third party needs to become viable.

The form and content of a third party doctrine must also take a number of additional considerations into account. To begin with, the issue positions contained in the doctrine must be dictated by where the preponderance of the evidence appears to lie. We might reasonably expect that, depending on the issue, either conservatives, liberals, or moderates might have the more convincing arguments and the preponderance of the evidence on their side. Neither liberals nor conservatives have a monopoly on the truth. This being the case, the doctrine that would have the greatest chance of challenging the hegemony of the major parties would have to be some form of synthesis. That is, it must contain some combination of issue positions which are currently more or less closely associated with either the left, the right, or the center. The doctrine must also be designed to compensate for both the liberal and conservative biases which are known to color the public debate surrounding these issues. And, as much as possible, the doctrine must coincide with the underlying sentiments of a majority of those who are currently alienated from the political process, by virtue of its polarization. For in some cases, the sentiments of a particular group actually do "incidentally" coincide with the best interests of the nation.

For a third party to have a chance of long term viability, its doctrine should be both comprehensive and consistent. Correspondingly, the doctrine should address the most important social, economic, political and legal issues confronting the nation. To achieve internal consistency, there should be logical linkages between issue positions within the doctrine, such that the doctrine points to conservative positions on certain issues, even as it points to liberal positions on other issues.

Finally, the criteria for selecting issues to be addressed by a third party ideology must be a fundamental concern. The chief criteria for selecting issues to be included in the party's core doctrine include: The issues should have received extensive long term press coverage, and relatedly, they should rank higher in terms of public concern than alternative issues. The length and complexity of the basic issue argument is also an important consideration. If the argument cannot be expressed in a concise summary statement, then it is more likely to become politically irrelevant. There is of course no guarantee that such a broad, eclectic, issue based ideology would attract a sufficient number of supporters for a third party to achieve viability. However, this is the strategy that is most likely to work in the current political environment.

PART NINE: CORRESPONDENCE, MEMBERSHIP, CONTRIBUTIONS

CORRESPONDENCE
Questions and comments concerning this site should be directed to: ava333@mindspring.com.

MEMBERSHIP
A.C.C. membership is automatic, upon receipt of contributions of $10 or more.

CONTRIBUTIONS
If you found this site interesting, if you believe in its importance, and if you would like to see more sites like it in the future, please make a small contribution.

The A.C.C. is not yet classified as a 501c3 organization and contributions are not yet tax deductible.

NET-CENTRISM: A NEW IDEOLOGY FOR A NEW MILLENNIUM